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PREFACE 
The Is lamic Republ ic o f I r a n i s a very impor tan t o i l 
producing coun t ry . I t owns n e a r l y 9.5 per cent o f the t o t a l 
proven o i l reserves o f the wo r l d and we l l over 13.5 percent 
o f t h e OPEC h o l d i n g s . I n a w o r l d where o i l s t i l l 
c o n s t i t u t e s near l y o n e - f o u r t h o f the t o t a l pr imary energy 
c o n s u m p t i o n and t h e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f b o t h t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l l y develooed emd less developed c o u n t r i e s i s so 
c r i t i c a l l y dependent on the hydrocarbons, the o i l i ndus t r y of 
the s i ze o f I r a n w i l l con t inue t o be very impor tan t . 
I n I rem's domestic c o n t e x t , the o i l i n d u s t r y has even 
g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e . D e s p i t e r u t h l e s s and u n m i n d f u l l 
e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the o i l resources by f o r e i g n o i l companies, 
what ever development i s seen i n I r a n t oday i s l a r g e l y 
because o f the o i l i n d u s t r y . I t has tyeen descr ibed as " the 
lead ing sec to r " and the "engine o f growth" by most o f the 
e x p e r t s o f the I r a n i a n economy. U n t i l t h e e x t r a - o r d i n a r y 
c o n d i t i o n s created by the e a r l y days of r e v o l u t i o n and l a t e r 
by the I r a q - I r a n war, the o i l expo r t s c o n s t i t u t e d near l y 97 
per cent o f the t o t a l I r a n i a n e x p o r t s , 80 per cent o f the 
t o t a l f o r e i g n exchange r e c e i p t s and almost 74 per cent o f the 
t o t a l revenues o f the government. 
The main o b j e c t i v e o f t he present study i s t o evo lve a 
genera l unders tand ing o f t he o i l i n d u s t r y i n I r a n since 
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1973 in the context of the Iranian economy. In doing so an 
e f f o r t has been made to study a) the h i s t o r i c a l background of 
the o i l i ndus t ry b) the s t r u c t u r a l changes at var ious 
points of time c) the o i l pol icy of I ran o i l in the pre-
and post - revo lu t ion period d) trends in product ion, exports 
and revenues and, e) the importance o i l sec to r f o r the 
economy of I r an . The study is based mainly on the avai lable 
secondary sources and the o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n o f the 
government of I r a n , OPEC and the UN. 
Keeping in view the above object ive chapter I seeks to 
p resen t a geo-economic p r o f i l e o f I r a n . Besides the 
geographical se t t i ng of the country, some aspects of natural 
resources endowment, population and the manpower develooment 
have been studied to provide the necessary backdroo to the 
p a t t e r n o f economic deve lopment . The purpose o f t h i s 
exercises is to provide a proper context to the study of the 
o i l industry which is the our main theme. 
Chapter I I provides a h i s t o r i c a l background of the 
I ranian o i l industry from 1901 to 1973. Chemge i s continuous 
process and without an understanding of the past i t would be 
d i f f i c u l t to understanding the nature and the funct ioning of 
the indust ry in the recent t imes . Concession agreements 
granted to fore ign o i l companies, the s t ruc tu ra l changes in 
the industry and the f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the o i l 
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agreements constitute various parts of the historical 
background. 
Chapter III, deals with the nature and developments of 
oil industry in Iran from 1973-1978. It covers the era of the 
monarchic rule and also coincides with the period of the 
oil boom. Various changes concerning the structure of the 
industry, the pattern oil production, exports and income 
besides the linkages that the oil sector has with the rest of 
the Iranian economy have been studies in it his chapter. 
In chapter IV the focus is on the developments in the 
oil industry since the Islamic revolution of 1979. In this 
part an effort has been made to examine the new oil nolicy of 
Iran and the structural change that the oil industry has 
undergone due to the social amd economic philosophy of the 
revolution. Since a large part of the reference oerioa of 
this chapter is covered by the Iraq-Iran war, the war dasiage 
to the oil industry, both upstream and downstream, has also 
been studied. Lastly the role of the oil industry in 
sustaining the Iranian economy and the war efforts have been 
briefly discussed. In the end an over all summary and some of 
the main conclusion emerging out of the study have been 
recorded. 
For the completion of this work I am very grateful to 
the former Director of the Centre of West Asian Studies, 
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CHAPTER-I 
IRAN: A GEO-ECONOMIC PROFILE 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T h i s c h a p t e r has been p r e p a r e d w i t h an o v e r a l l 
o b j e c t i v e t o present a geographical and economic p r o f i l e of 
I r a n . The O i l i n d u s t r y or any o ther sec to r o f the economy 
can not be s tud ied i n i s o l a t i o n from the r e s t o f t he economy. 
I n I r a n the o i l i n d u s t r y holds a very spec ia l p o s i t i o n . I t 
i s t he l ead ing s e c t o r o f t he c o u n t r y and has v e r y s t r o n g 
forward and backward l inkages w i th the o the r sec to rs o f the 
economy. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , necessary to have an idea about 
the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o f the economy and i t s p a t t e r n o-^  growth 
and development. 
Keeping i n v iew t he above o b j e c t i v e , t h i s c h a p t e r 
beg ins w i t h a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e b r o a d g e o g r a p h i c a l 
f e a t u r e s o f I r a n and i t s resource endowment w i t h s p e c i a l 
r e f e r e n c e t o o i 1 . A demographic p r o f i l e has a l s o been 
p r e p a r e d w h i c h d e a l s w i t h t h e p o p u l a t i o n d y n a m i c s , 
occupa t i ons o f t h e p e o p l e , t h e employment p a t t e r n and the 
manpower development. F i n a l l y , the re i s a d i scuss ion about 
the economy of I r a n and the developmental e f f o r t s t ha t were 
i n i t i a t e d dur ing the F i f t h F ive Year Plan (1973-1978) and the 
F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n ( 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 3 ) f o r m u l a t e d by t h e 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y government. 
The Geographical Set t ing: 
The Islamic Republic of I ran is located in South-West 
Asia and covers an area of some 1,648,000 sq.km. (628.000 
square mi les ) , extending approximately 2,300 km. from north 
t o s o u t h . I r a n shares i t s b o r d e r s on t h e n o r t h w i t h 
Azarbai jan and Turkmanestan ( f o r m e r l y p a r t of the Sov ie t 
Union), (1740 km). On the East with Afghanistan (850 km), and 
Pakistan (830 km). On the south i t has the Persian Gulf and 
the Gulf of Oman and on the west i t is bordered by I raq (1280 
km) and Turkey (470 km). I r a n ' s nor thern water boundary 
(Caspian sea) i s 640 km and the southern water boundary 
(Persians Gulf and the Gulf of Oman) is 1880 Km.^ I ran l i e s 
between la t i tude 25° and 40° N and longitude 44° and 63°. 
The country is surrounded from almost a l l sides by mountain 
ranges. Two-third of I ran is a plateau which stretches from 
the Indu-River to the v a l l e y of the T i g r i s , and from the 
Steppes of Russia to the Persian Gulf . Area wise, I ran is the 
second largest country a f t e r Saudi Arabia in South-west Asia. 
However i t i s by f a r the most populated count ry o f the 
reg ion . I t s t o t a l populat ion in 1989 was e s t i m a t e d a t 54 
m i l l i o n . ^ 
1. Islamic Republic of I r a n , Plan and Budget Organization 
S t a t i s t i c a l Centre of I r a n , A S t a t i s t i c a l Ref lect ion of 
the I .R. of I r a n . No.6. 
2. U.N. Demographic Year Book. 1991. 
I r an 's geographical posit ion makes i t a bridge for 
communication by land between f a r eastern parts of Asia on 
the one hand and the lands of mediterranean and Europe on the 
other. I ran occupies a high plateau ly ing more than 1500 
feet above sea level and rimmed on a l l sides by Mountains 
whose average e levat ion is more than 6,500 f t . 
The lowest lands are known as Karun r i v e r basin along 
the border of I r a q . The country's major mountain range, the 
Zagros, stretches from I ran 's north-western boundary to the 
Makran mountain in the south-east. 
The Alborz Mountains (Reshteh-ye-Kuhhaeye Alborz) run 
along the southern shore of the Caspian sea to aeet the 
border ranges of Khorasan in the east . The i n t e r i o r plateau 
of I ran is pa r t l y covered by a remarkable s a l t swsunp (Kavir) 
and apart ly by loose sand or stone (Dast ) . These vast desert 
regions of I ran stretch across the plateau from the north-
west close to Tehran and Qom for a distance of nearly 800 
m i l e s t o t h e s o u t h e a s t and beyond t h e f r o n t i e r . 
Approximately one-sixth of the t o t a l area of I ran is barren 
desert . 
The c e n t r a l p l a t e a u o f I r a n because of c l i m a t i c 
conditions, and swamp area are la rge ly uninhabited. I t has 
very l imited agr icu l tu ra l a c t i v i t y , but i t is extremely r ich 
in underground natural resources, which are very valuable. 
The to ta l area of Dasht-e-Kavir and Dasht-e- lut is 366,000 
square ki lometers. For administ rat ive purpose at present Iran 
i s d i v i d e d i n t o 24 p r o v i n c e s , 195 t o w n s h i p s and 498 
d i s t r i c t s . 
Khuzestan in the south west i s the province wi th the 
la rges t area of p o t e n t i a l l y a rab le l and . I t a l s o con ta ins 
most of the country 's proven o i l and associated natural gas 
r e s o u r c e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o hyd roca rbons , Khuzestan has 
i m p o r t a n t d e p o s i t s o f i r o n , o r e , copper , l e a d , s a l t , 
manganese and chromium. In I ran there are few major r i ve rs . 
Karun is the widest and only navigable r i ve r w i th the 850 km 
long waterway which r ises in the Zagros and f lows south into 
the Persian Qulf, Sefid-Rud i s the longest r i ve r which flows 
in to the Caspian sea. 
On the sea side the Persian Gulf has a tremendous 
amount o f s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t he p o l i t i c a l and economic 
geography of I r an . I t provides Iran with a maritime linkage 
through the Stra ight of Hormuz and the sea of Oman wi th the 
rest of the Globe. 
Climate 
The climate of I ran is one of great extremes. I ran 's 
complex c l imate ranges from s u b t r o p i c a l t o subpo la r , but 
I r a n ' s natural climate may be characterized as semi-arid and 
cont inenta l . The whole country l i e s in the north temperate 
zone. I ranian temperature is much colder in winter and hotter 
in summer. Degree of humidity, r a i n f a l l and wind is d i f fe rent 
f rom one r e g i o n t o another r e g i o n . There e x i s t s wide 
var ia t ion in the temperature of I r a n , ranging from 50°C in 
Khuzestan located on the northern coast of the Persian Gulf 
in the South-east to a low of - 25*^ C in Azarbaijan in the 
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north-west. 
Precipitation fluctuations are also very wide in Iran. 
They vary from one region to another region and also from one 
year to another year. The minimum rainfall per year is in the 
south-east (about 2 inch) and meo(imum in the costal region of 
the Caspian sea (about 78 inches). The annual average 
rainfall for the whole country is about 16 inches.^ More 
than half of Iran's surface area is wasted low and 
uninhabited salt deserts. Approximately one tenth of Iran is 
forest, the most extensive forest ranges are found in the 
Caspiem region. About 8 percent of the country's land area is 
arable and another 27 percent is suitable for grazing. 
3. Fisher, W.B. (ed.). The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol.1, 
Caunbridge, 1968, page 231-232. 
4. Ibid., p.234 
2 . Mineral Resources 
011 Resources 
Oil is found in three regions of I r a n . In the north i t 
is located near Qom; in the southern region near Bushgsm and 
Kuh-i-Mand extending upto Salman and S i r r i offshore f i e l d s , 
and a l l along the south-western region. However, i t is the 
south-western part of Iran ly ing on the western f lanks of the 
Zagros mountains tha t is most important for o i l . This area is 
also generally known as the Khuzestan region. 
In the fol lowing parts we shal l discuss some sa l ient 
g e o g r a p h i c a l f e a t u r e s of th e s o u t h - w e s t e r n r e g i o n s in 
re la t ion to o i l resources. 
This region, most part of which l i e s in the Khuzestan 
province, has the l a r g e s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n of o i l in I r a n . 
Topographically i t is a mountainous region with a series of 
large a n t i c l i n a l r idges. 
The o i l reserves of the Khuzestem region are associated 
with a geological process in which marine and other animal 
organisms of 01 igocene-Miocene age got c o l l e c t e d in the 
f loors of the seas and with the gradual coverings of various 
sediments remained isolated from outer environment. In the 
absence of a i r these organic materials got transformed into 
small par t ic les of petroleum and with the increased pressure 
of further sedimentation over the ages, the min i -par t ic les of 
t h i s pe t ro leum got f u r t h e r squeezed and s h i f t e d i n t o 
depressions. In f a c t , i t i s the ex i s tence o f these t h i c k 
impermeable rock s t r uc tu res f o l l owed by porous l imestone 
rocks (genera l ly known as Asmari rocks) i n the Khuzestan 
region tha t I ran has been lucky t o possess o i l and gas 
deposits of such large magnitudes. The Asmari rock beds of 
t h i s region are sometimes as th ick as 300 meters and form an 
enviable rese rvo i r o f good q u a l i t y o f crude pet ro leum and 
natural gas. 
Another geographical feature , which provides a d i s t i n c t 
n a t u r a l advantage t o I r a n , i s t h a t a lmos t the e n t i r e 
Khuzestan region is composed of dome-shaped o i l structures 
(See Figure 1.1) some of these structures are considered to 
be the l a r g e s t o i l s t r u c t u r e s i n the w o r l d , sometimes 
measuring 20-30 ki lometers in length. This feature alongwith 
a number of other topograph ica l and l o c a t i o n a l f ea tu res 
places Iran in to a remarkable advantageous pos i t i on in terms 
o f e x t r a c t i o n o f t h e hydrocarbon r e s o u r c e s , t h e i r 
t r anspo r ta t i on and downstream o p e r a t i o n s . Some of these 
great advantages are b r i e f l y described below. 
A. As mentioned e a r l i e r , most of t he I r a n i a n o i l i s 
located in a s ingle region, i . e . the south western region. 
5. Fisher, W.B., The Middle East . A P h y s i c a l . Soc ia l and 
Regional Geography. Methuen & Co. , London, 1991, Page 
229. 
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FIGURE 1*1 
DOME SHAPED OIL STRUCTURE 
S O U R C E : nihtfjW.B, MWdU Eo»f,oPhytlcol, Socio! ond RtglonalGMQrophy P227 
This l oca t i ona l concent ra t ion makes the b u i l d i n g up of 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ve ry economical and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y 
manageable. The o i l in f ras t ruc tu re in i t s e l f i s extremely 
capi ta l intensive and in the mountain region l i k e the one in 
the Khuzestan province i t becomes even more expensive. Apart 
from the problem l i k e lay ing of roads and communication 
channels, the very movement of equipment, mempower emd other 
essential mater ials would have been much d i f f i c u l t i f the o i l 
deposits were spread over large areas away from each other. 
I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e g e o - s t r a t e g i c aspec ts are a l so 
important. In the event of an external th rea t , i t is easier 
and c o s t e f f e c t i v e t o defend l o c a l i s e d asse ts and 
i ns ta l l a t i ons than the scattered ones. 
B, Oi l in the Khuzestan region is found in dome-shaped 
s t ruc tures . In these structures o i l gets deposited through 
g rav i ta t iona l force in synclines ( the lower side of the dome 
l i k e s t r a t a ) . I n other type of s t r u c t u r e s t h i s k i n d of 
advantage i s not avai lable and even while the existence of 
o i l i s known i t is not possible to exp lo i t i t comnercially 
because i t i s not accumulated a t one p lace i n s u f f i c i e n t 
quan t i t i es . 
6. I b i d . , page 231 
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Further more, in dome-sheiped s t ruc ture ext ract ion of 
o i l i s fa r easier than in other types of s t ruc tures . Lesser 
number of wel ls are to be bored to take out the same amount 
of o i l .Normal ly two wel ls on e i ther side of one Ant ic l ine are 
enough t o e x t r a c t o i l . Th i s c o n s i d e r a b l y reduces the 
operational cost of d r i l l i n g , i n s t a l l a t i o n and maintenance. 
C. I n Khuzes tan , because o f the e x i s t e n c e o f the 
associated gas in very large quant i t ies , the pressure on o i l 
surface is qui te h igh. Once a well i s d r i l l e d , the o i l s tar ts 
gushing out due to in terna l pressure. Therefore in the region 
whi le ext ract ing o i l addi t ional pressure from out side which 
i s normally generated by i n j e c t i n g water or gas i s not 
required. 
D. The o i l deposits of I ran are not very deep as compared 
to the other areas. This also helps to a very great extent in 
lower per un i t cost of ex t rac t ion . Less d r i l l i n g requirements 
not only reduce the cost of tha t pa r t i cu la r operat ion but the 
overa l l maintenance i s also easier and cheaper. 
E. A very important advantage to I ran o i l industry is 
t ha t a l l i t s major o i l f i e l d s are l oca ted c lose t o the 
Pe rs ian Gu l f c o a s t . Both i n up -s t ream and down-stream 
operations t h i s proximity helps the country save a l o t of 
resources in terms of t ranspor ta t ion cost. In countr-es where 
o i l deposits are located far and wide, br ing ing cruce o i l to 
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the sea coast invo lves very heavy expend i t u re on l ay ing 
p ipe l ines, t he i r maintenance and secur i ty . The seune is true 
about the downstream a c t i v i t i e s such as r e f i ne r i es which have 
to cater to the expor t market. For domest ic purpose, of 
course, the crude o i l , gas and the processed products have to 
be carr ied to d i f f e r e n t locat ions in the country at an extra 
cost but t h i s kind of locat ional advantage is very important 
in exportat ion. 
F. Another natural advantage associated wi th the locat ion 
is that most of the I ran ian o i l l i es at a higher level in the 
Zagros mountains and f o r t ransport ing i t t o the nearby sea-
coast not much of pumping act ion is required. In most of the 
s e c t o r s o i l f l o w s down the p i p e l i n e because o f the 
grav i ta t iona l force i t s e l f . In other o i l countr ies of the 
Persian Gulf region a large number of pumping s ta t ions are 
required to br ing the crude o i l to the loading termina ls . 
Non-oil Mineral Resources 
I ran 's t o t a l mineral resource base i s much wider than 
what is general ly known. Although o i l and natura l gas are 
most important i n both quan t i t y and v a l u e , t h e count ry 
possesses an ex tens ive and a wide range o f o t h e r minera l 
resources a lso . According t o the M i n i s t e r o f Mines and 
Metals, in June 1988 there were 780 mines producing d i f f e ren t 
minerals other than o i l in I ran and nore than 73 thousand 
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people were employed in this sector. Apart from meeting the 
domestic industrial requirement, the non-oil minerals also 
help the country in obtaining much needed extra foreign 
exchange. In 1987-88 total non-oil mineral export valued at $ 
90.2 mn.^ For the sake of convenience, the position of only a 
few important minerals has been discussed below." 
1. Coal 
Most of the coal in Iran exists in the northern part of 
the country in the region of Alborz mountains. But coal 
fields, are also known in the eastern provinces near Kujidak 
fifty miles north of Kerman and mainly within the Tabas 
wedge. Coal reserves in Iran are estinated at 6,000 million 
tons but only one-third of it is being presently exploited. 
In 1985 coal production was 900,000 tons per year but this 
production was not sufficient even for domestic consumption 
and about 400,000 tons per year was being imported. 
2. Iron-Ore 
Iron-ore deposits have been observed in many parts of 
the country. Some of them between the southern slopes of the 
Alborz system and the north-eastern part of volcanic belt. 
7. Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa. 
1990 Issue, page, 439-440. 
8. Ibid. 
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but the major Iron-ore deposits are located in the Kerman and 
Yazd provinces in the central and south eastern part of Iran. 
In the Yazd province oil fields near Bafq are estimated to 
have a reserve of 600 million to 1000 million tons and the 
Chadormelo mines possess some 351 million tons of ore. 
3. Lead and Zinc 
The producing mines of lead and zinc in Iran are 
located along the volcanic belt of the Zagros mountains and 
in the Tabas wedge. The main concentration is at Bafq near 
Yazd, at Khomein and in the areas west of Isfahan. Some 
fields are located at Ravanj near Qom also. Together these 
produced 57.6 thousand metric tons of lead and zinc in 198-
87.9 
Apart from the existing locations, prospects ore 
recorded for minerals in the 'normal folding' of the Zagros 
mountain also. In order to utilize these resources for 
industrial development of the country there are proposals to 
construct a smelting unit in Zanjan with an annual capacity 
of 40,000 tons of lead and 70,000 tons of zinc. Plans also 
exist for a zinc plant at Bafq, of which the capacity will 
gradually rise to 24,000 tons per year. 
Ibid, page 446. 
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4. Copper 
Copper in the most important mineral resource of Iran 
after oil. Altogether the country has nearly 330 copper mines 
and their cumulative deposits are 16,00 million tons. The 
major copper deposits are located at Sarcheshmeh in the 
Kerman province and Birjand. The Sarcheshmeh fields alone 
have 12,000 million tons of copper which is the second 
largest deposit in the world. The copper output of Iran has 
risen from 40,000 tons in 1985-86 to 50,000 in just one year. 
It was planned to increase copper production further to its 
full capacity of 145,000 tons per year by 1890. 
5. Uranium 
Uranium is another importamt resource of Iran from both 
the economic and strategic point of view. In 1976 major 
uranium deposits were found in the northern and western 
regions of Iran. After the revolution in 1984, reserves of 
5000 tons were discovered in the Yazd province in the central 
part of I ram. 
Agricultural Resources 
The Persian Gulf region is generally identified with 
its vast oil resources. In Iran the oil sector is by far the 
most developed and important sector of the economy in <nany 
respects. But the importance of the oil sector should not be 
allowed to blur the fact that Iran also happens to be a 
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country with substantial agricultural resources. Infact, if 
oil resources are excluded, Iran looks like a pre-dominantly 
agricultural country even today. More than half of the total 
population of the country lives in rural areas and derives 
its subsistence from activities which in one way or the other 
are connected with agriculture and its allied activities. In 
terms of the economically active and employed population 
also, the agricultural sector stands out taller than other 
sectors of the economy (see table 1.1). 
Since the main purpose at the moment is not to discuss 
the agriculture of Iran in all its details, the focus will 
remain confined to the nature and extent of existing and 
potential agricultural resources of the country in the 
overall context of the resource endowment. Without a brief 
reference to agricultural resources and their role in the 
Iranian economy, any economic profile of the country will 
remain incomplete. 
TABLE 1.1 
LAND USE IN IRAN 1988-89 
Land under cultivation of which 
Arable land 
Irrigated 
Dryland 
Area 
('000 ha) 
19000 
7,650 
(3,550) 
(4,100) 
Percent of 
Total 
11.5 
4..6 
(2.2) 
(2.5) 
11,350 
10,000 
19,000 
31,000 
6.9 
6.1 
11.5 
18.8 
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Fallow 
Pastures and meadow land 
Forest and scrubland 
Potent ia l ly usable land 
Non-agricultural land: 
Waste, desert, urban, water 85,800 52.1 
Total area 164,800 100.0 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization as c i ted in Economic 
In te l l igence Uni t , Country P r o f i l e : I r a n . 1988-89. 
Out of t h e t o t a l s u r f a c e a r e a o f 1 6 4 . 8 m i l l i o n 
hectares, more than ha l f of Iran cam be categorized as non-
agr icul tura l land. One-sixth of the country is composed by 
Dasht-e-Kavir and Dasht -e -Lut which t o g e t h e r have almost 
n e g l i g i b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Then t h e r e are 
mountainous regions greater part of which are d i f f i c u l t to 
bring under the agr icu l tu ra l f o l d , except for some kind of 
forest ry . 
Land on which f a r m i n g i s p o s s i b l e a t p r e s e n t i s 
estimated at 11.5 per cent of the to ta l only. In any case 
t h i s is a very small proportion of the t o t a l land and serious 
e f f o r t s are needed to increase land under c u l t i v a t i o n . With 
proper agr icul tura l pol icy the 18.8 per cent land which is 
potent ia l ly usable can be brought under the former category 
and eventually i t should also be possible to reclaim some of 
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the area which at present is written off as not suitable for 
agriculture. 
In 1988-89 only 4.6 percent of land was actually arable 
out of which 2-2 percent was irrigated and 2-4 percent was 
good only for dry farming. The proportion of fallow lemd is 
still very high, which speaks of traditional agricultural 
practices and shortage of good quality inputs such as 
irrigation facilities, improved needs, fertilizers and 
mechanical implements. If all the modern facilities are 
provided, as the present government is trying to do, the need 
to leave such a large part of fallow land can be reduced. 
Existence of natural pastures and rich forest land (6.1 
and 11.5 percent of the total, respectively), indicates that 
Iran possesses a very great potential for allied agricultural 
activities also. If properly developed they can solve a great 
deal of food problem of the country and provide additional 
employment in the rural sector. 
If one takes a holistic view of the agricultural 
resources of Iran, it is necessary to observe that inspite of 
tremendous importance of the sector, the resource development 
in agriculture is still far from adequate. There is need, 
there is potential but the only thing needed is the effort in 
the right direction. 
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The revolutionary government of Iran, immediately after 
taking over the reins of power announced development of rural 
and agricultural resources as its top priority. To achieve 
this objective the late Ayatollah (Imeun) Khomeini emphasized 
the need to continue the struggle (Jehad) for the 
reconstruction of the society with special emphasis on rural 
resource development. An organization called Jehad-e-
Sazindagi. was launched with clear objectives aiming at the 
rural and agricultural development of the country. Since its 
inception, the achievements of the Jehad-e-Sazindagi are very 
impressive inspite of the prevailing war conditions.^ 
It can be hoped that if this policy and the emphasis 
on rural and agricultural sector as contained in the Five 
Year Plan (1989-1993) continues, Iran can hope to develop its 
agricultural resources much faster than in the earlier ti»es. 
And it could be then that the agricultural and rural sector 
would be in a real position to effectively absorb the 
additional resources generated through the oil sector and the 
dualism existing in the economy at present will become less 
pronounced than it is at present. 
10. For a detailed study of the Jihad-e-Sazindigi see, 
Abidi, A.H.H., "The Jihad-e-Sazindigi in Iran", Journal 
of West Asian Studies Societv. A.M.U. Aligarh, No-2, 
1986, pp.46-69. 
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The Demographic P r o f i l e 
The I s l a m i c Repub l i c o f I r a n i s by f a r the aost 
populous country in the Persian Gul f r e g i o n . Apart from 
I r a q , which has enough p o p u l a t i o n t o s u s t a i n economic 
development, I r an ' s other neighbours around the Persian Gulf 
have very small popu la t ion and are c a t e g o r i z e d as labour 
d e f i c i t coun t r i es . I r an i s lucky in the sense t h a t i t s 
population in re l a t i on to other resources i s large enougn to 
f u l f i l l the labour requirements of the economy and generate 
demand fo r consumer and indus t r i a l products. 
According to the 1986 Census I ran ' s t o t a l population 
stood at 49,85 m i l l i o n , almost evenly d i s t r i bu ted between the 
urban (54. percent) and rura l (45.4 percent) . Between i486 
and the p r e v i o u s census o f 1976, I r a n i a n p o o u l a t i o n 
registered an average annual growth rate of nearly 4 percent. 
I t i s estimated tha t by now the I ranian populat ion would have 
grown to well over 54 m i l l i o n . ^ ^ Since nearly one four th of 
the land area of I ran i s uninhabited, the average density of 
population works out to be around 32.9 persons per square 
k i lometres. 
11. U.H., Demographic Year Book. 1991 
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The geographical spread of popu la t ion i s , however, 
qu i te uneven. While the h ighest c o n c e n t r a t i o n is in the 
p r o v i n c e of Tehran ( 8 . 7 m i l l i o n ) H a m has th e lowest 
p o p u l a t i o n of 0 . 3 8 m i l l i o n people o n l y . The f i v e aost 
p o p u l a t e d p r o v i n c e s o f I r a n are Tehran ( 8 . 7 m i l l i o n ) , 
Khorasan (5 .03 m i l l i o n ) . East A z a r b a i j a n ( 4 . 1 m i l l i o n ) , 
Mazandaran (3 .4 m i l l i o n ) and Isfahan (3 .3 m i l l i o n ) . ' 
The Population Dynamics 
The break-up of population in various age groups 
according to the census of 1926 and 1986 is given in Table 1.2, 
It is interesting to note that out of the total population 
of 49.8 million in 1986 nearly 56.9 percent of its falls into 
the young age group of below 20 years, while those belonging 
to the group of 45 years and above are only 14.7 percent. If 
we compare the above figures with the age structure of 1976, 
it is revealed that younger population is increasing in Iran 
day-by-day. This trend has several socio-economic 
implications. If this trend is allowed to continue, Iran will 
have a very repaid increase in its population in the coaing 
decades and if the economic growth does not keep pace ttiere 
can be a very acute problem of unemployment in future. It is, 
therefore, necessary that a proper population policy is 
12. I.R.of Iran, Plan and Budget Organization, Statist-ical 
Reflection of the Islamic Republic of Iran. No.7, 1991, 
page 5. 
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TABLE 1.2 
POPULATION OF IRAN BY AGE GROUP 
(Thousand) 
1976 census 1986 census 
Population Percentage Population Percentage Age group 
Total 
0-4 years 
5-9 years 
10-14 years 
15-19 years 
20-24 years 
25-29 years 
30-40 years 
35-39 years 
40-44 years 
45-49 years 
50-54 years 
55-59 years 
60-64 years 
65 year and 
over 
33 ,709 
5 ,430 
5 ,277 
4 ,303 
3 ,600 
2 ,792 
2 ,112 
1,707 
1,627 
1,669 
1,389 
1,329 
704 
1,453 
1,453 
100 
16.1 
15.6 
12.8 
10.7 
8.3 
6.3 
5.1 
4.8 
5.0 
4.1 
3.9 
2.1 
1.7 
3.5 
49,857 
9,102 
7,572 
5,995 
5,249 
4,230 
3,674 
2,934 
2,132 
1,676 
1,601 
1,606 
1,259 
1,192 
100 
18.25 
15.18 
12.02 
10.52 
8-48 
7.36 
5.88 
4.27 
3.36 
3.21 
3.22 
2.52 
2.39 
3.34 
Source: Plan, and Budget Organization Statistical Centre of 
Iran, A Statistical Reflection of the IR of Iran 
No.7 , 1991. 
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evolved in Iran, so that the population growth of this nature 
does not pose any undue socio-economic pressure on the 
country. The present government of Iran is fortunately axare 
of this problem. In the current Five Year Plan (1989-1993), 
one of the main objectives is to practice a policy of 'birth 
readjustment' to reduce the number of live births per cycle 
and diminish the natural growth rate, so that the overall 
socio-economic objectives are achieved without any untoward 
1 3 pressure of population. 
The other important aspect of the population dynamics 
of Iran is migrations. According to the census of 1986, some 
77.6 percent people have not left their place of birth in the 
last ten years. On the other hand, 7.8 percent people 
(nearly 4.1 million) migrated from rural to the urban areas, 
7.7 percent from urban to urban and 1.5 percent from urban to 
rural areas during the same period. Highest number of the 
people (nearly 12.4 percent) migrated to the province of 
Tehran alone. 
Economically Active Population and Employment 
In 1986 Census, some 13.1 million people were 
categorized as "Active population" representing a 2.9 percent 
average annual growth over the active population in 1976. A 
13. I.R. of Iran, Plan and Budget Organization, A Su?nniarized 
Version of the First Five Year Economic. Social and 
Cultural Development Plan (1969-1993). Page 17. 
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l i t t l e over h a l f of them l i v e d in the urban a r e a s . Of the 
t o t a l a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y n e a r l y 1 1 - m i l l i o n 
p e o p l e w e r e a b l e t o f i n d e m p l o y m e n t w h i l e 1 . 9 m i l l i o n 
remained unemployed. A s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t t o n o t e i n t h e s e 
census f i g u r e s i s t h a t growth r a t e of unemployment has been 
f a s t e r than the growth in a c t i v e popu la t ion between the two 
c e n s u s e s . C r e a t i o n o f new j o b s d u r i n g t h i s p r o c e s s o f 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r the I r a q - I r a n war, might lead t o f r e s h 
employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s eas ing the e x i s t i n g problems. 
Table 1.3 g ives the break-up of employment in var ious 
s e c t o r s of the economy in 1986. I n s p i t e of concerted e f f o r t 
t o increase i n d u s t r i a l p roduct ion in the country in the l a s t 
two development plans the number of people employed in t h a t 
TABLE 1.2 
EHPLOYMENT IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF ECONOMY 1986 
Sector T o t a l Percentage of t o t a l 
A g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t i n g e t c . 3 2 , 7 6 , 6 1 4 2 9 . 2 
Min ing and quarry ing 30 ,936 0 . 3 
Manufactur ing 1 4 , 9 1 , 7 8 2 13.3 
E l e c t r i c i t y , Gas, 
Water supply 88 ,722 0 .8 
Const ruc t ion 1 2 , 4 6 , 7 0 2 11.1 
Transpor t and 6 , 2 4 , 1 5 9 5.6 
communication 
Trade and Hote ls 8 9 , 6 8 , 9 7 8 8 .0 
Serv ices 3 1 , 7 8 , 0 8 9 28 .3 
Other 3 , 7 7 , 1 2 2 3 .4 
T o t a l 112 ,11 ,005 100.0 
S o u r c e : S t a t i s t i c a l C e n t r e o f I r a n , P l a n and B u d g e t 
O r g a n i z a t i o n , Census 1986. 1986 ( P e r s i a n ) . 
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sector was only 13.3 percent. The agriculture and services 
sectors remain the mainstay of nearly 2.9 percent and 28 
percent people respectively. Together they provide employment 
to more than half of the job seekers. Mining and quarrying 
which has a very big share in the total GDP employs just 
about 32 thousand people (0.3 percent) highlighting the 
dualiStic nature of Iranian economy. 
Manpower Development 
Iran, inspite of a sufficiently large population, is 
Short of technical and skilled manpower. It has to import 
qualified personnel from specially the men of specialities 
like doctors, engineers, and other professionals from other 
countries. This deficiency is realised by the economic 
planners of the country and in successive development plans 
large sums of money are allocated for education and manpower 
development. Constant efforts in this direction have yielded 
some good results also. 
In 1976, in the total population of over 6 years, the 
literacy rate was 47.5 percent which after ten years rose to 
66.8 percent. In urban areas the increase was from 65.4 to 
73.1 percent, while in the rural sector literacy rate 
increased from 30.5 to 48.4 percent over the same period 
(Table 1.4). 
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TABLE 1.4 
POPULATIOI ( YEARS OF AGE AND OTER IT LITBACT STATUS tSM CEISK 
(TiNusands) 
Descripticn 1976 Census 19fil Census 
Popilation No. of Literacy Population k . of Literacy 
6 yrs. t l i terate r a t e ! t yrs. I l iterates r a t e s 
over over 
Total CovBtry 
Hale 
Fenle 
Orbu a m 
Kale 
Feiale 
Rural area 
Kale 
Feiale 
27113 
t3S2t 
13187 
13113 
S!1! 
S2S3 
13131 
7051 
6!2t 
128TT 
8t9S 
4679 
t62B 
5145 
3483 
424) 
3053 
1196 
47.5 
51.9 
35.5 
iS.4 
74.4 
55.6 
31.5 
43.6 
17.3 
3870) 
19822 
18887 
21210 
10907 
10304 
10307 
8818 
8488 
23)13 
14078 
9835 
1SS07 
8765 
8742 
8371 
5287 
3084 
81.8 
71.0 
52.1 
73.1 
80.4 
65.4 
48.4 
60.0 
36.3 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, S t a t i s t i c a l Centre of 
I ran , A S t a t i s t i c a l Reflect ion of the IP of Iran 
No.6, 1990 page 12. 
As regards the un ivers i t ies and other ins t i tu t ions of 
higher learning, the enrollment in professional census is mich 
larger than in other courses. In the year 1986-87, *or »*nich 
la tes t s t a t i s t i c s is ava i l ab le , some 25.6 percent out of the 
t o t a l of nearly 168 thousand students were s tudying in 
engineering courses, whi le 22 .2 percent were e n r o l l e d in 
Medical and other health related sciences. The enro''lment of 
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university level students in selected courses is given in 
Table 1.5. 
In the end it can be concluded that there is an urgent 
need in Iran to restrict the overall growth of population 
which between the last two censuses has increased well over 4 
percent per year. Every effort should be made to achieve the 
TABLE 1.5 
STUDENTS OF UNIVERSITIES AND HIGH EDUCATION INSTITUTES BY 
FIELD OF STUDY AND DEGREE: ACADEMIC YEAR 1986-87 
Field of Study 
Total 
Total 
1,67,971 
24,854 
11,109 
5,270 
9,921 
5,251 
37,910 
43,095 
7,603 
Percentage 
100.0 
14.78 
6.3 
3.1 
5.9 
3.1 
22.25 
25.55 
4.52 
Science of education and 
teacher training 
Social and behavioural sciences 
Commercial and business 
administration 
Physics and natural sciences 
Mathematics & computer sciences 
Medical and health related sciences 
Engineering 
Agriculture, Fishery, forestry 
Source: Based on Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical 
Centre of Iran, A Statistical Reflection of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. No.5, 1991, page 21. 
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plan, object ives in t h i s aspect of socio-economic development 
and simultaneously more and more educa t iona l f a c i l i t i e s 
should be created i f dependence on fore ign manpower is to be 
reduced. 
The Economy 
The process of transformation from a purely 
agricultural economy to a modern industrial economy had begun 
in Iran much before other countries of West-Asia except 
perhaps Egypt. For instance, railways were modernized in Iran 
as far back as 1930s. 
However this process remained slow and went on in fits 
and starts until the discovery and commercial exploitation of 
oil and gas resources. As soon as oil revenues started coming 
in, the other sectors of the economy also got some impetus 
but an inevitable result of this historical discovery was 
that the focus of all economic activity was diverted to the 
development and export of hydrocarbon resources, Iran became 
a typical example of a dualistic economy. Amuzegar and 
Fekarat have summed up this condition as "situation 
characterised by an economically dominant and highly capital 
intensive sub sector co-existing with a large traditional 
labor abundant indigenous sector. The oil sector assumed 
14. Amuzegar, J. and Fekrat, M.A. Iran: Economic Development 
Under Dualistic Con(;iitions. London, 1971, p.2. 
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the status of the "leading sector" and grew at a very fast 
rate. In relation to the other sectors of the economy which 
got stimulous mainly because of the growth in the leading 
sector. Our objective at present is not to trace out the 
history of economic development in Iran but it is necessary 
to point out that the Iranian government could provide a big 
push to the economy by allocating the revenues available from 
oil However, it must be clearly understood that Iran even 
during the oil boom period, had never been a capital surplus 
country like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait mainly because it has a 
large population and its over all absorptive capacity is nuch 
greater than many oil exporting countries of the region. 
In this section an effort has been made to examine the 
process of planned development in Iran, the pattern of 
economic growth since 1973, the nature of development in 
agriculture, industry and the oil sector. The purpose of this 
exercise is have an overview of the Iranian economy so that 
the development of the oil sector which is our main concern 
could be studied in a proper perspective and in relatively 
greater detail in the next chapters. 
Planning for development 
The concept of economic planning has a long history in 
Iran. As far back as in 1922 R«za Shah had tried to evolve a 
blue print of industrialization but that effort can hardly be 
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described as a plan in the modern sense of the term. From 
1949 to 1978 Iran has worked out five development plans with 
different degree of success. Since the reference period of 
this study 1973 the main focus will remain on the Fifth 
Development Plan (1973-78) and the current five year plan 
(1989-93) which began after the Iraq-Iran war. 
Fifth Five Year plan 1973-1978: 
The Fifth Development PI em began in 1973 but soon after 
that in October 1974 it's allocations for different sectors 
were drastically revised upwards due to the sudden increase 
in oil revenue without much chsmge in overall socio-economic 
objectives. Fixed investments in different sector in the 
revised Fifth Plan are given in Table 1.6 below. 
TABLE 1.6 
TOTAL FIXED INVESTMENT IN DIFFERENT SECTORS 1973-78 
(billion dollars) 
Original Revised Share of Increase 
Revised on orig. 
Budget X Budget 
Industry and Mine 8.18 
Agriculture 
Transport & 
communication 
Housing 
Oil and gas 
Others 
Total 
2.67 
2.79 
5.96 
6.83 
10.41 
36.84 
12.53 
4.58 
7.29 
13.70 
11.72 
19.77 
69.59 
18.0 
6.6 
10.5 
19.7 
16.8 
28.4 
100.00 
53 
72 
161 
130 
72 
90 
Source: Granam R. Iran the Illusion of Power London. 1978, 
page 81. 
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The extent and quantum increases in the fixed investment 
allocations for different sectors of the economy in the 
revised Fifth Plan can be judged from the above table. There 
was obviously an upward revision in the estimates of value 
added in the new version of the plan. In term of total GDP 
the revised plan envisaged an average annual growth of 25.9 
percent as compared to 11.4 percent in the original plan. 
As for the main sectors of the economy, the value added was 
supposed to grow at an eunount rate of 5.5 to 7.0 percent in 
agriculture 15.0 to 18.0 percent in industry and mining from 
11.8 to 81.5 percent in the oil sector. 
The new result of this kind of unmindful and massive 
increase in investment was that the economy went absolutely 
out of control. This was mainly because the allocation were 
increased without any understanding about the absorptive 
capacity of the economy. It is estimated that the imports 
after 1975 were running at $ 1.2 billion per month nearly 
double the figure for the previous year. The money supply was 
also on an increase at the rate of 60 percent per year 
1 6 
leading to an uncontrollable increase in inflation. 
15. Looney, R.E., Iran at the End of the Country. Lexington 
Books, Lexington, 1977, Table 3-1, Page 31. 
16. Graham, R., Iran: The Illusion of Power. Croom Helm i.td. 
London, 1978, Page 87. 
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First Five year Plan of the Islamic Republic (1989-93) 
Soon after the revolutionary government of the Islamic 
Republic took over the region of power of Iran, the country 
was attacked by Iraq and the war continued for nearly eight 
years. The Iraq-Iran war was not only the longest armed 
confrontation in the modern history of the world, it also 
left behind an unprecedented trail of destruction, of both 
men and material in Iran as well as Iraq. 
The Iranian government which was engaged in the 
consolidation of the revolution got suddenly burdened with 
the added responsibility of defending the integrity of the 
country. Apart from the inherited problems of the previous 
regime, the economic burden of the war created a situation of 
acute financial crisis. The government, therefore, decidec to 
abandon the five year plan which was drafted in 198"'-82 and 
deal with the economy on the basis of annual budgets for the 
duration of the war. 
However, the concept of planning itself was not given 
up. Preparations continued for its first Five Year 
Development Plan (1989-93) which was eventually launched on 
the 21 March 1989. 
The economic and social philosophy of revolutions in 
general was extensively dealt with in the speeches and 
writings of the leaders of revolution. In the context of 
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planning however it is reflected in the policy frameworK of 
the First Year Plan (1989-93). The new dispensation provides 
a clear contrast to the social and economic culture which was 
prevalent during the Shah. The plan document proclaimed a 
policy which would be based on "furthering law abiding 
spirit, self-discipline, cooperation, espirt de corps and 
respect for the value and sanctity of productive activities: 
avoiding waste; protecting the environment and conserving 
natural resources, safeguarding the sanctity of the family 
and furthering the spirit of responsibility sharing and 
participation".^^ Before going into the details of the 
quantitative aspect of the first five year plan of the 
revolution it is necessary to mention its general objectr/e 
1. Reconstructing and reinforcing national defense 
capabilities as well' as satisfying its urgent needs on the 
basis of goals already set. 
2. Reconstructing and renovating productive and 
infrastructural capacities as well as population centres 
damaged during the imposed war within the frameworK of 
priorities envisaged in the plan. 
17. I.R. of Iran, Plan and Budget Organization, A Svimmar'zed 
Version of the First Five Year Economic. Social and 
Cultural Development Plan of the I.R. of Iran (''989-93). 
1990, Page 3. 
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3. Quantitative expansion and qualitative promotion of man 
culture, education, science and technology with special 
emphasis on the young generation. 
4. Achieving economic growth with the aim of increasing 
per capital production and productive employment as well as 
reducing economic dependence with special emphasis on 
attaining self-sufficiency in strategic agricultural products 
and bringing inflation under control. 
5. Endeavouring to ensure Islamic Social justice 
6. Providing for minimum basic needs of the population 
7. Setting and readjusting consumption patterns with a view 
to responding to the need of individuals and society in the 
process of material and spiritual growth and development and, 
at the same time ensuring human dignity and liberty. 
8. Reforming the country's executive and judicial 
organization and management at various levels. 
9. Endeavouring to ensure judicial security reinforce 
theoretical and practical basis of equality before the law, 
enforce justice and enhance legitimate individual and social 
freedom. 
10. Spatial organization and geographic distribution of 
population and activities commensurate with cases dictated by 
political and defense considerations. 
18. Ibid, Page 2. 
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TABLE 1.7 
FIXED INVESTHENT DURING THE FIVE YEAR PLAN 
1989-1993 
(BLS: Rials) 
Categories Fixed 
investment 
Percentage of 
category sub 
total 
A. General Affairs 
Statistics and General 
Technical Services 
Information and Mass 
commun i cat i ons 
Public Buildings and 
Installations 
B. Social Affairs such as: 
Health, Medical and 
Nutrition 
Urban Development 
Rural Development and 
Modernisation 
Housing 
Technical and Vocational 
Education 
High Education 
C. Economic Affairs: 
Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
Water Resources 
Electricity 
Industry 
722.6 
55.4 
248.0 
419.2 
14,028.9 
642.5 
985.9 
74.5 
9,336. 
237.0 
282.4 
13,364.4 
2,868.0 
1,120.4 
1,571.6 
1,932.2 
(2.46) 
(47.85) 
3 
(45.58) 
100 
7.66 
34.32 
57.98 
100 
4.57 
7.02 
0.53 
66.53 
1 .68 
2.01 
100 
21 .45 
8.28 
11 .75 
14.45 
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Oil 
Gas 
Mining 
Commerce 
Road & Transportation 
Posts and 
Tourism 
Telecommunication 
1,301.0 
640.4 
537.0 
335.3 
1,662.0 
943.5 
453.0 
9.73 
4.79 
4.01 
2.50 
12.43 
7.05 
3.38 
Grand Total 29,316.1 
Percentage of Grand Total given in parenthesis. 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, A Summarized Version 
of the F i r s t Five Year Economic. Social and Cultural 
Develooment Plan of the IR of I ran (1989-93K '990, 
page 75. 
The plan envisages a t o t a l investment of 29,316 b i ' l i o n 
r i a l s dur ing the f i v e year per iod between 1989 and 1393, 
which has been s p l i t in to three broad categor ies, namely the 
General A f f a i r s , Social A f fa i r s and Economic A f f a i r s . The 
overa l l rate of growth of the GDP at constant pr ice has seen 
worked out at 8.1 percent per year and the per capi ta l GCP at 
4.9 percent per year during the p lan, the above table gives 
the de ta i l ed break-up of f i x e d investment i n these tn ree 
categories and the sectors f a l l i n g under each of thea. I r the 
second category which includes important sectors l i ke Health, 
Housing and E d u c a t i o n have 47 .8 p e r c e n t o f the t c t a l 
investment wh i le category th ree has 45.6 percent of the 
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total. This means that the provision of essential facilities 
for human resource development such as health, housing and 
education will have 47.8 percent of the total investment 
while category three will have 45.6 percent of the total. 
This means that the provision of essential facilities for 
human resources development such as health, housing and 
education are given as high priority in the new plan as the 
development of production and services sector. Housing for 
instance is likely to receive 66.5 percent of the total 
investment in its category because this sector will helo in 
the reconstruction of the cities deunaged during the war and 
provide maximum employment opportunities to the labor wnich 
can find a job in other sectors. 
The same logic is by and large true for higher 
investment in the Agriculture and its allied sector because 
in its very nature this is a labour intensive sector and 
caters to the basic requirement of the society and industry 
by providing food and raw materials. 
Table 1.8 gives the growth rate of different sec':ors 
during the plan period in real terms. Mining, construction 
and manufacturing are expected to grow at a faster rate than 
other sectors of the economy. 
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TABLE 1.8 
GDP: SECTORIAL GROWTH RATES FOR FIVE YEAR PLAN, 1989-1993 
(PIS Billion) 
Serial 
1. 
2. 
3. 
3-1 
3-2 
4 
5. 
6. 
6-1 
6-2 
Source 
No. 
: Plj 
of 
' 
th 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Oil 
Industry and mine 
Manufacturing 
Mining 
Water Electricity & gas 
Construction 
Services 
Transportation 
Others services 
GDP At factor price 
Per Capital product 
and Budget Organization, A 
e First Five Year Economic. 
Develooment Plan of the IR of 
Average growth 
rate (1489-93) 
6.1 
9.5 
15.0 
14.2 
19.5 
9.1 
14.5 
6.7 
5 
6.83 
8.1 
4.9 
Summarized Version 
Social and Cultural 
Iran (1989-93). 1990. 
page 75. 
In the above description of the First Five Year Plan 
(1989-93) one can clearly see that it has been designed for 
an economy which can undergo massive reconstruction after a 
protracted war to bring the economy on a normal footing. 
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Pattern of Economic Growth: 
As already mentioned earlier, Iran is more fortunate 
than most of its neighbours in the Persian Gulf region in the 
sense that its economic structure is fairly diversified and 
the dependence on the oil sector is not as high as in the 
other countries. This also implies that Iranian resources 
endowment is such that it can absorb more and more investment 
in the years to come. However, it is important mention at 
this very stage that the above analysis should not blur the 
fact that the Iranian economy also suffers from problems of 
economic dualism that is to say the oil sector is very 
modern and developed along side a traditional agricultural 
sector. 
Table 1.9 shows the total GDP and its sectoral origins 
for four selected years and the average annual compound --ates 
of growth have been calculated for each of the five year 
periods between 1973 and 1987.^ As a general observation 
it is interesting to note that throughout the period from 
1973 to 1987 the Irani em economy has grown at a much faster 
rate than the average for other developing countries except 
the oil producers. 
19. Because of the data constraints the last spell is for 
four years. 
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At current prices the GDP grew at a phenomenal rate of 
21 percent and 22.3 percent per year between 1973-78 and 
1978-83. Obviously in real terms figure will be some what 
lower, but even then the high rate of growth was possible 
because of the availability of higher oil revenues after 
1973-74 and the ambitious allocation of money for different 
sectors of the economy. The overall growth rate between the 
period 1983-89 was much lower (though still much higher than 
the average for developing countries) because of the war and 
a sharp decline in the international prices of oil as well as 
fall in oil production in Iran-
Looking at the performance of different sectors of the 
economy after 1973 the highest rates of growth have seen 
registered in the services and the agriculture sectors 
between 1973-78 and 1978-83. As far as the agriculture sector 
is concerned the high rate of growth in this sector can be 
easily explained because nearly half of the Iranian 
population is rural based and the agricultural activities 
have always received a very high priority in terms of the 
budget allocations. Regarding the fastest growth in service 
sector which in the Bank Markazi classification includes a 
heterogeneous group of service activities during ten years 
after 1973, there are different interpretations available in 
economic literature. While mostly it is believed that this 
trend is in keeping with the general pattern of high growth 
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of services in the early stages of development in any 
20 
developing country, there are some like Homa Katouzian^ who 
take the growth of services sector at the same fast rate as 
that of total GDP with a pinch of salt. In the Construction 
and Electricity-Gas Sectors the growth was very high in the 
initial year but it gradually went down in the ten years 
period between 1973-83. Manufacturing sector registered a 
very high rate of growth between 1978-83 as compared to the 
last five years while the contribution of the oil sector 
remained between 8 to 10 percent. Period between 1983-87 is 
exceptional for Iran in two respects. First, it was during 
this period that the country was most fiercely engaged in war 
with Iraq and the whole economy was under very great stress. 
Secondly, this is the period in which the good days of oil 
boom were reversed by falling oil price. These circumstzmces 
are reflected in the falling growth rates of the total GDP 
during this period. As mentioned earlier the oil production 
declined sharply during the war. This in addition to the 
falling oil prices brought Iran to a situation where the 
growth of the oil sector turned negative in relation to the 
earlier period and its contribution to the total GDP also 
fell down from over 13 percent in 1983 to just about 4. 
20. See Katouzian H. The Political Economy of Modern Iran 
1926-79. Macmillan, London, 1981, pp.257-258. 
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percent in 1987. The other sectors in which the growth fell 
down sharply are mining and construction and the reason was 
clearly the war. Agriculture remained the only sector which 
stood by its earlier performance. Although its growth was 
also slowed down by the war its contribution increased from 
15.87 percent in 1983 to 23.3 percent in 1987. 
Since the oil sector happens to be the main concern of 
this study a more detailed look will be taken into its 
performance in the following chapters. 
Conclusion 
I r a n is one of the most impor tant c o u n t r i e s of the 
South-West A s i a n r e g i o n . I t ' s s i z e , l o c a t i o n and o i l 
resources also make i t geo-s t ra teg ica l ly very s ign i f i can t . 
I t s lamd mass of 1,648,000 sq. km. on the western side covers 
nearly the en t i re eastern f lank of the Persian Gulf and the 
Gulf of Oman, and has common borders w i t h I r a q , Turkey , 
Central Asian republ ics, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Unlike most of i t s neighbours in the Persian Gulf area, 
I r a n ' s resource base is quite balanced and d i v e r s i f i e d . Apart 
from very large o i l and natural gas reserves, i t has a very 
substantial agr icu l tura l base a lso. A population of over 50 
m i l l i o n people is large enough t o prov ide the requ i red 
manpower to the country. There are other non-oil mineral 
deposits also to meet the requirements of the i n d u s t r i a l 
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sector. Given this kind of resource base amd the right kind 
of economic policy Iran has all the potential to achieve the 
stage of self-sustained economic growth. 
Iran also has a comparatively longer history of 
economic development. This process had begun somewhere in the 
early 1930s, but because of the dominance of foreign powers, 
the economic development took place in fits and starts. But 
what ever could be done in the neune of economic developaent 
in the last half a century or so was possible only because of 
the monetary resources generated through the sale of crude 
oil. 
It would, therefore, not be wrong to say that oil 
sector is the leading sector in Iran. A survey of Iran's 
development since 1973 has also attempted in the later parts 
of this study. On the whole the picture that emerges is that 
Iran is an economy where the oil sector is most developed and 
modern as compared to other productive sectors of the economy 
— a situation which is theoretically characterized by many 
economists as that of the dualistic development. The nain 
task before the economic planners of the country is to 
correct this situation and devise such policies which can 
help the agriculture and the manufacturing sector to develop 
with the help of oil money. Or in other words, transform the 
whole economy in such way as to reduce its excessive 
dependence on the oil sector. 
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At present the situation is that the rural sector 
accommodates nearly half of the total population of the 
country and the agriculture sector contributes nearly 29 per 
cent to the total GDP. But the agricultural land as such is 
still very small as compared to the size of the country. In 
1988-89 only 11.5 per cent of land was categorized as the 
"land under cultivation". Agricultural practices and the 
irrigation system are still quite primitive. There is an 
urgent need in Iran to bring more land under cultivation and 
modernize the agricultural sector. It is only through rural 
development that the increasing pressure on urban areas can 
be reduced. The revolutionary government has decided to 
accord top priority to rural development and a whole movefaent 
by the name of Jihad-e-Sazindigi has been launched to achieve 
this objective. But it is a long process and economic 
priorities will have to be set right to bring about the mich 
needed change in the rural sector in general and the 
agricultural sector in particular. 
The industrial sector in Iran is also not as advanced 
in Iran at present as it should be. A detailed study of 
industrial development was neither possible or desired at the 
moment but one way to give a boost to the industrial activity 
could be to develop those industries first which cam utilize 
the countries' vast oil and gas resources both as raw 
material and as a source of energy. Iran is best suited for 
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petrochemical industrialization, which through various 
linkages would help other industries also to grow. 
An other important economic development problem of Iran 
is to contain the fast growing population of the country and 
develop its manpower resources. Iran at present, inspite of 
a large population, is quite dependent on other countries for 
technical and skilled manpower. In order to achieve self-
sufficiency in economic development the present efforts to 
develop manpower resources will have to be increased in a 
very planned manner. 
The overall rate of growth plemned and achieved upto 
1979 were based on an excessive exploitation of the Countries 
oil resources. After revolution the country was attacked by 
Iraq and it was actually the management of a war economy 
rather than planned development. 
In the end one can conclude that the future of the 
Iranian economy is, atleast for the present, liked very 
strongly with the development of the oil sector. For quite 
some time to come it will be the oil policies and the oil 
sector which would be crucial for the development of the 
economy as a whole. 
CHAPTER II 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The history of oil industry in West Asia begins with 
Iran. Oil exploration and comfflercial production in the 
southern part of Iran predates similar efforts in other 
countries of the Persian Gulf region. 
In this chapter an effort has been made to trace the 
history of the Iranian oil industry from 1901 when the first 
oil concession was signed in Iran upto 1973. During these 72 
years, a number of disputes arose between the Iranian 
government and the foreign compsmies operating the oil fields 
of Iran and as a consequence several modifications were nade 
in existing concession agreements. Some of these changes can 
be considered as turning points in the history of the Iran-an 
oil industry because they brought about important structural 
changes in the industry. Without some understanding of these 
stages, as briefly discussed below, it would be difficult to 
evolve a clear understanding of later developments. 
Soon after the discovery of oil in the western 
hemisphere and realization of its importance as the future 
source of energy, the then imperialist powers set their eyes 
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on Persia which was known to bear hydrocarbon resources. The 
earliest concession to exploit mineral resources of Persia 
was granted as far back as 1872 by the then ruler of Persia 
Shah Nasr ed-Din to a British national Baron Julius De 
Reuter. But that concession was cancelled very soon. This 
followed a similar unsuccessful arrangement with a Dutch 
concern also. 
The real efforts for the search of oil in Persia began 
after a French archaeologist Jacques de Morgan, who led an 
expedition near Persian-Masopoteimian border established in 
1892 that oil did exist in substantial quantity in the Casr-
i-Shirin region. In subsequent years, frantic efforts »*ere 
made by foreigners to obtain oil concessions in Persia and 
soon after the first concession the industry develooed at a 
very fast pace. 
The D'Arcy Concession 1901-1932 
The first proper oil concession which yielded positive 
results, was granted by the Persiam government in the /ear 
1901 to a Britisher William D'Arcy. This concession was 
negotiated and concluded at a time when the popularity and 
authority of the Persian ruler Shah Muzaffar-ed-Din was at 
its lowest. Corruption was rampant and the country was in the 
grip of ^ery serious financial crisis. The administration 
was weak and the powerful tribal chiefs dominated in t-neir 
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respective areas. The bargaining position of the Persian 
government was so weak that the concessionaires could 
literally get away with the terms and conditions which suited 
them best. 
The duration of the 1901 concession was 60 years and 
the area of operation comprised 500,000 squire miles covering 
whole of Persia except for the five northern provinces of 
Azarbaijan, Gil an, Mazandran, Astarabad and Khorasan which 
were considered as the Russiem area of influence. In other 
respects also the D'Arcy concession was comprehensively in 
favour of the Company, It gave away exclusive rights to 
"search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for 
trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt 
and ozokerile"^ in the entire Persia except for five northern 
provinces. 
As regards the payment to the Persian government, the 
concessionaire agreed to make the following payments in 
return for complete fiscal exemption:*' 
1. Cash bonus on signature of £ 20,000 
1. Amirsadeghi, H. (ed.). Twentieth Century Iran. 
Heninemsmn, London, 1977, page 94. 
2. Mikdashi, Z., A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil 
Concessions: 1901-65. Praegar, New York, 1966, Appendix-
Ill. 
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2. Within one month from the date of formation of the 
first exploitation company £ 20,000 in paid up 
shares. 
3. 16X of annual net profit of any company or 
companies that may be formed to work the 
concession. 
4. £ 2000 tons (£ 350) p.a. for three weeks hitherto 
used by negative producers. 
5. £ 1,000 p.a. as salary of the Imperial Commiss-joner 
The above terms were very claverly worked out to 
protect the interests of the Concessionaire. The linsage 
between the payments to the Persian government and the 
profits of the Company provided protection to the Compan>' in 
the event of any commercial losses incurred by it. Any 
uncertainty regarding low sales, low prices or high cost 
obviously meant loss of revenue to the Persian government. In 
fact for the Persian government, which so desperately needed 
a constant and assured flow of public revenues to overcome 
its budgetary and other monetary difficulties, the aoove 
financial terms amounted to a virtual subjugation. 
The Persian government accepted the financial provision 
of royalty at the rate of 16 percent of the net profit for 
two reasons: (1) It conformed to the earlier pattern agreed 
to in the case of Russian mining concessions and the De 
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Reuter Concession and; (2) I t was hoped that the o i l industry 
would prosper in the coming years giv ing more p r o f i t s to the 
Company and more revenues to the government. But t h i s d id 
not turn out to be the case. For some years th ing went on 
smoothly but soon i r r i t a n t s between the government and the 
company star ted coming to the surface. 
In 1905 when the d r i l l i n g began on a t e r r i t o r y i n 
south-west Persia c o n t r o l l e d by the B a k h t i a r i t r i b e , i t s 
chief was given 3 per cent ownership in a l l the companies to 
be established and a sum of £ 3000 annually f o r protect ing 
t h e p r o p e r t y o f t he compan ies . The terms o f f e r e d t o 
Bakht iar is were c lear l y more luc ra t i ve than the ones offered 
to the central government. 
In 1908 o i l was found in commercial q u a n t i t i e s a t 
M a s j i d - i - S u l a i m a n bu t by t h i s t ime complex ion o f t he 
ownership of the company had changed due to the f inanc ia l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of D'Arcy. The B r i t i s h Admiralty, in order to 
counter the expanding German naval threat advised a B r i t i s h 
commerc ia l g i a n t Burmah O i l Company t o he lp D'Arcy 
f i n a n c i a l l y and a compemy ca l led Concession Syndicate Ltd. 
was formed t o t ake over t h e asse ts o f t h e o r i g i n a l 
concessionaire. 
3. I b i d . , page 15. 
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In 1909 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed to 
take over D'Arcy concession in Persia with Lord Starthcena of 
the Burmah Oil Co. taking over as its Chairman. Soon after 
that oil production started in Persia and was followed a very 
rapid expansion of oil activities. The company hurriedly 
constructed 130 miles long pipeline with 400,000 tons p.a. 
capacity to carry crude oil to the Persian Gulf terminals and 
a refinery was set up at Abadan in 1912 to refine 120,000 
tons of crude per year. 
By this time rivalry between Britain and Germany had 
already started causing frictions. Britain desperately needed 
a reliable and secure additional sources of fuel oil for its 
navy. Growing financial needs of APOC prompted Winston 
Churchill, the First Lord of British Admiralty at the time, 
to persuade the British government to acquire majority rights 
in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Persian oil, or for that 
matter Middle Eastern Oil, for the first time acquired 
strategic importance. Oil Production in Persia increased very 
rapidly during the period from 80,000 tons in 1913 to 897,402 
tons in 1918, but at the same time a serious dispute arose 
between the Company and the Persian government over the 
damage to the pipeline caused by the Bawi tribesman. The 
Company accused the government of not fulfilling its 
responsibility to provide protection under the provisions of 
the agreement and withheld the royalty payments. The dispute 
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was sorted out by the intervention of Armitage-Smith but a 
climate of destruct was created. In fact by the 
interpretation of the 1901 agreement done by Armitage-Smith 
Accord* the interest of the Persian government was further 
undermined although their actual iaplications were not 
realised until the depression of early 19308. 
Although the oil affairs of Persia went on smoothly for 
the next ten years and Production of Crude oil increased 
substantially from 1,385,301 tons in 1920 to 5,939,302 tons 
in 1929, the ascent in of Reza Khan to power in 1924-25 
marked the beginning of greater assertion of authority by the 
Persian government. During a visit to the oil installation 
in 1924, Reza Khan made quite a few observation regarding the 
unfair deal meted out to Iran, specially in the context of 
fewer Iranians employed by the Company and virtually no 
arrangement made to train the Iranians for higher posts in 
future. The nationalist elements, among the governaent 
functionaries were also taking a stronger note of the virtual 
free hand enjoyed by the Company in planning and production 
of oil strictly in accordance with its commercial interest 
and the interests of the Imperial government in London rather 
than genuine aspiration of the Persian people. 
4. For details of Armitage-Smith Accord, see Shwadran, B., 
The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers. 1973, pp.25-26, 
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Reza Shah, who had consolidated his power in later half 
of the 1920s, was keen to modernize Iran at a fast pace. For 
his plans to have better communication, notably railways, and 
develop modern industries, he needed more money. On the 
contrary the share of Persia in the gains obtained through 
its oil resources was much smaller, than the financial 
benefits enjoyed by the Company and the British government 
(See Table 2.1). 
TABLE 2.1 
Oil Production, Profits of APOC, and Payments 
to Persia 1913-31 
Year Oil Production Profits of APOC Payments to 
(millions of tons) (£'000) Persia (£'000) 
1913-14 
1 9 U - 1 5 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
1919-20 
1920-21 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928 (9 mos.) 
1929 
1930 
1931 
0.27 
0 .38 
0 .45 
0 .65 
0 .89 
1.11 
1.38 
1.74 
2 .33 
3 .00 
3.71 
4 .33 
4 .56 
4 .83 
5.36 
4 . 2 9 
5.46 
5 .94 
5 .73 
27 
64 
86 
344 
780 
736 
849 
264 
,779 
,431 
,517 
,067 
4,397 
4 ,800 
4 ,106 
3 ,686 
4 ,247 
3 ,785 
2 ,413 
10 
325 
469 
585 
593 
533 
411 
331 
1,054 
1,400 
502 
529 
1,437 
1,288 
307 
Source: Based on, Mikdashi, Z., A Financial Analysis of 
Middle East Oil Comoanv. London, 1966, Table 1. 
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The Persian government pressed for a revision of Armitage-
Smith/Accord. Minor disputes regarding the accounting 
procedures and the payment of the tax went on for quite some 
time and a kind of temporary settlement was reached but the 
clamouring of the Persian government for a better deal 
continued. 
In 1928 Persian asserted that Armitage-Smith Agreement 
was not valid because the Ma.i 1 is never ratified it. The need 
for a fresh concession agreement was recognized both by the 
APOC and the Persian government and negotiations began 
between the two sides. The talks went on for a long time 
without any tangible solution in sight. The Persian side was 
keen to hammer-out a settlement through which they could 
acquire some share-holding rights in the Company. Reduction 
in the area, duration of the concession emd royalty terms 
atleast as good as being offered in the neighbouring Arab 
side of the Persian Qulf were also demanded. The Company on 
the other hand sighted financial losses due to reduced demand 
and was willing to concede very little. Abul Hasan 
Taymourtash, the Persiam Minister for Court who represented 
his government in the negotiations at one stage warned the 
Company saying : 
5. Amirsadeghi, H., op.cit.. page 40, 
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"If by next spring I find myself 
discouraged and disappointed in the 
reactions I expect to my proposals I 
shall turn against you and fight when you 
will expertise a definite volt-face on my 
part. We want to have an arrangement 
whereby the Persian government shall feel 
that it has a definite interest in the 
Company to the extent that every shiling 
of gains is shared equally by them with 
the Company" 
The fact was that the loss of royalty, was a logical 
consequence of the 1901 concession. In times of depressed 
world demand and prices of oil, it had just become too auch 
for the Persian government to bear. The royalty payments by 
the Company which stood at £ 1,437,00 in 1929 went down to 
£ 1,288,00 in 1930 and the prospects were that in the next 
year Persian government will have to content itself with only 
£ 307,000. It is also interesting to note that, barring minor 
fluctuations, while production from the Persian oil fields 
registered a constant increase, the method of calculating the 
Company profits was such that the Persian revenues cculd 
never be stable or predictable. This dischotomy became nore 
striking during the early 1930s (see Table 2.2). 
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TABLE 2.2 
PERSIAN OIL PRODUCTION, PROFITS OF AIOC, BRITISH TAX AND 
PAYMENTS TO PERSIAN GOVERNMENT 1931-50 
Year 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
Oil 
(Mi 
Production 
nion long 
tons) 
5.7 
6.4 
7.1 
7.5 
7.5 
8.2 
10.2 
10.2 
9.6 
8.6 
6.6 
9.4 
9.7 
13.3 
16.8 
19.2 
20.2 
24.9 
26.8 
31.8 
Net Profits 
(£ '000) 
2,319 
2,380 
2,654 
3,183 
3,519 
6,123 
7,455 
6,109 
2,986 
2,842 
3,292 
7,790 
5,639 
5,677 
5,792 
9,625 
18,565 
24,065 
18,390 
33,103 
British Tax 
(£ '000) 
671 
195 
305 
512 
409 
911 
1,652 
1,157 
1,956 
2,975 
2,921 
4,918 
7,663 
10,663 
10,381 
10,279 
15,286 
28,310 
22,480 
50,707 
Payment to 
Persian Govt 
• (£ '000) 
1,339 
1,525 
1 ,812 
2,190 
2,221 
2,580 
3,545 
3,307 
4,271 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,464 
5,624 
7,132 
7,104 
9,172 
13,489 
16,032 
Source: Ssune as Table 2 . 1 , page 109 
The 1933 O i l Concession 
The actual roya l ty f i gu re f o r 1931 as announced by the 
Company (£ 306,872) turned out to be less than amticipated. 
Reza Shah loosing hope of a nego t i a ted s e t t l e m e n t i n the 
framework of o l d concession decided t o cancel i t on 26 
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November 1932. But he was careful enough not to challenge 
the B r i t i s h might and said t h a t by c a n c e l l i n g the o ld 
concession he has ac tua l ly , "wiped the s la te clean" to pave 
way for a fresh concession. Similar signals were sent by his 
minister Taqizadeh a lso , who wrote to the resident d irector 
of the APOC saying t h a t : ® 
"as t h e P e r s i a n governnent has no o t h e r 
i n t e n t i o n except to s a f e g u a r d P e r s i a n 
i n t e r e s t s , should t h e A n g l o - P e r s i a n O i l 
Company be prepared contrary to the Past to 
safeguard Persian i n t e r e s t s , in accordance 
with the views of the Persian government, on 
the b a s i s of e q u i t y and j u s t i c e , w i t h 
necessary secur i ty f o r sa feguard ing those 
in te res ts , the Persian government w i l l not in 
pr inc ip le refuse to grant a new concession to 
that Company". 
At th is stage fresh negotiations began with both sides 
rea l i z ing the r e a l i t i e s on the ground and were hopeful of a 
new and better sett lement, although at one stage the Conpany 
representative even threatened to "cal l i t o f f" emd go back. 
With some hard barga in ing , however, th e new concession 
agreement was signed on 29 Apr i l 1933. 
6. I b i d . • pp.99-100. 
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In the 1933 concession the area on which the Company 
could operate was reduced to 100,000 sa. miles as against 
500,000 sq. mi les in the o r i g i n a l 1901 agreement but the 
durat ion remained 60 years. The main terms and condit ion of 
payment to the Persian government were as fo l lows : 
1. A r o y a l t y b e g i n n i n g on January 1st 1933, of 4s 
(go ld) / ton of Petroleum sold fo r consumption in Persia 
or exported. 
2. A sum equal to 20X of the d i s t r i b u t i o n t o o r d i n a r y 
stockholders of APCXJ in excess of £ 671,250 p.a. 
3. The t o t a l amount to be paid by company under (1) and (2) 
was never to be less than £ 750,000 p.a. 
4. In case of exp i ra t ion or surrender, the Company was to 
pay 20X of the surplus d i f ference between the amount of 
the general reserves at the expi ra t ion or surrender, and 
the amount of the same reserves as of 31st December 
1932. 
5. During the f i r s t 15 years o f t h i s concess ion a tax 
commutation of 9d. / ton f o r the f i r s t 6 m i l l i o n tons of 
Petroleum produced p .a . and 6 d . / t o n i n excess of 6 
m i l l i o n tons. This commutation payment was never to be 
less than £ 225,000 annually - a l l guaranteed v i s -
a-v is gold. 
7. Mikadeshi, o p . c i t . . Appendix I I I , pp.297-98, 
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8. During the 15 years following, a tew commutation of 15 
d./ton for the first 6 million tons p.a., and 9d./ton in 
excess of 6 million tons. This teoc commutation payment 
was never to be less than £ 300,000 annually. 
7. £ 2,000 annually to cover expenses of the government 
delegate. 
Keeping in view the pressures and constraints, both 
internal and external, under which the government of Persia 
was operating at that time, the 1933 concession can be 
considered as a change for the better. Under the new 
dispensation the Persian government got a better deal in so 
far as the royalty payments were concerned. Royalty based on 
production per ton, as against the one based on the net 
profit of the company, saved the host government from the 
contingencies arising out of low demand or low price of crude 
oil and the resultant loss of revenue. The 1933 concession 
also ensured a minimum guaranteed payment of £ 750,000 to 
the Persian government. There was no such provision in the 
D'Arcy concession. 
As regards the area, according to most analysis, the 
curtailment of the concession area to one-fifth did not give 
any particular advantage to the Persians because the Company 
had a choice and it went in for 100,000 square miles which 
was the most potential part of the whole territory. But 
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l a te r on ( a f t e r 1954), i t was that one-fourth area vacated by 
the APOC (AIOC) which the National I ranian Oi l Company (NIOC) 
u t i l i z e d to for i t s new j o i n t venture and service contracts. 
Among other th ings an other impor tant ga in from the 
1933 concession was t h a t f o r the f i r s t t ime the Company 
f o r m a l l y conceded t h e governments demand t o g r a d u a l l y 
increase the number of Persiem nationals on i t s s t a f f . I t 
agreed to recru i t Persian ar t isans, technical and sk i l l ed 
s t a f f i f they possessed t h e r e q u i r e d competence . The 
unskil led s ta f f was to be en t i re ly Persian. The Company also 
agreed to spend at least £ 10,000 per year on the t ra in ing of 
Persian students so t h a t they can q u a l i t y f o r b e t t e r and 
a 
higher positions in the days to come. This was a modest, 
but certainly an important beginning to integrate the oil 
industry with the local economy. 
As far as the workability of the 1933 concession was 
concerned, things by and large went on rather well for the 
remaining part of the 1930s. Problems, however, started 
cropping up when the oil production suddenly dropped due to 
the outbreak of World War II. Since the payment of royalty 
was linked to production per ton, the revenues to the Persian 
government suddenly started falling. They dipped down from 
8. For other details of the 1933 concession see, Shwadran, 
B., OD.cit.. pp.44-46. 
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3.3 million in 1938 to £ 2.8 million in 1939 and 1940 and to 
£ 2.00 million in 1941. The Persiam government obviously 
made a protest and the company immediately agreed to make an 
extra payment of £ 1.5 million for 1939 and £ 4 million for 
1940 and 1941.^ The dispute thus got temporarily patched up. 
In the mean time the name of Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) 
was changed to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935. 
The next phase of conflict between the Persian 
government and the Company began in 1947 when the British 
government put a limit of 30X on the distribution of 
dividends by all companies. The Iranian government had a 
take of 20 percent over and above £ 671,250 on the ordinary 
dividends distributed by the AIOC, which at that time was 
equal to nearly one-fourth of the income derived from the 
royalty because the company was earning good profits. The 
company profits nearly doubled in a single year from £ 9.6 
million to £ 18.6 million in 1947 and followed a steep 
upward trend in the coming years also. The British 
government taxes also increased substzuitially. In some years 
they even accounted for nearly three times the income of the 
Persian government (see Table 2.2). 
9. Mikdashi, Z., oo.cit.. page 112, 
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The growing difference between the tax revenue earned 
by the British government through AIOC operations in Iran and 
the royalty received by the Iranian government between 1946 
and 1950 had become a sore point. The resultant controversy 
between the Company and the Persian government ultimately 
culminated into the nationalization of oil industry in 1951. 
Nationalization of Iranian Oil Industry: Its Background And 
Implication: 
The nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry in 
1951, was perhaps the most significant development not only 
for Iran but the entire oil exporting Third World. Even for 
those countries where oil production in commercial quantities 
was in early stages, the Iranian changes had for reaching 
effects. It is not intended here to discuss the whole range 
of issues involved in the controversy, but a brief background 
to the nationalization is important for a better 
understanding of various factors which helped shape the 
future structure of the oil industry in Iran. The main focus 
will be on the facts pertaining to the structural changes in 
the oil industry and some of the important financial aspects 
avoiding, as far as possible, the political implications of 
the controversy. 
10. For a detailed account of the political background of the 
nationalization of Iranian Oil Industry, see Bill, J.A,, 
and Roger Louis, W.M., Musaddia. Iranian Nationalism and 
Oil, I-B. Tauris & Co., London, 1988. 
63 
As mentioned earlier, the payments by the AIOC to the 
Iranian government suddenly got restricted due to the British 
governments "limitation of divided" policy in 1947. As a 
consequence the profits of the Company increased while the 
payments to the Iranian government remained stagnant almost 
at £ 7 million. In the next year also the Iranian take was 
proportionately far less than the increase in the income of 
the company and the British government out of the income oil 
production (see Table 2.2). 
Obviously there grew a very strong wave of resentment 
against this situation in Iran. Various political groups at 
that time took advantage of the situation and tried to 
articulate public opinion in Iran against the economic 
injustice meted out to the country at the instance of the 
commercial interests represented by the AIOC and the 
Imperialist government of Britain. The then government of 
Iran for its own economic reasons and out of the domestic 
political pressure, made a very strong protest against the 
financial losses to the country. The AIOC immediately made an 
offer of some additional payments to Iran and agreed to hold 
negotiations to come out of this potentially explosive 
situation. The talks started in mind-194.8 and in the next 
year on July 17, 1949, a Supplemental Agreement was signed 
between the government of Iran the AIOC. 
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According to t h i s agreement, aparts fo r other things, 
i t was decided that (1) the per ton royal ty w i l l increase 
from 4 to 6 s h i l l i n g s wi th retrospect ive e f f ec t from 1948, 
(2) an annual payment in respect of I ranian taxat ion of a 
f l a t ra te one s h i l l i n g per ton r e t r o a c t i v e t o 1948, (3) 
easier terms f o r share of the I r a n i a n government in the 
general reserve of the Company and a guarsmtee of a minimum 
payment of £ 4 m i l l i o n per annum in respect of the dividends 
and a l locat ion to general reserve (4) a d i f f e r e n t basis fo r 
f i x i n g p r i c e s f o r o i l consumpt ion i n I r a n , A f t e r the 
Supplemental Agreement was r a t i f i e d the Company was to pay 
the government £ 50,90,909 i n respect o f the amount 
standing on the general reserve as of December 31 , 1947 and 
addi t ional sums under the various headings from £ 18,667,786 
fo r 1946 and £ 22,890,261 fo r 1949".-^ 
However, from day one the Supplemental Agreement was in 
t r o u b l e . There was a s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e between Prime 
Minister Razmara who considered the agreement a favourable 
deal and Dr. Mohd. Mossadiq, a h a r d - l i n e r and i n f l u e n t i a l 
member of the Ma. i l i s . Even before the agreement could be 
placed before the Ma.i 1 is f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n , the l eg i s l a t i ve 
body was dissolved. On i t s reconst i tu t ion in 1950, when the 
11. Shwadran, B., o p . c i t . . page 90, 
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matter came up for consideration a committee was formed to 
examine the implications of the agreeaent under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Mossadiq. The committee recommended the 
disapproval which later got endorsed by the Ma.ilis. This very 
committee was entrusted with the task of suggesting a course 
of action to deal with the crisis. 
The fuel was added to the fire by the conclusion of an 
agreement in 1951 between the Aramco and the Saudi government 
for 50-50 profit sharing arrangement. The Chairman of APOC 
insisted that the increase in tonnage royalty both in the 
years of low production and the higher production will be 
1 3 
advantageous to Iran compared to the Saudi arrangements. 
But he could not convince the hard - l i ne rs , who by that t ime, 
had s ta r ted i n s i s t i n g fo r the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Much t h a t 
Razmara t r i e d to uphold the agreement, the p o l i t i c a l wave was 
in favour of a dras t ic ac t ion . Dr. Mossadiq submitted his 
p l a n f o r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n on 15 February 1 9 5 1 . Razmara 
r e s i s t e d the move on v a r i o u s t e c h n i c a l , economic and 
p o l i t i c a l grounds but a few days a f te r his declarat ion he was 
assassinated. Mossadiq became Prime Minister i n Apr i l 1951 
and very soon the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a l l asse t s and 
12. I b i d . 
13. Mikdashi, Z . , o p . c i t . . page 154. 
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properties of the AIOC was approved by the Majlis. 
The AIOC did not take this measure lying down. With the 
active support of the British government a battle of nerves 
began between the Company and the Iranian government. All 
major oil producing companies decided to stand by the AIOC 
and the Iranian Oil stopped flowing down the pipelines. The 
boycott was so effective and organized that within months 
Iran started finding herself in the mids of a ser-ous 
financial crisis. While the matter was taken to the 
International Court of Justice, the major commercial 
compamies of the area were busy chalking out their strategy 
to put further pressure on Iran. The shortfall of Iranian 
production was quickly made up by increasing production 
elsewhere in the region by the sister concerns of the AICC. 
Iran could not withstand the pressure of financial 
difficulties caused by a virtual stoppage of oil production 
and revenues for two years. Dr. Mossadiq was overthrown 'n a 
coup staged by General Zahidi, who was willing to negotiate 
with the contending parties provided that he was given a 
face-saving device. The American government immediately 
offered its good offices for mediation between the Iranian 
government and a Consortium of eight major companies wnich 
controlled nearly all the oil production in south-west Aaia. 
American interest was to avoid long drawn controversy wnich 
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might d is turb easy f low of o i l suppl ies to i t s European 
a l l i e s and Japan and to establ ish a foothold of American 
commercial o i l companies i n t o f u t u r e I r a n i a n O i l 
operations 14 
Formation of Consortium 
After very hect ic negotiations the h i s t o r i c agreement 
known as "The Consortium Agreement" was concluded by the 
I ranian government on 29 October 1954. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of 
e ight major companies and a group of American independents 
who had formed t h e Consor t ium was in t h e f o l l o w i n g 
proportions: 
Company Percent 
B r i t i s h Petroleum 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Standard Oil of New jersey 
Standard Oil of Ca l i fo rn ia 
Texaco 
Mobil 
Gulf 
CFP 
I r i con Group 
Total 
Scheae 
40 
14 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
5 
100 
Nationa 
British 
lity 
I 
Anglo-Outch 
United 
United 
United 
United 
United 
French 
United 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
14. For a detai led descr ipt ion of i n t r i c a t e p o l i t i c a l and 
diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s see 
Shwadran B., o p . c i t . chapters V and V I ; Stocking G.W. , 
Middle East O i l . Pangrin Press, London, 1971, Part I I ; 
and Amirsadeghi, H . , op.ci-^. Chapter IV. 
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The transition from a single company's (AIOC) operation 
to a Consortium of all major companion brought about a very 
major change in the entire structure of oil Industry in Iran, 
which will be discussed in some details in the following 
paragraphs. But before that is done, it is important to 
mention that the formation of a Consortium in Iran was 
beginning of a process of horizontal integration of oil 
companies at the international level. Later developments in 
other parts of the south-West Asian region saw this type of 
integration getting consolidated. In simple terms it meant 
that the oil companies would henceforth face the producing 
nations jointly rather than individually. They made their 
commercial interests so very interdependent and interrelated 
to each other that atleast in upstream operations they would 
not compete among themselves the way they did earlier. It was 
beginning of the age of oligopoly now. The interrelationship 
of the major oil companies in Persian Gulf region is shown 
in the following Table 2.3. 
A closer analysis of the Consortium agreement shows 
that in substance there was not much of a difference between 
the 1933 agreement and the 1954. Consortium agreement as far 
as Iran was concerned. Except for the fact that in the new 
dispensation the companies accepted the right of Iran to own 
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TABLE 2.3 
INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES IN 1966 
(PERCENTAGE OWNERSHIP) 
Abu Dhabi Kuwait Iranian Iraq Arabian 
Marine Oil Co. Consortium Petroleum American 
Areas Company Oi 1 
Company 
B.P. 
Mobil 
Socal 
Texaco 
Jersey 
Gulf 
Shell 
CFP 
Total 
Source: 
66-2,3 
-
-
-
-
-
-
33-1,3 
100 
Fesharaki, F. 
International 
50 40 
- 7 
7 
- 7 
7 
50 7 
14 
6 
100 95 
. Develooment 
and Domestic 
of 
23.75 
11.875 
-
-
11.875 
-
23.75 
23.75 
95 
Iranian Oil 
Asoect. Praeaer 
-
10 
30 
30 
30 
-
-
-
100 
Industry. 
, U.S.A., 
1976, page 49. 
the assets of the industry and reserves of oil, every thing 
else was the same as in 1933 accord. The operations became 
more complicated but Iranian interests remained where they 
were. 
The area to be covered by the 1954 Consortium 
agreement remained the same at 11,00,000 sq. miles except the 
Kermanshah Oil field and the refinery located there. The 
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duration of the agreement was reduced to 25 years (as 
against the 39 remaining years of the previous agreement), 
but it was subject to three extensions of 5 years each at 
the description of the Consortium which meant that the 
arrangement was to continue until 1994, exactly the same 
period as stipulated in the 1933 agreement. 
As regards the payments to Iran, the arrangement worked 
out was in substance the same as in the case of 50-50 profit 
sharing agreements elsewhere. Under the 1945 agreement Iran 
was entitled to receive a royalty at the rate of 12.5 percent 
of the production and un equal share in the net profits with 
the only difference that in other cases this royalty was to 
be in the form of cash only, while under the Consortium 
agreement Iran had the option to get it either in kind, that 
to say in the form of oil or to sell it for cash at the 
posted price. 
The new 1954 agreement also devised a new arrangement 
for the operations of the Iranian oil industry upstreeun and 
downstreeun for the Consortium area. At the first stage two 
operating companies were formed: the Iramian Oil Exploration 
and Producing Company (lOEPC) and the Iranian Oil Refining 
Company (lORC). These two companies were registered in Iran 
but incorporated under the laws of Netherlands. The share of 
these companies were held entirely by the participants of the 
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Consortium in the same p ropor t ion as t h e i r share in the 
Consortium i t s e l f . The operating companies got the exclusive 
r i g h t to operate the producing f i e l d s and the r e f i n i n g 
o u t f i t s . The non-basic funct ions such as t r a i n i n g , t ranspor t , 
maintenance, housing and medical f a c i l i t i e s were l e f t f o r the 
NIOC. The NIOC c o u l d a l s o look a f t e r t h e i n t e r n a l 
d i s t r i bu t i on of o i l products and run the Naft-e-Shah f i e l d 
and the Karmanshah re f i ne ry . 
As p a r t o f t h e i r own i n t e r n a l ar rangement the 
par t ic ipants of the Consortium formed two more companies at 
London. The f i r s t one cal led the I ranian Oi l Par t ic ipant L td . 
(lOP) which would hold the shares of the above mentioned two 
"operating companies" , and the second one was ca l led the 
Iranian Oi l Service Company Ltd (lOSC) to arrange fo r the 
supply of personnel. 
Af ter the Consortium agreement beceune f u l l y f unc t i ona l , 
the o i l p r o d u c t i o n o f I r a n s t a r e d r i s i n g r a p i d l y . I t 
increased from 14.7 m i l l i o n tons in 1955 to 76.5 m i l l i o n tons 
in 1964 and the payments to the I r a n i a n government a lso 
increased fo r £ 32.3 m i l l i o n to £ 171.5 m i l l i o n between the 
15 
same years. 
15. Mikdashi, Z . , o p . c i t . . pp.220, 223. 
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The Non-concessionary Contracts 
The Consortium agreement of 1954 covered the richest 
oil areas of Iran and was run under its provisions which have 
been briefly discussed above. But there were other areas 
outside the Consortium agreement which were either unexplored 
or had very marginal known potential. The government of Iran 
undertook the development of these areas on a very different 
basis. These contracts which are generally described as 'Non-
concessionary oil contracts" were extremely significant in so 
far as they comprised of a number of Joint-venture and 
service contracts. 
The main importance of these agreements was that a) 
they were first of their type in any country of the Persian 
Gulf region and, b) they gave a new and different direction 
to the structure of oil industry in Iran. We shal' now 
discuss some salient features of these two types of 
contracts. Table 2.4 gives the relevant details of the Joint-
venture signed between 1957-1971. 
Joint-Venture Contracts 
The purpose at the moment is not to describe each 
Joint-venture contract separately that was signed by the NIOC 
with the companies outside the Consortium. Table 2.4 gives 
some idea about each of them. In order to understand the 
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nature of these contract only two agreements which represent 
the difference between them will be described. 
1. The NIOC (not the Iranian government) signed its first 
Joint-venture agreement with subsidiary of the Italian 
company ENI called AGIP. Under this agreement an operating 
company by the name of Iraniam-Italian Oil Company (SIRIP) 
was formed which had an Iranian as its Chairman and both the 
parties sent equal number of persons on the Board of 
Directors. It covered some 22,700 sq.km. area lying on the 
eastern slopes of the Zegros upto the Gulf of Oman. 
Upto the stage of discovery of oil in commercial 
quantity, the Italian company agreed to invest a total of t 
22 million which will eventually be shared equally by both 
the parties if the venture proved commercially successful. 
The posted price will be the price prevailing in the Persian 
Gulf area. There was no royalty involved but the foreign 
company was to pay income teoc at the rate of 50 percent on 
its share of crude. 
2. After the initial success of the AGIP arrangement, 
though on a limited scale, a large number of other foreign 
companies showed interest in this kind of arrangement with 
the NIOC. 
The second type of Joint-venture contract was s'lgned 
with a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of Indiana (USA), 
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known as the Pan American International. There were a few 
minor differences between this contract the earlier one with 
the AGIP. While SIRIP was an independent concern, the 
operating company in this case. The Iranian Pan American Oil 
Company (IPAC), was to act as an agent of Pan Am and the 
NIOC under a joint control. The difference was that in the 
second case in addition to a minimum investment of $ 82 
million by Pan Am, the foreign company was also obliged to 
pay a cash bonus of $ 25 million to NIOC on the beginning of 
commercial production. 
These type of agreements, " dealt of blow to the 
traditional system of concessionary agreements" and provided 
Iran with an opportunity to manage its oil affairs atleast in 
the free areas according to terms and conditions best 
suited to its national interest". 
In 1971 NIOC signed a number of other such contracts on 
better terms and conditions than the earlier partnership 
agreements. The improvement in the terms were worked out on 
the basis of vast experience that the NIOC had obtained by 
running such agreements.^^ 
16. Fesharaki, F., Development of the Iranin Oil Industry. 
Praeger, London, 1976, page 71. 
17. For details see, Ibid., pp.73-78. 
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Service contracts 
After the success of the Joint-venture contracts, the 
NIOC came up with another arrangement which was new to the 
producing countries of the area. 
Under this kind of dispensation commonly described as 
"Service contracts", the foreign companies will have 
absolutely no ownership right in Iran. They will mearly work 
as a contractor of the NIOC and will be paid for in oil for 
the services they rendered. Table 2.5 provides some details 
about the early contracts of this nature. 
The first Service Contract, was signed in 1966 between 
the NIOC and the a French company commonly referred to as 
(ERAP). The operating company SOFIRAN which was created by 
ERAP to work for it in Iran was registered in Iran. 
The agreement stipulated that ERAP will provide 
interest free loan to NIOC for the seismo-geological survey 
of 250,000 sq. km. onshore and 21,000 sq. km offshore area. 
On success of this survey in terms of oil finds, the NIOC 
will be entitled the another loan (interest bearing) to cover 
the cost of development and production on selected areas 
20,000 sq. km. onshore and 10,000 sq. km. offshore. The 
operated area was to be reduced after five to seven years. 
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TABLE 2.5 
NONCONCESSIONARY SERVICE CONTRACTS 
SOFIRAN 
Contractor 
European 
Consortium 
CONOCO* 
Parties to the 
agreement 
ERAP and 
SOFIRAN 
ERAP, ENI, 
mspaboll, 
Petrofina, 
and OMW 
Continental 
Oi1 Company 
Effective date 12/3/66 6/24/69 4/6/69 
Area sq. km. 
Offshore 
Onshore 
Primary exploration 
period 
Offshore 
Onshore 
Maximum exploration 
expenditure obli-
gations 
Offshore 
Onshore 
21,500 
254,000 
6 years 
6 years 
$ 6 million 
$14 min ion 
27,260 
8 years 
$10 million 
12,860 
7 years 
$ 12 mi i"^  ion 
Minimum operation 
obligations 
Offshore 
Onshore 
6,000sq.km. 
seismic 
6,000 sq.km. 
seismic 
Three explo-
ratory wells 
Three explo-
ratory wells 
Ownership at 
wellhead 100X NIOC 100X NIOC 100X NIOC 
Duration from comm-
ercial production 
Cash bonus 
25 years 25 years 25 years 
$ 1 million 
Source: Fesharaki, F, Development of the Iranian Oil Industry 
International and Domestic Aspects. Praeger, London, 
1976, Page 81. 
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A major departure in this type of arrangement over the 
earlier ones was that a concept of "National Reserves" was 
introduced for the first time. The contractors (SOFIRAN) was 
to developed and work on only 50 per cent of operational area 
while the remaining half will be directly operated by the 
NIOC, Like other agreements the service contracts also 
provided for a minimum guaranteed investment and the time 
frame was negotiated according to the Iranian convenience. 
Conclusion 
Iran was the first country in the West Asian region 
where oil was first discovered, explored, produced and 
exported. Since 1901 when this process began the Iranian oil 
industry has undergone some very important changes which 
affected the financial aspects of the gains accruing to the 
operating foreign oil companies, the countries to which the 
companies belonged and the Iranian government. It also 
brought about some changes in the structure and the ownership 
pattern of the industry. 
However, if one takes a total view of this history the 
main conclusion that emerges is that throughout the period 
the Iranian Oil resources were subjected to a ruthless 
exploitation in which the prime motive of the foreign oil 
companies was to maximise their financial gains through the 
production of as much of Iranian oil as possible. The 
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foreign governments which helped the companies in this 
process also not only used Iranian oil for their strategic 
ends but also benefited financially through taxation. The 
gains to the Iranian government and the people were marginal. 
Every time some changes took place, they were mainly to ease 
out the internal pressure brought about by the nationalist 
forces in Iran. The successive Iranian regimes during this 
period were such that either they were powerless to 
safeguard the interest of the country and its people or they 
depended on foreign powers for their own survival and, 
therefore, did little to mount the right kind of pressure on 
the companies. 
However, even in the mids of this hopeless scenario, 
the historical forces did act to bring about several 
important structural changes in the industry which can be 
called significant and an improvement over the past as far as 
Iranian interest was concerned. 
In the above context it is important to mention some 
freedom of action that the Iranian government obtained to 
operate freely the areas outside the Consortium agreement. 
Joint-Venture and Service Contracts signed by the NIOC with 
independent Oil companies may not be very significan-»i in 
terms of oil production or financial gains, but they Kill 
always remain important in so far as teh Iranin government 
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could exercise the sovereign r i g h t over the count ry 's o i l 
resources at least in a l im i ted sense. They also brought 
about histor ic changes in the overall structure of the o i l 
industry in I ran. Otherwise, the h is to ry of the Oi l 
industry in Iran upto 1973, and infact upto 1979, in some way 
or the other, is the history of exploi tat ion. 
CHAPTER III 
OIL INDUSTRY IN IRAN: 1973-1978 
Introduction 
This chapter is ineant to study the first part of our 
main theme, that is, the development of Oil industry in Iran 
six years between 1973-1978. In certain aspects reference is 
made to a few years prior to 1973 also for reasons of 
continuity or comparison. At some places, the whole period is 
referred to as the 1970s merely for the sake of convenience. 
In terms of policy for instance, the period 1973-1978 covers 
the last six years of monarchy in Iran and also coincides 
with the period of oil boom in the Persian Gulf area. Things 
ofcourse changed considerably after the Islamic revolution of 
1979. Market conditions have also undergone a considerable 
change since then. The conditions and changes in the 
industry since the revolution will be studied in the next 
che^ jter. 
This chapter has been divided into three parts. The 
first part deals mainly with the structural aspects of the 
industry, market conditions and the price structure. In 
doing so Iran has been dealt with as part of the OPEC because 
what ever changes occurred in the Iranian oil industry during 
the 1970s were largely a result of the success achieves by 
the OPEC as a group. In such aspects where the changes »*ere 
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in the nature of internal dynamics (as in the case of NIOC-
Consortium disputes), the support of the OPEC was very very 
crucial. In the matters relating to the market and price of 
Iranian oil also the overall conditions created by the OPEC's 
struggle had a very significant impact. 
In the second part, the quantitative aspects of the oil 
industry in Iran have been studied. They mainly include the 
pattern of oil reserves, production, export and the revenues 
generated through the sale of crude oil. 
The last part of this chapter is devoted to the 
linkages and covers the relationship of the oil industry with 
the rest of the Iranian economy. It is after all this aspect 
which connects the welfare the country as a whole with the 
leading sector of the economy, that is oil. 
The remaining discussion in this chapter will proceed 
along the same line, and in the same order as conceived 
above. At the end, a few important conclusions will be drawn 
on the basis of our understanding regarding the oil industry 
in Iran during the 19708. 
Until the early 1970s, for all practical purposes the 
oil industry in West-Asia was dominated by the major oil 
companies of the United States of America and Western Europe. 
What ever structure of the industry existed in the oil 
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producing countries of West-Asia and North Africa was 
virtually an extension of the international dyneunics in which 
the producing countries had very little role to play. 
Circumstances for change, if any, may have originated in West 
Asia but the nature of change that took place was decided 
upon by the operating companies rather than the producing 
countries. 
Historically speaking, Iran was the country in West 
Asia where the structure of oil industry changed in its very 
early stages, and quite often the Iranian initiatives worked 
as a catalyst of major changes all over industry, of course, 
not always to the advantage of the producers. For instance 
the shape that the Iranian oil industry took after the 
nationalization of 1951 was a unique example in the history 
of world oil industry. The failure of the then Iranian 
government to effectively run the industry on its own after 
the nationalization and the formation of "Consortium" was 
perhaps a very significant and crucial change which 
affected not only structure of the industry in Iran but 
elsewhere also. Instead of competing with each other, the 
major oil companies adopted the strategy of cooperation. 
Not only in Iran but practically everywhere else a process of 
horizontal integration of companies began in the upsrream 
activities. This was the biggest structural change in the 
oil industry since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
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Most of the de ta i l s pertaining to the nature of th is change 
have already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , the Consortium agreement was 
signed in 1954 and was to continue unt i l 1979. At the t i»e of 
concluding the agreement the companies had recognised the 
pr incip le of na t iona l i za t ion but the real s i tua t ion was that , 
" I t ( the Consortium agreement) gave t o the I r a n i a n s the 
shadows of what they sought, while reta in ing for the Br i t ish 
the substance of what they had". 
Fesharak i a rgues t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e C o n s o r t i u m ' s 
agreement r e c o g n i z e d t h a t th e a s s e t s and t h e r e s e r v e s 
belonged to I r a n , the r i g h t of the companies to operate 
them, and operate the way they l iked was c l e a r l y and c leverly 
protected by various provisions of the agreement. There was 
prac t ica l ly no di f ference between the 50-50 p r o f i t sharing 
agreements signed in other producing c o u n t r i e s and the 
"Consortium agreement" of I r a n except f o r the n a t i o n a l 
ownership of the assets and reserves. The host country in 
e i t h e r case could not i n t e r f e r e in the running of the 
2 
concession. 
1. Stocking, G.W., Middle East Oil. Panguin, London, 1971, 
as cited in Fesharaki, F. Development of the Iranian Oil 
Industry. Praeger, London, 1976, page 50. 
2. Fesharaki, F., Ibid.. page 50. 
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By the first quarter of the 1970s, however, the 
circumstances had drastically changed and the producing 
countries were in the position to assert their sovereignty in 
a real scene over their hydro-carbon resources. 
In order to understand important developments in the 
Iranian oil industry after 1973, it is very necessary to 
examine the overall changes brought about by OPEC's struggle 
to obtain better price over the industry. Iran can not be 
separated from the OPEC. 
In the following section, it is proposed to briefly 
examine, first the role of the OPEC during the 1970's in 
the context of price changes and ownership pattern and then 
highlight Iran's own struggle to effect changes in its 
relationship pattern and then highlight Iran's own struggle 
to effect changes in its relationship with the Consortium. 
The second part would constitute the internal dynamics of the 
Iraniam oil industry. 
Iran in the OPEC (1971-1978) 
The changes that the Iranian oil industry witnessed 
during the seventies, both in terms of the structure and its 
performance, were the result of two parallel processes. On 
the one hand, it reflected the collective success achieved 
by the OPEC against the maijor oil companies and on the otner 
they were part of the internal dynamics in which the 
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government of Iran was trying to obtain better terms from the 
Consortium of companies operating 95 percent of the known 
Iranian oil deposits. 
This section deals with the first process because 
without a clear understanding of the collective bargaining of 
the OPEC it is impossible to have a true perception of the 
changes that took place within the Iranian oil industry. 
Struggle for Prices 
The Tehran and Tripoli Agreements 
The ten years period between the inception of OPEC in 
1960, and the Tehran agreement of 1971 can be described as 
the era of struggle on the part of OPEC member countries 
against the stronghold of the major oil companies. Little 
that they could achieve was too insignificant to have any 
appreciable impact on the relationship between the producing 
companies and the host governments. 
The ice started breaking after the Libyan governawnt 
successfully pressurized the companies to come to terms Kith 
Libya's aspirations and sign an agreement on 4 September 1970 
resulting in an increase of 30 per cent per barrel in the 
posted price of Libyan oil, 92 cent increase thereafter in 
the next five years, and an increase in the tax-rate to 58 
percent. Saudi Arabia followed the suit. This great 
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achievement of the Libyan government was supported by all 
OPEC member countries but that was a libyan achievement. 
As far as the OPEC was concerned the real break through 
was achieved through the Tehran agreement of 1971. This 
development had far reaching consequences for the oil 
industry in the Persian Gulf region as a whole. 
With the dawn of 1970s a number of wholly unexpected 
developments took place in the world oil market. In 1970 the 
demand for oil began to increase in the west due to an upturn 
in the economic activity. The shortage of tankers and the 
tight refinery capacity in Europe prevai1ing at that time 
also made the West Asian supplies suddenly crucial for the 
oil industry. 
Back in the West Asian region, the Libyan controversy, 
was brewing. The new revolutionary regime of Colonel Gadaffi 
was hell bent on obtaining a higher price of Libyan Oil since 
it enjoyed a freight advantage after the closure of the Suez 
Canal and was of better quality as compared to most of the 
Persian Gulf crudes. Taking advantage of the tanker crisis 
and the Algerian support, the new Libyan government ordered 
the Occidental Oil Company, which had one-third of its total 
business from Libya, to cut back its production. The Libyans 
officially proclaimed that the cuts were aimed at 
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conservation of oil, but the fact was that the cut back 
provided a tactical advantage in the negotiations with the 
Company. The companies would not hold on to the pressure and 
very soon the Libyan government obtained a $ 0-30 per barrel 
increase in the oil prices, and a hike in their taw rates 
from 50 per cent to fiunounts varying from 54 to 58 per cent. 
Libyan victory over the companies had a snowballing 
effect. In December 1970 the OPEC decided that its Persian 
Gulf members should also press for an increase in their oil 
prices. After an initial tough instance, the Compemies agreed 
to hold talks which began in Tehran in January 1971. The 
Companies wanted to negotiate with all the members of the 
OPEC so as to avoid leapfrogging, but they could not succeed 
in their efforts and parallel talks began in Tripoli as well. 
Tehran agreement was ultimately signed on 14. February 
1971 between the Persian Gulf OPEC countries (Iran, Iraq, 
Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain) on the one side and 22 
operating companies on the other. It gave the Persian Qulf 
countries a 33 cents rise in basic oil prices in 1971 and an 
additional 2 cent per barrel in settlement for the freight 
disparities. After that 5 cents increase was agreed upon 
each year upto 1975. All discounts and allowances were 
eliminated. The income tax rate was also increased from 50 
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per cent to 55 per cent. This was a very big success aiHi a 
turning point in the history of the OPEC. 
In the very next month fresh negotiations started in 
Tripoli which materialized on 2 April 1971 is signing 
agreement for a 90 cents increase in the posted price of 
Libyan crude and an income tax rate at 55 per cent. The 
companies also agreed to pay the Libyan government 7 cents 
increase in posted price to reflect the world demand and an 
additional 9 cents per barrel surcharge over and above 55 per 
cent income tax. 
Benjamin Shwadran has best summarized the position that 
emerged out of these agreement as: 
"The achievement of Tehrem and Tripoli agreements nust 
be marked as the end of an old era and the beginning of a new 
one in the relationship between the producing countries and 
the concessionaire companies. Not only did the companies 
concede to all the demands of the producer governments, but 
the negotiations revealed the growing power, self confidence, 
and inflexibility of the governments, whereas the companies 
appeared weaker and almost helpless. The producers eme'-ged 
strengthened by their attainments and ready, with ever 
greater vigor, to continue the struggle to ultimate victory. 
The Companies emerged from their experience rather tinid, 
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they realized that their power was rapidly declining. 
Publicly the companies expressed satisfaction with the 
agreements, proclaiming that five years of stability of oil 
supply and price had been guaranteed, but this was a face 
saving device. They knew that very soon new demands would be 
made and there would be no alternative but to concede to 
them".^ 
2. Minor Price Adjustments (1971-1973) 
The Tehran agreement of February 1971 was supposed to 
have created a mechanism which would give stability to the 
oil market through an agreed time-taible for increase in oil 
prices upto 1975. But that turned out to be a very short 
lived hope. In the second half of the same year the United 
States floated the dollar which in effect meant its 
devaluation. The oil producing countries of OPEC claimed a 
compensation for the loss of the value of their oil which was 
denominated in US currency. The compemies agreed in January 
1972 to raise the Gulf oil prices by 8.49 per cent. 
In February 1973 the US dollar was once again 
devaluated by 10 per cent and consequently the Persian Qulf 
Oil prices were raised again by 5.8 per cent w.e.f. 1st of 
April. The sliding of the dollar was faster in real terms 
3. Shwadran, B. Middle East Oil Crisis since 1973. Westview, 
London, 1986, page 27. 
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than the compensatory price rise of the oil leading to 
growing disappointment in the OPEC. The companies which knew 
that their bargaining position had been eroded, agreed in 
June the same year to another hike of 11.9 per cent 
(including 5-8 percent in April) and agreed to a system of 
periodic adjustment on the monthly basis according to the 
movement of the U.S. dollar in relation to the average index 
of 12 major currencies. These increases in oil prices raised 
the oil revenues of the Persian Gulf produce substantially. 
During the same period the U.S. demand for oil had also 
increased at a very fast pace. U.S. imports of oil from the 
Persian Gulf area increased from 0.6 million b.d. in 1971 to 
1.7 million b.d. in 1973. This rise in U.S. oil demand 
created a wide gap between the posted prices and actually 
realized prices of oil which the Persian Gulf producers were 
able to sell directly in the market out of their share in 
production. 
This dichotomy of posted and realized prices also gave 
the producers a feeling of great loss in terms of income tax 
receipts which were calculated on the basis of posted price. 
They soon demanded from the companies to begin negotiations 
for a suitable price increase so that the posted price was 
brought above the realized price and there was no suffering 
on account of income tax realization. They demanded a 70 per 
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cent increase but the companies were waiting for negotiations 
that the six Persian Gulf members of the OPEC announced which 
was a 70 per cent increase for the Arabian Light (marker 
crude) from $ 3.01 to $ 5.12 leading to a government take 
from $ 1.77 to 3.05.^ 
The effect of these price increases on Iranian revenue 
was quite substantial. Iran's oil revenues shot-up suddenly 
from $ 1851 million in 1971 to $ 4,399 million in 1973. 
3. The Oil Embargo and Price Revolution of 1973-74 
As things were halting up in the oil market, the second 
Arab-Israel War broke out on 7 October 1973 between Egypt and 
Israel, Saudi Arabia which was cleunouring for leadershio of 
the Arab world ever since the downfall of Nasir took a tough 
instance against those favouring Israel. Although there is 
more to it than meets the eye the OPEC decision to impose a 
total oil embargo on the United States and Netherlands caused 
glitters in the oil market. More deadly than this was the 
decision of Arab producers to cut back production by 5 per 
cent from the September level and go on doing so at the rate 
of 5 per cent every month until the complete Israel 
withdrawal from all Araib territories occupied in June -969 
and the Legal rights of the Palestinians are restored. Some 
4. Europa Publication, The Middle East and North Afr7ca. 
1975-76. London, 1975, page 84. 
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Arab countries cut the production beyond 5 per cent and upto 
10 per cent. 
Iraq and Libya did not favour the embargo and advocated 
more radical action. Iraq suggested outright nationalization 
of the oil industry, something that it had already done in 
1972. Taking advantage of the prevailing situation it went 
ahead on its own and nationalized Exxon and Mobile interests 
in the Basrah Petroleum Compstny. In fact, it was because of 
the temporary shortage caused by the embargo that Iraq was 
able to sell its oil more easily than other wise possible. 
Iran was obviously not a party to the dispute because 
it had nothing to do with the intra-Arab dynamics. Though a 
temporary advantage, Iran also benefitted from the embargo. 
In open auction the NIOC was able to fetch a very high p'-ice 
for its oil. In December that year for instance, it sold its 
free sale crude at a price as high as $ 17.40 per barrel. 
A slightly deeper analysis of the oil embargo of 1973 
would reveal that it was essentially a political measure and 
a demonstration of Arab solidarity against Israel and tnose 
western countries which supported Israel inside the Arab 
world, it was a game of influence and leadership. Saudi 
Arabia whicn always looked towards the United States for the 
security of its system and the regime decided to use oil as a 
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p o l i t i c a l weapon only because i t d id not want to leave the 
i n i t i a t i v e in the hands of rad ica ls . That i s why without any 
subs tan t ia l change of equat ions i t was Saudi Arab ia on ly 
which seemed a l l too keen to withdraw the embargo. In the 
meantime, there came what the consumers ca l led as the F i r s t 
Oi l Stock of 1973. On 22-23 December 1973 the o i l minister of 
the Persism Gulf decided in Tehran to u n i l a t e r a l l y increase 
t h e o i l p r i c e s f rom $ 5.11 t o $ 11.65 per b a r r e l , 
representing a 130 per cent h ike . Compared to 1 October 1973 
pr ice level of $ 2.59 the December 23 increase meant a f u l l 
400 per cent r ise in o i l p r i ces . Now the stage was already 
set fo r the formal l i f t i n g of the embargo which in any case 
had los t i t s teeth . The OAPEC on 18 March 1974 announced the 
withdrawal of the embargo. 
For the purpose of t h i s study i t i s not important to 
examine the ro le the Arab o i l embargo played in cast ing the 
die in favour of the OPEC. Most probably, these were other 
economic f ac to r s which played a more impor tan t r o l e i n 
l i f t i n g the t i d e i n f a v o u r o f t he p r o d u c e r s . What i s 
important is the over a l l e f f ec t of OPEC's great struggle f o r 
o b t a i n i n g j u s t and f a i r p r i c e s f o r t h e i r h y d r o - c a r b o n 
resources' f o r a l l OPEC members. I t meant more resources at 
t h e i r command to pursue fu r the r economic development. For, i t 
was perhaps a g r e a t e r ach ievement because i t s l a r g e 
populat ion and untapped economic potent ia l was wai t ing f o r 
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extra monetary resources and the oil price hike of 1973 
ensured that they would now be available. 
Price increase After 1974: The Controversy within OPEC 
Upto December 1973, when the OPEC successfully brought 
the price level of oil to $ 11.65, there was a rare unanimity 
among its members. Saudi Arabia and Iran had different 
perceptions regarding the level of increase, but the climate 
was such that they could reconcile there differences and an 
over all 400 per cent increase in prices was unilaterally 
affected. 
But after that, for a variety of reasons both political 
and economic, not only that the OPEC members had a different 
view about further hike in prices, they quite often 
threatened for a show down and go in for separate oil arice 
structure. 
In different meetings of the OPEC, the member countries 
were roughly divided in three groups. Countries like Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait which had a very small population, limited 
absorptive capacity and large surpluses were keen to freeze 
the oil prices or at best raise them very marginally. Saudi 
Arabia specially for its very special relationship with the 
5. For details see, Shwadra, B., oo.cit.. pp.53-57, 
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U.S. did not want to rub the West on the wrong side any 
further. On the other extreme countries such as Iran and Iraq 
which had a comparatively large population and a divers-jfied 
economic potential always pleaded for higher and higher 
prices for oil. Countries like Libya and Algeria joined this 
group quite often more for ideological and political reasons. 
The third group was those of smaller producers who were happy 
with what ever they got and were found some where in between 
the two extremes. 
In this condition the price of oil did increase a 
number of times but every time it was a marginal increase. 
Between January 1974 and January 1979 the total increase 
effected for the Arabian Light was from $ 11.65 per barre' to 
$ 13.34 per barrel. For some time it even led to a 3ual 
pricing system, which later in 1975 converted to a single 
price system. The main monetary gains after 1974 were in the 
nature of royalty increase. 
With this brief study of OPEC's struggle and success on 
the price front, a look at the changes in the pattern of 
ownership is in order. 
6. For exact Iranian position see, various interviews and 
statements by the Shah and other officials in y£ES 
(hereafter MEES) 2 January 1976 (Supp.), 7 November •'97& 
(Supp.) and 9 November 1976. 
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Struggle for Greater Control 
Parallel to the drive for obtaining a better and more 
realistic price structure for the crude oil, the OPEC meiBbers 
were equally keen to have some control over the oil industry 
in their respective countries. The old concession agreements, 
even after a few minor changes in favour of the producing 
states, were still by and large monopolistic in nature. 
Producing states had either no or merely notional ownership 
rights over their petroleum resources. The OPEC in its 
feunous "Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy" of 1968 
had raised the issue but it was not until the dawn of the 
1970s, that the companies agreed to seriously negotiate the 
matter. For the oil producing states this issue was equally 
if not more important than raising the price of their crude 
oil. This would mean a structural change in favour of the 
producing states not only in the upstresun operations but this 
measure would also facilitate some foothold in the downstream 
activities also. 
However, it is necessary to point out that while the 
struggle for control over the oil industry was launched by 
the OPEC, various groups in the OPEC and some of its meabers 
pursued the objective in different manners. For instance, 
while countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya and Algeria preferred 
launching separate struggles, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and small 
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Shaikhdoms opted for a joint struggle and negotiations with 
the Companies. 
In this section we shall deal first with the joint 
efforts of the Arab Gulf States for participation and then 
concentrate on the Iranian effort to negotiate a separate 
deal with the Consortium. Cases of Iraq, Libya and Algeria 
will be left out although they also contributed a great deal 
in the overall success of the producing states to obtain more 
control on their oil industry. 
The Issue of Participation 
The concept of partnership was already introduced by 
Iran through its joint-venture contracts with a number of 
independent oil companies in 1971, but it was confined to the 
areas outside the old concession agreement with the 
Consortium. 
The real issue at stake was how to obtain control in 
the existing concessions with the major oil Companies. There 
were the concessions which either controlled the entire oil 
production of the countries or were sitting over the most 
potential areas. 
Emboldened by their success on the price front at the 
Tehran and Tripoli round of negotiations, and the prevailing 
sellers market, the OPEC in its 25th conference in Vienna in 
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July 1971 gave a call for negotiations for participation of 
the producing states in the existing old concessions also. As 
stated earlier several countries including Iran opted for 
separate deals for their countries. Only Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and smaller Gulf State decided to negotiate participation 
under the joint leadership of Saudi Arabia. 
Shaikh Zaki Yamani, who was the Chief negotiator asked 
for an initial 25 per cent participation raising upto 51 per 
cent participation over the year and offered compensation 
based on the net book value of the assets of the Companies. 
But the coapanies were willing to part with only 20 per cent 
and asked for compensation based on the value of the 
reserves. 
The hard negotiations went on for some time but 
ultimately the companies agreed in December 1972 to an 
immediate 25 per cent stake in the concessions. Mith 
provision to raise it to 51 per cent over the next ten years. 
As regards the compensation, the producing states agreed to 
compensate the companies on the basis of "up-dated book 
value** of assets. A suitable arrangement was also worked out 
for the sale of producing countries* share of crude oil. They 
were categorised in three different groups and were to be 
sold either directly or through the compemies under separate 
terms and conditions. 
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As the time passed by, even this general agreement was 
modified further in favour of the producing countries. For 
instance the Kuwaiti General Assembly refused to ratify the 
agreement and asked for better terms. Saudi Arabia, which had 
ratified the agreement also later tried for a better deal and 
finally by the end of 1972, they obtained 60 per cent 
participation. 
This development which was truly historic in OPEC's 
struggle for greater control over the oil industry has a very 
positive effects on Iran's effort to negotiate with the 
Consortium. We shall now go over to the Iranian efforts in 
that direction 
The 1973 Iranian Agreement with the Consortium 
Emboldened by the change in the over all bargaining 
position of the oil producing states in the Persian Gulf 
region and the positive structural changes brought about by 
the Tehran agreement of 1971, the Iranian government 
announced in March 1973 its intentions of taking over the 
entire oil industry in the country after the expiring of the 
twenty five year Consortium agreement in 1979. This was a 
very calculated move. As was expected the oil companies got 
disturbed by the announcement and were very keen to protect 
their commercial interest as much as possible beyond 1979 
also. They very well knew that they no longer had the same 
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kind of privileged position as they enjoyed back in 1951 and 
1954. 
The Iranian monarch quickly offered two options to the 
Consortium of companies. Either they continue their 
operations in the same form and become an ordinary buyer of 
Iranian oil without any preferential treatment in 1979 or 
agree to an immediate take over of the industry by Iran and 
retain the possibility of some privileges beyond the expiry 
of the 1954 agreement. The new agreement was for twenty five 
years during which the companies would be eligible for a 
preferential treatment over other purchases of Iranian oil in 
terms of prices and the guarantee of supplies. The Companies 
after due consideration agreed in principle to go in for the 
second option which contained elements of protection at least 
for their future interests. 
Unlike the fifties, when every negotiation was hard and 
long drawn for the producing states, the 1973 agreement oil 
sale and purchase in Iran was a quick four month affair. In 
terms of the new agreement signed in July 1973, the status of 
the Consortium got transformed merely to a "service comoany' 
which would perform according to the policy dictates of the 
Iranian government every thing related to exploration, 
production and transport of oil. In return they would be 
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given a preference over the buyers. Some of the important 
provisions of the 1973 agreement which was signed between the 
NIOC and the consortium were as follows: 
1. The agreement was to be effective retrospectively fro« 21 
March 1973 and for the nine month period upto the end of 
December 1973, the Consortium would pay 55 cents per barrel 
for the crude supposed to have been purchased from the NICX:. 
This would be in addition to the income tauc calculated on the 
basis of difference between that figure and the posted price. 
2. The production policy would be decided by the NIOC and 
according to the initial stipulation, the NIOC would produce 
42.5 billions barrels of crude oil over the twenty five year 
period between 1973-1993. Of this amount 29.3 billion barrels 
(69 per cent) would be lifted by the Consortium, 6 billion 
barrels (14- per cent) would be for domestic use and the 
remaining 7.2 billion barrels (17 per cent) for the direct 
sale by the NIOC. The production increase was also to be on 
a predecided manner. From 4.2 million b.d. in 1971 to 7.6 
million b.d. by 1977. The production would re«ain at the 
1977 level for the next seven years and then gradually 
decrease to 1.5 million barrel by 1993. 
7. Fesharaki, F., op.cit.. page 58. 
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3. The price of oil delivered by NIOC to the Consortium 
would (including Abadan refinery) be based on the following 
criteria: 
(a) An operating cost of 10-11 cent per barrel. This may rise 
when NIOC undertakes secondary recovery method. 
(b) A full expensed royalty of 12.5 per cent of posted 
prices. 
(c) The balancing margin principle, which takes into account 
the benefits Iran would have received under participation but 
allowing for the Consortium companies' depreciation charges 
on the remaining unamortized net book value of their assets 
in Iran. The margin is estimated at 6.5 cents per barrel 
until the end of 1975, but subject to revision there after. 
(d) interest on 60 per cent of the capital expenditure 
provided by NIOC to increase the production capacity of the 
Iranian oil fields. This will last only for five years, which 
embraces the period of meyor capacity expansion. The interest 
payable is estimated to be 0.418 cent per barrel in 1973, but 
this will increase in future years. The remaining 40 per cent 
of capital requirements necessary to expand production v«i 11 
be advanced by the Consortium compemies as payment for crude 
oil purchases. 
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A close analysis of the new 1973 agreement between the 
NIOC and the Consortium reveals that the change brought about 
by this agreement in the relationship between the Iranian 
government and the Companies had far reaching effects on the 
structure of Iranian oil industry. 
The first and foremost implication was that the new 
government brought about a kind of "dis-integration" of the 
old structure under which the Consortium had a complete 
control over the whole range of operation both "upstream" and 
"down stream" in terms of crude production, refining and 
distribution. The drastic change in the upstream 
administrative structure and the ownership and control in 
favour of the Iranian government (via NIOC) was too 
pronounced to be disputed. Of course the new integration was 
yet to take place, though the NIOC was gearing up to assume 
that responsibility also. 
The Last Iranian Dispute 1975-78 
The turbulence of 1973-75 upset all the calculations of 
the operating cooipanies as well as producing states of the 
Persian Gulf region. Iran was no exception. The arrangement 
worked out under the 1973 NIOC Consortium agreement could 
8. Hawdon, David (ed.). The Changing Structure of the World 
Oil Industry. Croom Helm, London, 1985, page 81. 
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also not hold the ground for very long. By the end of 1975 
very serious disputes emerged between the Iranian government 
and the Consortium companies. 
The Iranian government accused the Companies of a) 
failing in their commitment under the 1973 agreement to 
contribute 40 per cent of capital investment in Iran's oil 
production programme through advance payments against future 
oil deliveries. According to the NIOC, the Companies failed 
to provide its share of investment during the last six months 
of 1975 amount to pay $ 30 million first instalment of 1976 
as well, and, b) not lifting full quantity of Crude agreed 
upon. 
During 1975 alone the Companies brought on an average 
740,000 b/d less than their nominations. The Shah v<arned the 
companies that if the Companies did not fulfil their 
cormnitment regarding the investment, Iran would revise its 
q 
prices of Oil. The then, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas 
Hoveida also described the shortfall in consortiin lifting in 
1975 as "an attempt to force Iran to reduce its prices" and 
asserted that the NIOC was quite capable of handling the sale 
of all Iran's oil exports. He held the companies responsible 
for $ 2.1 billion deficit in the Iranian budget of 1976-77.^° 
9. Middle East Economic Survey. 23-30 January 1976, page 2 
10. MEES. 13 February, 1976, page 5. 
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The Companies, on their part, expressed inability to 
continue with their 40 per cent share of investment which was 
estimated at $ 500 million for 1976 because of the 
insufficient margin actually allowed to them. They accused 
that they were being allowed only 10-15 cents b/d margin as 
against a fixed 22 cents b/d anticipated.^ 
The dispute got further complicated because of 
occasional big falls in the Iranian production. Both sides 
kept on fixing the responsibility on the other. Long drawn 
negotiations continued until 1978 but the forces of 
revolution undertook the events before a final conclusion 
could be arrived at. 
The Quantitative Aspects 
Iran has the distinction of being the first country in 
the West Asia - North Africa region where oil was discovered 
and produced. After granting a concession in 1901, the First 
exploration compemy was formed in Iran as far back as in 1903 
and the coaamercial production began at the historic Masjid-e 
Sulaiman in 1908. 
As the progress was achieved, need grew and technology 
improved, more and more search operations were conducted to 
11. Ibid. 
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locate oil and ascertain its magnitude. Starting from 0.27 
million ton in 1913-14, no one could imagine that one day 
Iran would become one of the most important producers of oil. 
In the following section we shall discuss in some 
details the position of Iranian oil reserves and production 
during the 1970s. 
Oil Reserves 
Iran's proven oil reserves in more recent times (1969-
1979) are given in Table 3-1. During this period the Iraniem 
reserves position was stable ranging between 13.29 and 14.54 
per cent in proportion to total OPEC reserves. In the context 
of the World reserves, however, the Iran's position seems 
somewhat declining perhaps because of significant discoveries 
in non-OPEC areas. In absolute terms, however, Iran has taken 
a few magor les^ is forward as far as its oil reserves are 
concerned. Beginning from 55 billion barrels in 1969. Iran's 
reserves position improved very considerably in the next five 
years. By 1974, it had 66 billion barrels with it, an 
increment of 10 billion barrels compared to 1969. 
Within Iran, most of the oil reserves are located in 
Khuzestan lying in the south-western part of the country. 
However, in the 1960s and 1970, oil in lesser but significant 
quantities has been found in other parts of Iran as well, 
especially in the offshore areas. 
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TABLE 3.1 
PROVEN OIL RESERVES, WORLD, OPEC AND IRAN 
(1969, 1973-1979) 
(million barrels) 
Year 
1969 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Source: 
Total World 
534,219.9 
580,495.7 
654,102.6 
624,577.4 
612,350.6 
617,508.8 
621,895.0 
631,596.0 
OPEC 
398,750.0 
420,887.7 
487,439.1 
448.947.6 
440,414.8 
438,247.4 
443,794.0 
436,179.0 
OPEC. Statistical Bulletin 
Iran 
55,000 
60,000 
66,000 
64,500 
63,000 
62,000 
59,000 
58,000 
, 1987. 
Iran as X 
of world 
13.79 
10.33 
10.09 
10.32 
10.23 
10.04 
9.46 
9.18 
Iran as X 
of OPEC 
13.79 
14.25 
13.54 
14.36 
14.30 
14.14 
13.29 
13.29 
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However, while discussing the oil reserve position in 
Iran or for that matter any where in the world, it is 
necessary to mention that the estimates for reserves vary 
considerably from one source of information to the other. The 
position of proven oil reserves also changes from time to 
time not only on the basis of new information available but 
also on the basis of the "recovery factor" on the rate at 
which oil can be extracted out of "oil in place" in any 
particular area or the country. Multiplying the "Oil in 
Place" by the "recovery factor" gives the figure of "proven 
oil reserves". In Iran the recovery factor is generally 
around 18X and it is expected that this factor will go up in 
the days to come. It is difficult for us to go into all these 
details because of the limitation of scope and the lack of 
available information. Therefore the oil reserves of Iran are 
taken as they are available from the OPEC sources. 
Oil Production 
It is well known that Iran is one of the major 
producers of oil in the West Asian region. Going by the past 
record, the position of Iran as an oil producer has been 
chemging from time to time in the regional context. Back in 
1951, Iran was the largest producer of oil, next only to the 
United States of America in the non-Soviet block. At that 
time it supplied nearly 18.9 per cent of the total Middle 
Eastern Oil. This position was lost for some time after the 
110 
disruption caused by the nationalization of the oil industry. 
In the 1960s it was relegated to the fourth position in the 
Persian Gulf area but since the early seventies, Iran is back 
to the position of the second largest oil producer in the 
area after Saudi ArabiaJ^ Since then Iran has maintained in 
status as such and the Iranian oil production policies have 
had very considerable effect on not only the West Asian oil 
market but also on the world market. In the same proportion, 
Iran's voice in the OPEC has commanded due influence and the 
position taken by Iran in the event of any dispute or 
contingency concerning oil has considerably influenced the 
course of events world over as far as the oil and energy 
issues are concerned. 
In the national context, however, the Iranian oil 
production policies have been formulated mainly on the basis 
of two factors. One, the existing world market structure and 
demsmd and two, the Iranian national priorities and its lack 
of financial resources for the economic development of the 
country. 
In this section it is proposed to examine the trends in 
the oil production of Iran on the basis of various oil fields 
12. Fesharaki, F., op.cit.. page 202. 
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and the producing companies, besides the overall trend in the 
country as a whole. But before that is done, it is necessary 
to discuss briefly the oil market structure and its demand 
during the reference period of this chapter i.e. 1973-1978 
and the national priorities of Iran during the same period. 
As far as the market structure is concerned it is 
important to recall that during the last three quarters of 
the 1970s the oil prices shot up very considerably providing 
Iran with the prospects of enhanced oil revenues. Similarly 
the structure of oil industry underwent drastic 
transformation during this period. Emboldened by the success 
of the "Participation" effort of several Arab Oil producers 
of the Persian Gulf area and the nationalization of oil 
industry in Iraq, the Iranian government also asserted its 
right to have greater control over its oil resources which 
were for all practical purposes dominated by the Consortium 
of companies under the 1954 agreement. Through the 1973 NIOC-
consortiuffl agreement, which has already been discussed in 
detail earlier, the Iranian government for the first time 
succeeded in exercising direct control over the oil 
production of the country and also decided about the shape 
that the downstream activities would take in the country in 
future. 
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As fa r as the out look of market demand f o r o i l was 
concerned the 1970s, have wi tnessed a number of phases. 
After the i n i t i a l surge in the US demand from 1971-1973, the 
world economy in general experienced a s p e l l of recess ion 
during 1975. But soon the process of recovery began i n 1976 
and continued through the rest of the decade. On an average 
the indus t r ia l i zed countr ies of the west recorded a growth 
ra te of 3.4 per cent per year w h i l e the economy of the 
developing countr ies grew at the rate of 5.0 per cent. The 
overal l impact of t h i s growth pattern on the demand fo r o i l 
was very pos i t ive and the 1970s can general ly be described as 
a period of comfortable o i l demand. This o i l market st ructure 
and demand is re f lec ted also to a very great extent in the 
t r e n d s i n I r a n ' s p r o d u c t i o n o f c rude o i l d u r i n g the 
seventies. 
The second major determinant of o i l production as noted 
e a r l i e r , was the nat ional p r i o r i t i e s of I r an . In t h i s context 
i t is important to mention that unl ike countr ies l i ke Saudi 
Arabia , Kuwait and other small Shaikhdoms o f the Arabian 
Peninsula, I ran i s a country w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t l y la rge 
populat ion and a f a i r l y la rge base o f o t h e r resources t o 
d e v e l o p . T h e r e f o r e , i t a lways needed e x t r a monetary 
resources for i t s various developmental schemes and p'ans. 
Oi l obviously is the asset which can eas i l y be monetizec and 
Iran has been extremely keen during the 1970s to make use of 
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this natural asset for development of other sectors of the 
economy. 
During the monarchy, this keenness had assumed a rather 
crazy dimension because the then government was in a 
tremendous hurry to have too much of development of little 
too soon. The Shah did not hide his ambition to transform 
Iran overnight into a modern and industrialized country. 
Whether, this kind of attitude had sound economic basis or 
not has been a matter of dispute and discussion among the 
planners and economists. But for the purpose of present 
discussion, one thing that clearly stands out is that Iran as 
a matter of policy, was interested in the early 1970s to 
produce as much of oil as possible and sell it at as high a 
price as possible. 
Iran's need for extra oil production is also reflected 
in the investment requirements of the Fifth Five Year Plan 
(1973-1978). In its pre-revised version also the government 
had planned a fixed investment of $ 36.84. billion for the 
development under this plan. After the revision in 1974 both 
the targets and monetary allocations were enhsmced rather 
surprisingly. The fixed investment for the revised Fifth 
Plan were increased from $ 36.84 billion to $ 69.59 billion 
1"? 
representing a 89 percent upward revision. "^  
13. Graham, R. Iran. The Illusion of Power. Groom Helm, 
London, 1978, Table 1, page 81. 
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It is in this background of Iran's national priorities 
and monetary requirements that we shall now try to look into 
the pattern of oil producing during our reference period. 
As mentioned earlier Iran has been the second largest 
producer of Crude oil in OPEC, after Saudi Arabia. Between 
1970 and 1978 Iran has roughly maintained its position as oil 
producer in relation to OPEC and the world out-side the 
Soviet block. Table 3.2 gives the break of Iran's Crude 
production as a percentage of OPEC amd the World production. 
As a proportion of OPEC's total production Iran has 
registered slow but consistent increase between 1970 and 1975 
starting from 16.35 per cent to 19.70 per cent and remained 
nearly around the same level for the remaining period until 
1979 when oil production suddenly dropped due to the oil 
workers' strike as a precursor to revolution. In the context 
of world production also nearly the ssune pattern has been 
witnessed. 
In absolute terms there was a sudden quantum jump in 
production in 1971 over the previous year when the production 
increased by 18.5 per cent in just one year. For the next 
three years, the oil production increased at a fast rate in 
relation to the previous year (See Table 3.3). It is 
important to mention here that until the 1973 NIOC-consortium 
agreement the government of Iran did not have a big say in 
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TABLE 3.2 
OIL PRODUCTION: WORLD. OPEC AND IRAN 
(1970-1979) 
('000 b,d) 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Source: 
Total World 
45,272.2 
47,854.7 
50,708.4 
55,478.9 
55,813.4 
52,746.1 
57,566.7 
59,806.7 
60,265.8 
62,800.1 
Total OPEC 
23,413.0 
25,326.3 
27,094.4 
30,988.5 
30,729.2 
27,155.0 
30,737.8 
31.253.5 
29,805.3 
30,928.9 
: OPEC. Statistical Bullet 
Iran 
3,829.0 
4,539.5 
5,023.1 
5,860.9 
6,021.6 
5,350.1 
5,882.9 
5,662,8 
5,241.7 
3,167.9 
in, 1987. 
Iran as X 
of World 
8.45 
9.48 
9.90 
10.56 
10.78 
10.14 
10.21 
9.46 
8.69 
5.04 
Iran as ! 
of OPEC 
16.35 
17.92 
18.53 
18.91 
19.59 
19.70 
19.13 
18.11 
17.58 
10.24 
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TABLE 3.3 
CRUDE PRODUCTION IN IRAN: ANNUAL CHANGES 
(1970-1978) 
('000 b/d) 
Year Production Annual Change X 
18.5 
10.65 
16.67 
2.74 
-11.15 
9.95 
-3.74 
-7.43 
Source: OPEC, Statistical Bulletin. 1987. 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
3,829.0 
4,539.5 
5,023.1 
5,860.9 
6,021.6 
5,350.1 
5,882.9 
5,662.8 
5,241.7 
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deciding the level of production. The increase until 1973 was 
perhaps due to the sharp increase in the U.S. demand for oil. 
The Arab Oil embargo in which Iran was not a party also had a 
positive impact on the level of Iranian production in 1973. 
After 1973, although the government was interested in higher 
production, it was basically the market forces which 
determined the actual level.. Production suddenly fell in 
1975 because of world recession in that year under pressure 
of higher prices. Then the recovery and adjustment process in 
1976 is also reflected in the production trend. But leaving 
aside these percentage changes, one can say that Iran's oil 
production remained quite stable between 1973 and 1978 around 
an annual average of 5670 million barrels per day. The 
government did not mind it because, its revenues were 
constantly rising due to increase in oil prices even at that 
production level and they were more than sufficient to fulfil 
the revenue requirements of that time. 
After this brief review of overall production trend, it 
would not be out of place to have an idea about the 
geographical and Company-wise break up of oil production in 
Iran. The Company-wise statement is also significant because 
it gives an idea about the structure of upstream activities 
in the oil industry of Iran before the revolution. Table 3.4 
shows Iranian production by operator, while Table 3.5 
provides the geographical spread. As far as the first 
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Years 
1969 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1978 
1977 
1978 
Total 
3,378 
5,881 
8,022 
5,350 
5,883 
5,883 
5,883 
TABLE 3.4 
DUIIAN OIL PMOUCTION (IT OPERATOR) 
Consortiu 
3,100 
(91.82! 
5,392 
(91.99) 
5,543 
(92.00) 
4,875 
(91.12) 
5,411 
(91.97) 
5,099 
(90.00) 
5,099 
(71.38) 
(1H9,1973-78) 
SIRIP 
27.0 
[10.15] 
72.0 
[17.261 
78.0 
[16.48] 
53.0 
[11.571 
45.0 
[ 9.95} 
45.0 
[ 8.24] 
na 
Joints Ventures 
IPAC 
104.0 
[39] 
93.0 
[22.30] 
132 
[28.83] 
177 
[38.60] 
208 
[46.00] 
273.0 
[50.00] 
335.0 
LAPOC 
119 
[44 .7 ] 
184.0 
[44 .12] 
195.0 
[42.29] 
175 
[38.20] 
152 
[33.6] 
182.0 
[33.3] 
174 
IHIKO 
18 
[1.01] 
68 
[16.30] 
58 
[12.58] 
S3 
[11.57] 
47 
[11.39] 
46 
[ 8.42] 
n 
{'mm) 
Total 
266 
(7.9) 
417 
(7.11) 
461 
(7.85) 
456 
(8.58) 
452 
(7.88) 
546 
(9.64) 
la 
Nice 
9 
(6.26) 
(6.29) 
(1.29) 
(6.31) 
(1.30) 
(1.31) 
na 
Source: Arab Oil m 6as Directory. 1979-80 ( ) = Percentage of Irama Total 
[ ] : As I of Joist venture 
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TULE 3.S 
n u pRoracTiM OF cmoE on IT F I H K 
IH72-H7S) 
( n l l i M barrils) 
1S72 1S73 1974 1975 1971 1977 1171 
Southirn Oil fields 1,781 1.997 1,979 1,752 2,019 1,116 I.J84 
(90.63) (92.07) (91.63) (91.20) (91.69) (69.0) (69.17) 
Naft-«-Shah Oil Fields 6 6 7 6 7 6 5 
direct production (0.30) (0.27) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (1.32) 
Joint venture covnies 178 166 169 163 171 217 113 
(90.0) (7.65) (7.84) (8.48) (7.76) (10.64) (11.50) 
Iran-Pan Aierican Oil 51 47 52 65 79 116 89 
Coipanr (IPAC) (Dvood, 
Forottzan, Abouzar. Soroush) 
Iran-Italian Oil Coipany 32 26 26 18 17 15 12 
(SIRIP) (Nouroz, Bargunsar) 
Lavan Oil Cotpany fUPCO) 65 68 71 61 57 69 41 
(SalMR) 
Iraniaa Marine International 31 25 20 19 18 17 11 
Oil Conany IIKINOCO) 
(Rostai) 
Total 1.965 2,169 2,155 1,921 2,197 2,039 1,552 
( I : as S to tOUl 
Source: Bank Harkazi Iran, Balance StiHt and Annual Renort. different issies. 
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criterion is concerned, the domination of the Consortium is 
pretty obvious. It handled and controlled nearly 90-92 per 
cent of the total crude production of Iran. 
The position of the remaining 8-10 per cent of 
production is also very significant to note. Until 1977, the 
role of NIOC as an independent oil producing identity was 
very very limited. It may handled the Naft-e-Shar oil field 
in Bakhtaran province. The other companies operating the 
fields out side the Consortium area and working under joint 
ventures shifted their position marginally over the years 
within a rather constant scope and proportion. 
The seune pattern is seen in the geographical spread of 
production (Table 3.5). The southern oil fields operated by 
the Consortium had the lion's share because of the reasons 
already discussed- The only oil field directly operated by 
the NIOC was Naft-e Shar which was left to it under the 1954 
agreement. The breakup other fields operated under the joint-
venture arrangement is also given. Most of these fields are 
the offshore ones which became operative after the new system 
of joint or service contract was adopted by the NIOC since 
1971. 
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Oil Exports 
Iran is a major producer and exporter of oil in the 
Persian Gulf area. The oil export profile of Iran from 1973 
to 1978 (Pre-revolution period) has been given in Table 3.6 
and Table 3.7. During the three years' period between 1973-75 
Iran on an average exported some 5056 thousand barrels of 
crude oil. In the next three years this average was reduced 
by nearly 1500 thousand b/d. This appreciable fall was due 
to sudden fall in the total demand after 1976 and also 
because of near total disruption of Iranian oil production 
due to a country-wide strike in the oil sector in the last 
three months of 1978. 
But most significant aspect, as far as the Iranian oil 
exports are concerned, is the mechanism and structure of oil 
exports in Iran. This structure is rather complex and very 
interesting to study. Upto 1979 oil exports in Iran were 
handled at three levels. At each level there was a different 
agency involved and each agency followed a different 
mechanism and worked according to its own priorities. The 
largest quantity of exports were handled by the Consortium. 
The second was the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) which 
began with very small quantities but gradually acquired more 
importance due to revision in relationship with other 
agencies. 
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And at the third level there were a number of 
independent companies working in Iran under the joint venture 
agreements and they managed oil export in a different manner. 
In the following part the crude oil export profile of Iran 
will be discussed under these three categories. ^  
The Consortium 
A large part of oil exports in Iran were handled 
according the sale and Purchase Agreement of 1973 with the 
Consortium. It is important to note that the exports by the 
Consortium were slightly less than what it produced because 
it delivered some crude oil for its Abadan refinery and some 
for other refineries on account of Nicx:. It also had to 
spare some crude oil for the NIOC which the latter was free 
to export directly under separate arrangements. This 
proportion has been changing through the years depending upon 
the revision of agreement with the NIOC. 
In 1973 the Consortium exported some 87.8 per cent of 
the total Iranian oil which was supplied with its affiliate 
companies to different destinations mostly in the markets of 
United States and Western Europe. By 1978, however, this 
share was reduced considerably to the level of 60.4 per cent 
14. Bank Markazi Iran, Barrasi-e-Taawulate-e-Iotisadi 
Kishwar Bad-Az-Inoilab. 1981, pp.127-128 (Persian). 
125 
because more and more o i l was connit ted to the NIOC. In 
a b s o l u t e terms on an average the o i l e x p o r t s o f the 
Consortium were reduced to 2996 thousand b/d during 1976-78 
as compared to 4332 thousand b/d in the previous three years. 
The NIOC 
The National Iranian Oil Company, which is the sole 
agency to aanage oil affairs of the country on behalf of the 
government of Iran, also undertakes oil exports directly. 
Although its role in the total oil exports of Irsm was very 
limited during 1973-78, it handled exports under various 
arrangements. 
NIOC's own production from the Naft-e-Shar (formerly 
Naft-e-Shah) oil field was very meagre. The oil it produced 
from the Consortium under the 1973 agreement was available 
for direct export. The other source of oil was 50 per cent 
share that the NIOC got from its partnership in the Joint-
Venture contracts operative mainly in the offshore areas. 
However, the direct exports of the NIOC increased very 
substantially from just over 447 thousand b/d between 1973-75 
to 1290 thousand b/d during 1976-78. This increase was, 
perhaps, due to enhanced capacity of the NIOC to handle 
direct exports in the World market. Formerly, the NIOC was 
not able to lift its entire 50 per cent share from the joint 
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venture. That is why its share in oil exports increased from 
a near 6.48 per cent in 1973 to 34.5 per cent in 1978. 
For some time the NIOC preferred to direct its export 
to the East European Markets because they were not quite open 
to Western Companies, but later on it concentrated more on 
the auctions in the open market because it more often than 
not fetched a better price. Except for the Madras Refinery 
in India, where the NIOC had a link-up jointly with AMOCO it 
did not go for long term arrangements like the Consortium 
companies. 
The Joint-Venture Companies 
This Group of Companies which mainly operated the 
offshore fields discovered after 1971, also undertook export 
of Iranian oil. Apart from their own share in the joint-
ventures they also handled the remaining oart of the 50 per 
cent share belonging to the NIOC and which the national 
company was not able to export directly. These companies 
normally sold this part of the Iranian oil in the 
international market at the market price or the "half way 
price" depending upon the nature of contract. Their exports 
have been generally stable through out the period except in 
1978 when they dropped suddenly to 175 thousand b/d from the 
level of 288 thousand b/d in the previous year. 
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As regards the direction of Iranian oil exports more 
than 70 to 75 per cent of it went to Western Europe and Japan 
in various years. The share of Central and North America 
varied between 10 to 15 per cent. 
Oil Revenues 
Oil revenues in different years were dependent upon the 
quantity of oil exports and the price level prevailing that 
year. As it is oil revenues were the most significant 
components of the total monetary resources of the Iranian 
government. It was because of this source of income, which 
almost entirely accrued in the form of foreign exchange, that 
Iran could maintain a fairly high level of per capita 
national income and embark upon massive economic development 
programme. The details of this aspect will be discussed in 
the following section as our present objective is limited to 
see only the pattern of growth in the oil revenues of the 
country between 1973-1978 or in other words, its qusmtitative 
aspect only. 
Movement of the oil production level and the oil prices 
have already been shown earlier. As indicated in Table 3.8 
the value of crude oil exports of Iran constituted an average 
well over 87.43 per cent of the total value of Petroleum 
exports between 1973-1978. Although efforts were on to 
increase the share of oil products in both the total 
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TABLE 3.8 
VALUE OF CRUDE AND PETROLEUM EXPORT 
(1973-1978) 
($ US million) 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Source: 
Val ue of Total 
Petroleum Export 
OPEC, 
5,617 
20,904 
19,634 
22,923 
23,599 
21.684 
Statistical 
Value of Crude 
Export 
4,399.2 
17,821.8 
18,433.2 
20,242.9 
21,210.2 
19,300.0 
Bulletin. 1987. 
X of Total 
Petroleum export 
78.31 
85.25 
93.88 
88.30 
89.87 
89.00 
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production and export of the country. Any other reason for 
higher percentage share of crude oil in the total value of 
Petroleum exports was that a great part of the petroleum 
products were- used for internal consumption which has been 
constantly increasing over the years. 
In absolute terms there was a tremendous increase in 
the oil revenues (mainly from the export of crude oil) 
between 1973 and 1974. But this increase in the value of 
crude exports as well as total petroleum exports was mainly 
due to a sudden and sharp increase in the prices of oil 
during 1973-74. Since then the oil revenues of Iran 
registered a slow increase and retained in the range of $ 
17.8 billion to $ 21.2 billion. It is difficult right now to 
determine the role played by production and price levels of 
crude oil in Iran in the total oil revenues of the country 
between 1973-78, although such an exercise might give some 
very interesting results. 
As far as the pattern of growth in the oil revenues of 
Iran is concerned, figures in table 3.9, show that as 
compared to 58.5 per cent annual growth in the oil revenues 
during the three years after 1970, the average growth of 
these revenues increased considerably in the next three 
years. 
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TABLE 3.9 
RATES OF GROVfTH IN THE VALUE OF CRUDE EXPORT 
(Percentage) 
Years 1970-73 1973-76 1976-79 
Value of Crude Export 
Value of Total Petro-
leum Export 
Source: Base on Table 3.8. 
Then it suddenly dropped to just about 0.42 per cent 
per year between 1976-79. This last phase is the one in 
which the production was disrupted for a few months prior to 
the revolution and more importantly the prices of oil were 
gradually but steadily going down-hill. 
The overall significance of the revenues generated by 
the oil sector of Iran will be discussed in their relation to 
the economy of Iran in the discussion that is going to 
follow. 
Oil and the Iranian Economy 
In the previous sections, we have discussed in some 
detail various aspects concerning the structure of the oil 
industry in Iran between 1973-1978, and the pattern of oil 
production, exports and revenues. It has been seen that 
58.47 
33 .55 
66 .32 
59 .80 
0 .42 
- 5 . 7 5 
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during this period, not only the structure of the industry 
underwent a great deal of transformation, but a very 
considerable growth was witnessed in the quantitative aspects 
as well. 
In this section an effort will be made to study the 
contribution of the oil industry to the Iranian economy 
without which any study of the oil industry will seem 
incomplete. However, due to certain limitations the focus of 
discussion will remain confined to the contribution of oil 
revenues in the general budget of the government and to the 
developmental activities undertaken through the Plan 
Organization. In the end, a brief reference will also be made 
to a few forward and backward linkages of the oil sector. 
We have already seen in chapter one the overall 
importance of the oil sector as a source of GDP over the 
years. Between 1973-1978, the oil sector contributed, on an 
average, nearly 30 per cent to the gross domestic product of 
the country. This share was much larger than the relative 
contribution of agriculture and the combined total of 
manufacturing, construction and power sectors' growth 
together under industry. 
Similarly in the total exports of the country the 
contribution of the oil sector has been enormous. In six. 
years since 1973 the oil sector has contributed between 90 to 
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99.9 per cent of the total value of export (Table 3.10). In 
other words it can be said that it was only because of the 
oil exports that the country could paid for its ever 
increasing imports requirements without resorting to much 
external borrowing. 
But even this is not a total picture. In order to have 
a real assessment of the importance of the oil sector for the 
economy one will have to look more closely into the fiscal or 
indirect influence of this sector on the economy of Iran. 
Support to Govemaents Ordinary Budget 
If one wants to have an idea about the true and real 
value of oil for the Iranian economy one way of doing so is 
to look at the relative importance of the oil revenues in the 
overall budgetary requirements of the government over the 
years. Table 3.11 is self explanatory in this respect. 
Between 1973 and 1977, the oil and gas sector has borne the 
responsibility of providing the bulk of the revenues to the 
general budget of the country.^^ During this period its 
contribution has ranged from a low of 66.9 per cent in 1973 
to a high of 86.4 per cent in 1974. In terms of the rate of 
growth over the same period also. While the share of oil 
15. 1978 being an abnormally low year for oil revenues has 
not been included in the present amalysis. 
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TABLE 3.10 
VALUE OF TOTAL EXPORTS, OIL EXPORTS AND NON-OIL EXPORTS 
(1973-1978) 
(minion US $) 
Year Total Export Oi1 Exports Non-Oi1 Export Oil X of 
Total 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
6,207 
20,941 
20,181 
23,541 
24,260 
22,476 
5,617 
20,904 
19,634 
22,923 
23,599 
21,684 
590 
637 
547 
618 
661 
792 
90.49 
99.98 
97.72 
97.73 
97.72 
96.64 
Source: OPEC, Statistical Bulletin. 1987 
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TABLE 3.11 
REVENUE, EXPENOnURES AND D E H C n OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN 
(1973-1978) 
billion rials 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1. Revenues 464.8 1,394.4 1,582.1 1,836.4 2,034.3 1.598.6 
o n and Gas 311.2 1,205.2 1,246.8 1,421.5 1,497.8 1,013.2 
(66.9) (86.4) (78.8) (77.4) (73.6) (63.4) 
Tax receipts 135.8 157.8 270.8 342.9 441.8 463.4 
2. Expenditures 478.0 1,254.4 1,569.4 1,874.0 2,422.8 1,986.0 
Current 316.2 727.8 929.3 1,047.3 1,223.0 1,272.4 
Fixed Invest- 161.2 348.7 526.8 591.6 921.6 572.2 
ment 
Pre-Payments 0 117.9 113.3 235.1 278.2 69,3 
3. Deficit (-) or -13.2 140.0 12.7 -37.6 -388.5 -387.4 
Surplus 
4. Met utilization 58.2 -7.2 -10.0 -18.9 347.9 280.0 
of doaestic 
credits 
5. Net utilization -1.9 -51.3 -14.0 7.8 13.9 0.8 
of foreign 
credits 
Source: Bank Narkazi Iran, Balance Sheet and Annual Report. Different 
Issues. 
( ) = as X to revenues. 
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revenues to the total registered an average increase of 48.1 
per cent per year the corresponding figure for the only other 
source of public revenue the tax receipts, showed a growth of 
only 34.3 per cent. Thus showing a continuous rising share of 
the former. 
This trend, which was an extension of the earlier 
pattern, had actually saved the government of resorting to 
harsh fiscal and monetary measures to make the ends meet. In 
other words one cam say that it was only because of the easy, 
consistent and assured supply of revenues through the oil 
sector that the Iranian economy could achieve such high rates 
of growth as it did during the 1970s and the people of Iran 
could enjoy a better standard of living without tightening 
their belts. However, it is extremely important to point out 
that the above amalysis is in terms of aggregates only and 
does not go into the question like who benefitted most out of 
the economic development. 
Apart from the indirect influence on terms of revenues, 
the oil sector had also been responsible for the bulk of the 
foreign exchange earnings of the country. Table 3.12 shows 
the position of Iranian foreign exchange receipt and payments 
during 1973-1978. In most of the years on an average well 
over 80 per cent of foreign exchange receipts came from the 
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TABLE 3.12 
RJREIGN EXCHANGE RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS 
(1973-1978) 
(million dollar) 
Current Account 
(Met) 
Current Receipts 
Oil and Gas 
Other goods 
Services 
1973 
345 
6,232 
4,945 
(79.3) 
548 
(8.8) 
739 
(11.8) 
1974 
8,483 
20,922 
18,654 
(89.1) 
563 
(2.6) 
1,705 
(8.1) 
1975 
2,914 
21,972 
19,074 
(86.8) 
447 
(2.0) 
2,451 
(11.1) 
1976 
4,157 
24,404 
20,671 
(84.7) 
472 
(1.9) 
3,261 
(13.3) 
1977 
1,293 
25,989 
20,926 
(80.5) 
595 
(2.2) 
4,468 
(17.1) 
1978 
-31.1 
23,207 
18,116 
(78.0) 
417 
(1.7) 
4,675 
(20-1) 
Current Paywnts -5,887 -12,439 -19,058 -20,247 -24,696 -23,239 
Goods -4,969 -10,644 -16,046 -16,060 -17,968 -13,551.4 
-3,012 -4,187 -6,728 
-3,607 -1,766 -1,005 
961 1,709 3,881 
-4,568 -3,475 -2,876 
-1,084 2,288 2,197 
5,076 -1,084 2,288 2,197 
Source: Bank Markazi I r a n , Balance Sheet and Annual Report. D i f fe ren t 
issues. 
( ) = as X to revenues. 
Services 
Capital Accowt 
(NET) 
Capital Receipts 
Capital Payonts 
Basic Balance 
Total Balance 
-918 
925 
1,505 
-580 
1,387 
1,151 
-1,795 
-3,220 
702 
3,922 
5,076 
-9,687. 
219. 
1.680. 
-1,461. 
65. 
65. 
2 
,3 
.5 
.2 
.6 
.6 
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export of oil and gas. The share of other goods has been 
miserably low in this context. It is important to note here 
that inspite of such enormous foreign exchange earned by the 
oil sector, Iran still needed additional sums and had to 
borrow money from outside. 
But if one compares the comfortable foreign exchange 
position of Iran during the 1970s with the kind of hardship 
other developing countries faced during the seune period, the 
importance of the oil sector immediately gets highlighted. 
It was only because of oil that Iran never required to bother 
about the level of its foreign exchange reserves. Oil was a 
constant source of foreign exchange. 
Support to the Development Expenditure 
The other important aspect of the indirect influence of 
the oil sector was through its contribution to financing the 
developmental activities of the country under the Five year 
plans. In almost all the plans, the contribution of oil 
revenues has been very significant, but for the sake of 
convenience we shall take up only the Fifth Five Year Plan 
(1973-1978), which incidentally coincides with our reference 
period for this chapter also. 
Generally speaking, during the Fifth Plan, out of the 
total monetary resources available from the oil sector, 32 
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per cent were u t i l i z e d f o r the general treasury requirements 
o f t he government w h i l e 68 per cen t went t o the Plan 
Organization. 
As already mentioned in Chapter I , the o r i g i na l F i f t h 
PI em was much smaller in i t s size both in terms of revenues 
and developmental expenditure. In 1974 a f te r the hike in o i l 
p r i ces i t was d r a s t i c a l l y rev ised upwards. This k ind of 
upward revis ion was possible only because of the projected 
increase in the con t r ibu t ion that was to come from the o i l 
sector in terms of rece ip ts . The revised t o t a l and sector 
a l loca t ion targets were aimed at achieving an overa l l growth 
r a t e o f 25.9 per cen t per yea r . Th i s a m b i t i o u s and 
phenomenal p l a n n i n g o f g rowth i n the economy was made 
possible only because of the prospects of o i l income. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e above f i s c a l and monetary 
cont r ibut ion of the o i l sector to the economy of I r a n , there 
were a large number of other very important l inkages, both 
forward and backward. 
Forward and Backward Linkages 
One of the most important amd obvious forward linkage 
of the o i l industry wi th the rest of the economy relates to 
the provision of cheap energy fo r the growth of other sectors 
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of the economy. Oil industry provided the country with 
almost unlimited supply of primary energy. This situation 
naturally induced greater emd greater energy consumption in 
the country, some of it was even wasteful. Since the per 
unit cost of energy supplied by the oil and gas industry was 
relatively low, it also encouraged a great deal of 
substitution of oil for other sources of energy. 
In more concrete terms, it has been found that in the 
year 1977 oil products supplied around 77 per cent of all 
primary energy consumption of Iran. If we add the share of 
the natural gas also, the contribution of the oil sector goes 
upto 91.8 per cent out of the total energy consumption of 
1.35 quads (one quad is equal to 10 btus) in 1977. 
Looking at the same linkage by end users of oil 
products in the country in 1977, one finds that 
transportation and residential/commercial sectors above 
consumed well over half of the oil products. Table 3.13 gives 
the detailed breakup of the oil products, consumed by various 
sectors of the economy. 
16. Mossavar Rahmani, B. Energy Policy in Iran. Perganun 
Press, New York, 1981, page 31. 
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TABLE 3.13 
COMPOSITION OF 1977 PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY TYPE OF FUEL 
Quads Percentage of total 
on Products 1.04 77.0 
Natural Gas 0.20 14.8 
Solid Fuels 0.08 5.9 
Hydropower 0.03 2.2 
Total 1.35 99.9 
Source: Mossavar, Rahmani, B. Energy Policy in Iran. Perganan 
Press, New York, 1981, Table 3.1. 
The other significant forward linkage was that the oil 
and gas sector stimulated the growth of a large number of 
Petroleum-based industries in the country, apart from a full 
rsuige of downstream activities such as oil transportation, 
storage, refining etc. The details of these activities have 
been discussed in the next chapter but it would not be out of 
place to emphasize that no other sector of the economy has 
provided so much of stimulus to the over all economic 
activity in Iran as the oil sector. 
As far as the backward linkages are concerned, it would 
suffice to say that all kinds of demands generated by the oil 
sector and met by the domestic economy are part of the 
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re la t ionsh ip . Unfortunately, enough material i s not instant ly 
ava i lab le to go i n t o the d e t a i l e d study o f t h i s type of 
linkage but the importance of i t needs no e labora t ion . 
Conclusion 
The decade of the 1970s i s of ten ca l led the decade of 
the OPEC. I t was during t h i s decade that the OPEC's long 
s t rugg le against the Major O i l Companies began to y i e l d 
r e s u l t s . The changes t h a t the I r a n i a n o i l i n d u s t r y 
experienced between 1973-78 were to a great extent a resu l t 
o f a j o i n t - s t r u g g l e under OPEC of which I r a n was a major 
partner. The struggle had two object ives. To obtain j u s t 
and remunerative pr ice level f o r crude o i l and to exercise 
greater cont ro l over the o i l i n d u s t r y by the producing 
s ta tes . As f a r as the f i r s t pa r t o f t he s t r u g g l e was 
concerned Iran worked as part of the OPEC. But in the second 
aspect, i t decided to deal wi th the Consortium of companies 
separately fo r h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l reasons rather than 
become par t of the s t rugg le f o r " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " under the 
Saudi leadership. While the negot iat ions f o r pa r t i c ipa t ion 
were a l r e a d y on , I r a n c o u l d succeed i n p e r s u a d i n g the 
Consortium to sign an agreement in 1973 on v i r t u a l l y i t s own 
terms. After t h i s agreement amd u n t i l 1979, the Consortium's 
ro le was lega l ly reduced to a "service company". The crude 
product ion po l i cy come under d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the NIOC. 
Although i t is d i f f i c u l t to conclude that the 1973 agreement 
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rendered the Consortium absolutely powerless, there is no 
doubt that the new arrangement was a step forward in the slow 
but steady structural transformation of the Iranian oil 
industry. The NIOC which had gradually acquiring the 
capability to manage the oil affairs of the country on its 
own assumed a much bigger role after the 1973 agreement. 
Another iraportsmt development during this period which 
had a bearing on the structure of the industry was signing of 
a few more "Service Contracts" with the independent oil 
companies. These contracts were small but very significant in 
the sense that unlike other countries Iran exercised its full 
sovereign right in signing these agreements. 
As regards the trends in crude production and oil 
revenues, while the production and exports of oil remained 
stable during this period at nearly the 1972 level. Iran's 
oil revenues registered a very high growth because of the 
price increase from $ 4.4 billion in 1972 to $ 18.4 billion 
in 1975 and $ 21.2 billion in 1977. 
This quantum Jump in the available monetary sources 
further reinforced the direct impact of the oil sector on the 
rest of the econoay. It's share in the total revenues of the 
government in ordinary budget went up from 67 per cent in 
1973 to 86 per cent in the year next year and remained well 
over 75 per cent thereafter uptil 1977. 
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In terms of support to the development expenditure also 
the impact of the oil sector became much more visible after 
1973 than before. It was only due to the availability of the 
extra oil revenues after 1973-74, that the Fifth Five Year 
Plan (1973-1978) targets and sectoral allocations could be 
revised so dramatically upwards. 
In the end one can conclude that through various 
forward and backward linkages the oil sector in Iran remained 
the leading sector of the economy during the period 1973-
1978. But at the same time the increased importance of the 
oil sector also made the problem of dualism even more acute. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY AFTER REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
In this chapter an effort has been made to study the 
state of the oil sector in Iran since 1979. This period has 
been extremely volatile. It begins with the victory of the 
Islamic revolution and also covers the eight years period of 
Iraq-Iran war. The Islamic revolution , was not merely a 
change of regime. It brought about a complete change in the 
approach to life in Iran and gave a new direction to the 
political and economic policies. The oil policy of the 
revolution was quite different fro« the one pursued by the 
monarchic regime. The sudden outbreak of war with Iraq, 
however, created an extra-ordinary situation. The entire 
set of priorities had to be changed and the whole economy 
including the oil sector had to be run on the basis of 
requirements of the war. Physical damages to oil 
installations altered the predicted course of the oil 
industry. 
To study the changes in the oil Industry of Iram in the 
above context this chapter begins with the economic and 
social philosophy of the revolution which gave a new 
orientation to the entire country including the oil sector. 
The focus then shifts to the physical deunages suffered by the 
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oil industry due to the war and its implications. Trends in 
oil production, exports and revenues are followed by a brief 
study of the downstream oil operations emd finally the role 
of the oil industry in financing the war economy of Iran. 
Soclo-Polltlcal Orientation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
The Islamic revolution in Iran was different from other 
revolutions that took place in different parts of the world 
in recent times. It was not a coup d'etat, it was not just a 
revolt, it was not a filling of the political vacuum on the 
basis of some alien political philosophy. The Iranian 
revolution had its origins within the history of the Iranian 
society. It had to negate and oppose certain forces which 
supported the perpetuation of un-Islamic system of 
governance. 
The basic philosophy of Islsunic revolution is based on 
the understanding that Islam is first and foremost a set of 
values created by the influence and teachings of the Koran 
and the traditions of the holy Prophet (Peace be on him). 
These values gradually created some noras of civilization 
which can be called the Isleunic civilization. In order to 
manage the affairs of such a civilization there was a need 
for a set of laws — social laws, political laws and economic 
laws. The set of these laws is called the "Shariah". 
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The revolution wanted Iranian society, and if possible 
the societies of the entire muslim world, to come back to 
these Islamic values and manage their affairs under the 
guidance of "Shariah". 
In order to achieve this monumental task the religious 
leadership of Iran had been struggling for a long time. 
The only difference between the present leadership and that 
of the past (which led to the constitutional revolt of 1906) 
was that the objective of leadership at that time was to 
"minimize the degree of illegitimacy of the political 
system", while the new leadership led by Ayatullah Ruhullah 
Khomeini was insistent upon opposing the entire illegitimate 
system under the Pahlavi ruler to the end. 
Politically this struggle manifested itself into an 
open opposition to the un-Islamic and illegitimate rule of 
the Shah in Iran and opposition to the Western Imperialism 
which were hand-in-glove and provided strength to each other. 
The revolutionary leadership, though not as harsh towards the 
Soviet Union and its allies and to the West, did not accept 
that block also as a friend and an ally. Their slogan was 
1. It must be clearly understood that religious and 
political leadership are not two separate groups in a 
Islsunic State. They are one and same the because religion 
and politics are inseparatable. 
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"Neither East nor West Islam" (Na Sharqi, na Gharbi, Jumhoori 
Islami)". 
The other basic postulate of the revolution was "the 
Unity of the Islamic Ummah". The slogan was, "Neither Shiite 
nor Sunni, but Islam" (Na Shiah, na Sunni, Inqlab Islami). 
As far as the economic thinking was concerned the 
approach of the revolution was no different. The objective 
was to transform the economic life of the society as soon as 
possible to the one which is based on the tenets of Islsun. 
Although the subject is extremely interesting and deserves a 
greater discussion we will confine ourselves to the attitude 
of the revolutionary government towards the matters 
pertaining to the Oil sector, which is our immediate concern. 
In that context also, as we will see in our discussion 
regarding the oil policy, that the approach of the new 
government was very much in conformity* with its socio-
political philosophy. 
Oil Policy of Iran After Revolution 
The revolutionary government took over the 
responsibility of governance in February 1979 but the impact 
2. For a detailed discussion on the economic philosophy and 
princples of Islam see, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadar, 
iQtisaduna (Our Economics), World Organization for 
Islamic Services (WOIS), Tehram, 1982. 
148 
of the Islamic revolution had begun on all segments of the 
Iranian Society and the economy much before that. The oil 
sector was no exception. Right from its formative stages the 
leaders of the revolution were aware and conscious of the 
importance of the oil industry and they had a clear 
perception about how it should be managed and made use of. 
The oil policy of the revolution, as we will see later, was 
in consonance with its overall economic and political 
philosophy which was based on three tenets. Anti-Imperialism 
or opposition to dependence on the West, need for self 
determination and to avoid wasteful exploitation of the 
countries' natural resources and income. All these three are 
reflected in the oil policy of the revolutionary government 
as it unfolded itself from 1979. 
The importance of the oil industry as the core sector 
of the economy became clear when the revolutionary leadership 
decided to support the strike of oil workers in 1978. They 
knew that the strike in the oil sector would hit at the very 
root of the economic system of the Pahlavi regime and once 
the oil production was stopped in the country it would not be 
possible for the Shah to sustain his rule any further. And 
that turned out to be true. Imam Khomeini sent several 
messages to the oil workers to keep up their struggle against 
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the Shah and not allow a drop of oil to flow unless he left 
the throne. 
In the following section the oil policy of Iram since 
1979 will be studied regarding its attitude towards the 
foreign oil companies, the structure of the industry in 
future and the production policy of the revolutionary 
government. 
The Attitude Towards the Foreign Oil Companies 
As mentioned earlier the revolutionary leadership of 
Iran was basically opposed to the country's dependence on the 
multinational oil companies, which it thought were 
systematically allowed by the previous regimes to exploit the 
most important natural resource of Iran to the advantage of 
the capitalist system of the west and in the bargain the 
Iranian people were deprived of their due and legitimate 
share of prosperity. 
The perception of the new government regarding the past 
is best reflected in the following smalysis: 
"This era [since 1909] witnessed the 
inertia, insouciance and incapacity of the 
3. For details see, Turner, T. "Iranian Oil Workers in the 
1978-79 Revolution" in More, P. and Turner, T. (ed.) Oil 
and Class Struggle. London, 1980, pp.272-291. 
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governing, bodies of the country, namely the 
monarch and their related coterie. 
Consequently, the I rani em oil was to be the 
most effective weapon in the hands of the 
Western nations, in flourishing their economy, 
and industry, while importing no dividends to 
Iran, whose oil was by now compounding the 
status of any nation who could lay hand on it. 
During the 71 years that elapses from 
the establishment of the oil industry: prior 
to the advent of the Islamic Revolution, there 
were a number of oil, gas, and petro-chemical 
units constructed and installed which greatly 
enhanced the nation's economy and political 
status. However, such activity was in no way 
exempted from dependence and affiliation to 
multi-national companies; in consonance with 
the other sectors within the Iranian scope of 
activity. The transfer and consolidation of 
technological progress was scant and could 
well be contrasted to the speed of a tortoise; 
while this policy justified the presence of a 
large contingent of foreign experts, under the 
guise of 'technical exports', training the 
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local staff for the operation of sophisticated 
technology. This very theory led to successful 
victory of the Islamic Revolution, and the 
former regime's downfall". 
In this background soon after assuming power, the new 
government declared that the foreign oil companies would have 
to leave the country on 28 February 1979 itself. The Chairman 
of the NIOC Mr.Hasan Nazih declared that, "the word 
Consortium was being deleted from our country's dictionary". 
The reason of this attitude was that although theoretically 
the Shah had nationalized the oil industry, but in effect the 
Consortium and the Oil Service Company of Iran (OSCO) 
continued to play a key role in setting broad policy." Even 
before the oil exports resumed from Iran on 5 March, the NIOC 
Chairman notified the Consortium that henceforth the 
Companies will be dealt with individually and OSCO functions 
will cease. Iran will celebrate the "renationalization of its 
oil-.7 
4. Ministry of Petroleum, I.R, of Iran, Petroleum Industry 
of Iran After the Victory of the Islamic Revolution. 
Tehran, Spring, 1990. 
5. MEES. 5 March, 1979, page 8. 
6. Middle East Economic Digest, (hereafter MEED), 2 March, 
1979, page 17. 
7. Ibid. 
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After the revolution and by the time Iranian oil 
exports began in March after a complete halt for two months, 
the NIOC Crude sale became more diversified. The OSCO was 
suspended and its employees were asked to leave the country. 
The former members of the Consortiun accepted a new deal and 
a nine-month supply agreement was assigned between the NIOC 
and the companies with effect from 1 April 1979. In the 
meanwhile, the Iranism Oil Service Compamy (IROS) continued 
to function on behalf of the NIOC until early 1981 when it 
was also replaced by Kala Limited, a subsidiary of the NIOC. 
At that time it was thought that the NIOC would keep on its 
rolls some 80 former experts of the foreign companies as 
minimum requirement of foreign assistance and as a matter of 
strategy the conojlex production areas and gas reinjection 
projects would be closed down for some time keeping the 
production level to somewhere near two-thirds of the pre-
revolution level. 
This complete disassociation froa the foreign oil 
companies marked the end of a process that had begun in Iran 
in 1901. This also meant a complete change in the structure 
of the Iranian Oil industry. Any change of this nature 
upstreeun is bound to bring about attendant changes downstream 
8. Europa Publications, Middle East and North Africa. 1990 
edition, page 145. 
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also. Now the responsibility of running oil affairs of the 
country totally rest on the government of Iran. 
Unlike 1951, the present Iranian government had 
formulated its oil policy on realistic assessment of its 
capability to manage the oil industry on its own. The 
following discussion which relates to mode of management and 
the industries' structure downstream will throw more light on 
several important issues concerning the oil policy of the 
revolutionary Iran. 
Self-determination 
The other important aspect of the new Iranian oil 
policy was to manage all affairs of the industry with the 
help of Iranian workers and experts. Foreign help or 
collaboration was to be sought only in those areas where it 
was absolutely necessary. Even in such cases where foreign 
help was required, the efforts were to keep the level of 
foreign involvement to the minimum and manage it in such a 
way as to maximise the gains for Iran. 
Under this overall policy framework, the government of 
Iran assigned the NICX: the role of the nodal agency to manage 
the oil affairs of the country on its behalf. 
A number of subsidiary companies were either brought 
directly under the control of the NIOC or the new ones were 
created to look after the varied and complex jobs. At a 
154 
l a te r stage a few jo in t - ven tu re companies were also launched 
m a i n l y i n the downstream o p e r a t i o n s . We s h a l l b r i e f l y 
i den t i f y some of the major subsidiar ies of the NIOC to have a 
c loser look a t the new s t r u c t u r e t h a t was c rea ted a f t e r 
revo lu t ion . 
1 . Kala Liaited: This subsidiary wholly owned by the NIOC was 
es tab l ished i n London i n September 1980 t o take over the 
purchases export and Marketing of Crude Oi l from I ran ian Oil 
Service Company (IROS) which was owned by the Consor t ium. 
The word Kala i t s e l f means "suppl ies" in Persia. 
2 . National I ranian D r i l l i n g Company 
This new company was created i n January 1979 by a 
decree of the leader of the r e v o l u t i o n , t o under take a l l 
prospecting of o i l and d r i l l i n g operations which were e a r l i e r 
performed by a number of fore ign companies. 
3. Iranian Offshore O i l Company 
Th is company, now g e n e r a l l y known as lOOC, was 
es tab l ished in September 1980, t o take over the complex 
operations of the j o i n t - ven tu re o i l companies establ ished by 
the Pahlavi regime wi th the help of fore ign o i l companies 
such as SIRIP, IPAC, LAPCO, IMINOCO and SOFIRAN. I t s task 
was to manage the o f f -shore o i l operations of I ran in the 
Persian Gulf. 
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4. National Iranian T«mker Company 
This company which was established in 1970 was accorded 
due importance by the new government. It was assigned a much 
greater task when its 10 tankers fleet was enhanced to 28. In 
fact the NIOC wanted this company to take over the entire 
export of Iranian oil through the sea, a large part of which, 
was managed by the foreign tanker companies before the 
revolution. 
The above brief description of four major subsidiaries 
of the NIOC gives us an idea about the keenness of the new 
Iranian government to establish the full range establishments 
so that Iran could do away with its former dependence on 
foreign expertise and Companies. 
In other areas, especially downstream, also the 
existing infrastructure was either strengthened or the new 
one was created in order to establish full control over the 
oil affairs of the country. Details of some important 
aspects will be discussed later in this chapter. 
It is, however, important to nention at this stage that 
this drive of self-determination meant a complete 
transformation of the entire structure of oil industry in 
Iran, a truly historic change for the benefit of the Iranian 
nation. 
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The oil Production Policy 
This aspect of the new oil policy enunciated by the 
revolutionary government of Iran had very vital and far 
reaching implications not only for the future direction of 
the domestic economy but the world oil market also. 
Unlike the policy of the previous regime which was 
based on maximum production of oil, the revolutionary 
leadership from the very beginning thought that oil should be 
produced only to the extent it is necessary for the well-
being of Iranian people. It is a resource to be conserved 
rather than wasted. One of the major criticism of the 
revolution against the Shah was that he indulged in very 
eunbitious, unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, all of which 
was financed by the excessive exploitation of the country's 
oil resources. Imam Khomeini, in one of his interviews with 
MEED gave a clear policy directive by saying that, "Future 
oil production will depend on the countries actual needs'*.^  
This policy was later explained by the NIOC Chairman 
as: 
"As most of you are aware, the new 
policy of the revolutionary government of Iran 
is not to produce the level which was 
9. MEED. 26 January, 1979, page 5 
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preva i l ing before the revo lu t ion . And we are 
going to review our production po l i c ies from 
time to t i ne as i t deems necessary in the 
l i g h t of our own nat ional requirements". 
"Every t i m e t h a t a consumer i n an 
Indus t r ia l i zed country buys a hundred monetary 
u n i t s ' worth of o i l from I r an , he i s fac t pays 
SOX in taxes t o h is own government, 40% in 
p r o f i t s to intermediaries (whole-sel lers and 
r e ta i ne r s ) and only 10X f o r the crude o i l 
i t s e l f , o f wh ich 558 i s absorbed by the 
re f i n ing and t ransport indus t r ies . This only 
leaves 5% o f t he t o t a l t o the p r o d u c i n g 
country f o r the pr ice of our o i l . Thus our 
annual sales of o i l , which reach $ 2 b i l l i o n , 
represent 5% of the global value of cap i ta l 
t h i s money c r e a t e s i n the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d 
countr ies, that i s to say an absolute value of 
$ 400 b i l l i o n . We are being deprived of $ 400 
b i l l i o n we c o u l d be g e t t i n g f rom the 
production of o i l , as we are forced to import 
10. MEES. 2 A p r i l , 1979 (supplement), page V I I I . 
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manual and i n t e l l e c t u a l l abour from the 
industr ia l i zed nat ion". ' 
Whi le a d v o c a t i n g th e p o l i c y of c o n s e r v a t i o n t h e 
government also made i t clear fo r the benef i t of the World 
o i l market tha t the new policy is in no way aimed at creat ing 
a shortage in the o i l market. I r a n would r a t h e r s t r i k e a 
balance and t h i s would help both the producers and the 
1 2 
consuming nations. 
Oil and the Foreign Policy of Iran 
As a major foreign policy pronouncement of the 
revolutionary government, Iran declared that it would stoo 
oil supplies to Israel and South Africa which was earlier 
supplied through some private companies. 
For sometime oil exports were also stooped to the 
United States of America after it froze the Iranian assets in 
that country through a Presidential decree. As a measure of 
its independence the Iranian officials later declared that 
the oil exports to the US do not make any difference for Iran 
as it has several outlets. 
11. Ibid., 12 February, 1979, page 4. 
12. See Nazih Hasan interview to MEES. 2 April 1979, 
(supplement), page IX. 
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Iraq-Iran War: Impact on the Iranian Oil Industry 
Giving the importance of the oil sector as the backbone 
of the Iranian economy it obviously became the prime target 
of enemy attacks during the war. Iraqi understanding was, 
and perhaps rightly so, that if they succeeded in destroying 
the major oil installations of Iran and cause disruption of 
crude oil exports, Iran would not be able to sustain the war 
for very long. Therefore, raids on the oil industry targets 
were as severe and frequent as on the military installations 
of the country. An important proof of the significance of oil 
industry in the enemy's war strategy was that after a few 
years when the Iraqis realized that they were unable to break 
the will of the Iranian people to fight, they intensified 
attacks on the oil industry targets. That is why the total 
number of raids during 1986-87 were far more than in the 
early phase of the war.^*^ Another important reason for 
concentration of attacks on the oil sector was that it was 
the only source of income and foreign exchange earning for 
Iran. More and more damage to this industry meant more and 
more limitation on Iran's capability to finance the 
expenditure of war and replenish the essential supplies of 
arms and ammunition. Although Iran demonstrated unimaginable 
capacity to sustain the war and keep the oil flowing inspite 
13- For details of the date-wise Iraqi air raids on various 
oil facilities of Iran, see Ministry of Petroleum, I.R. 
of Iran, Petroleum Industry of Iran After the Victory of 
the Islamic Revolution. Tehran, 1990. 
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of tremendous pressure, theoretically it would not be wrong 
to say that oil industry and war had a much stronger linkage 
than other sectors of the economy. The fact that Iraq could 
not ultimately succeed in destroying the revolution and 
reduce Iran to a subservient position in the Persian Gulf 
region, which was their primary objective, the fact remains 
that the war imposed by that country meted out a very serious 
blow to the economy of Iran in general and the oil sector in 
particular. Had there been no war, and the new government not 
compelled to change its priorities, Iran would have been a 
different country than what it is today. 
Physical Damage to Oil Facilities 
In February 1979 the revolutionary government took over 
the rein of power in Iran. But even before it could settle 
down to implement its economic policies, the country was 
attacked by Iraq in September 1980. The Iraq-Iran war, 
longest in the modern history of the world, caused 
unimaginable damage to both the countries in terms of humetn 
losses emd destruction and prosperity was put bark by several 
decades in both the countries. For Iran it was more traumatic 
because the new government was still in the process of 
consolidating the gains of revolution and people in general 
were looking forward to a new direction in life. When 
suddenly everyone had to quickly adjust to the imperatives of 
War. 
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This section will be devoted to a brief study of the 
implications of the Iraq-Iran war for the oil sector in Iran 
because the reference period in this chapter is entirely 
covered by the War. Although a large number of studies have 
been published on various aspects of the War but there still 
exist some serious differences in estimates regarding both 
the quantitative and qualitative impact of the war on the 
economy and especially the oil sector of Iran. 
Except for one or two important oil installations there 
is no systematic information available regarding the extent 
of damage suffered by individual oil facilities of Iran 
during the war. Although everyone agrees that the total 
dimension of the physical loss was quite enormous. Table 4.1 
gives a detailed account of the number of Iraqi attacks on 
various oil facilities of Iran classified into ten different 
type of installations during 1980-88 and two years' period of 
1986-87 in which the intensity was suddenly increased. It 
appears that there was not a single type of oil facility in 
Iran which did not face the brunt of Iraqi air raids. The 
concentration was obviously on refineries (specially the 
Abadan refinery which was one of the biggest refinery in the 
world and was completely destroyed). Similarly oil fields and 
export outlets were also brought under maximum pressure 
because of the reasons already mentioned. 
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TABLE 4.1 
NO. OF ENEMY ATTACK ON IRANIAN OIL 
INSTALLATION DURING THE WAR 
Installations No.of Raids 
1980-88 
No.of Raids 
1986-87 
1. Refineries: Total 69 
a) Abadan Refinery 22 
b) Tabriz Refinery 16 
c) Isfahan Refinery 12 
d) Bakhtaran Refinery 10 
e) Tehran Refinery 3 
f) Shiraz Refinery 6 
2. Pipeline Installation Total 76 
3. National Petrochemical Company 16 
Total 
4. Iranian Oil Offshore Company 56 
Total 
a) Kharg Island region 14 
b) Bahregan region 20 
c) Lavan region 17 
d) Sirri region 4 
5. National Iran Drilling Company 4 
6. National Iran Gas Company 32 
7. Oil Products Distribution Compemy 11 
8. Southern Oil Field 55 
9. National Iranian Tanker Company 38 
10.Export Tankers 1 
52 
20 
7 
10 
9 
2 
4 
52 
11 
32 
4 
11 
10 
14 
3 
27 
1 
45 
26 
1 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum IR of Iran, Petroleum Industry 
of Iran. After the Victory of The Islamic Revolution. 
Tehran, 1990, 
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The above description of the air attacks merely 
indicates the level of pressure mounted on the oil sector 
during the war. As far as the monetary cost of the damage to 
the oil industry is concerned there are again no final and 
authentic figures available. There are a large number 
estimates available for the total direct and indirect 
economic losses suffered by Iran in the eight years' war, but 
since every study has adopted different definitions and 
methods of calculation the range of damages is vastly 
different from one and another. Incidentally within the 
overall economy, no study has conclusively arrived at a 
figure regarding the loss of the oil sector in terms of 
damages. In this situation we will rely as far as possible 
on the official Iranian estimates. Wherever they are not 
available figures in other studies will be made use of. 
In an interview with the OPEC Bulletin in August 1990, 
the Oil Minister of Iran Gholamreza Aghazadeh confessed that 
the figure of $ 400 bn mentioned at that time pertained to 
the total loss suffered by the entire country and it was not 
a true figure for the losses of the oil sector. He said at 
that time that, "No separate figure for the hydrocarbon 
industry is available, but this exercise might be undertaken 
in the future".^^ The Middle East Economic Digest, however, 
quoted an unofficial study which estimated $ 15,000 million 
14. OPEC, OPEC Bulletin. August 1990, page 16. 
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worth of damage to the oil and related industries during the 
warJ^ Even if this figure is accepted as reflecting the 
true cost of damage, the task of reconstruction of the oil 
industry to bring it back to 1977 level will be colossal 
considering the time factor involved, and material and 
technological requirements. 
It is important to mention in this connection that the 
very fact that Iran could keep its oil flowing during the War 
was a commendable job. It involved not only the problems of 
logistics but also the risk in repairing the damage in the 
war conditions. This fact has been acknowledged by a number 
of independent observers and Imam Khomeini in one of his 
messages to the oil workers of Iran appreciated and 
congratulated them for the difficult task undertaken by them 
1 6 
with revolut ionary zeal . 
Loss of Oi l Production and Revenues 
O r i g i n a l l y the r e v o l u t i o n a r y l eade rsh ip of I r an had 
decided as a matter of po l icy to reduce dependence on o i l 
revenues and concentrate more on o the r sec to rs s p e c i a l l y 
a g r i c u l t u r e t o meet t he f i n a n c i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the 
15. MEED. 3 March, 1989, page 2. 
16. Ministry of Petroleum, I.R. of Iran, Petroleum Industry 
of Iran After the Victory of the Islamic Revolution. 
Tehran, 1990, page 6. 
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country. It was, therefore, intended to keep oil production 
at a level which is optimum as per requirements of the 
economy. But the war obviously changed all priorities and the 
imperatives of war dictated the actual practice. The 
government of Iran had to try to maximize the production and 
export of oil in order to meet the cost of war. In fact, at 
one stage it even asked the OPEC to increase its quota of oil 
production and not to treat it at par with Iraq in that 
respect. Eventually not satisfied with the OPEC response Iran 
at times even defied the quota restrictions because of its 
emergent needs. 
However, inspite of the above mentioned production 
policy the ground reality was that Iranian Oil production, 
export and revenues went down considerably both because of 
the difficulties created by the war and the downward trend in 
the oil market for the ^ ast few years. 
As far as the physical damage to the various oil 
production and export facilities are concerned, it is very 
difficult to establish an exact correlation between the 
deunage to individual outlet and the resultant fall in the 
production. But given the type of pressure mounted by the 
enemy attacks on oil targets as mentioned in Table 4.1, it is 
obvious that the war did have a tremendous negative impact on 
the Iranian oil production and revenues. In the last three 
years of the war specially the intensified attacks on the 
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Kharg oil terminal, pipelines and oil tankers of various 
nationalities, had brought the Iranian government under a 
very considerable monetary pressure. 
Table 4.2, gives some idea about the possible impact of 
the war an oil export and revenues of Iran between 1980-86 
although the worst last two years are not included in the 
calculations. According to this "educated guess" the loss of 
Iranian oil exports due to the war works out to be some 
292,243 thousand tons and that of oil revenues as $ 69 
billion. A total loss of this magnitude in just about seven 
years is enormous and will have a very serious impact on the 
future of the Iranian economy. 
Another way of looking at the impact of war on the oil 
sector is to look at the fall in the contribution of oil 
revenues to the GNP of Iran during 1979-87. Table 4.3 shows 
that this ratio fell from 37.96 per cent in 1975 to 13.52 per 
cent in 1980 the very first year of war and then each year it 
kept on falling rather sharply with a low of merely 4.37 per 
cent in 1986. To make-up for this loss the Iranian government 
had to resort to higher taxation and go in for external 
borrowings on short terms basis from the market which in fact 
were costlier than the normal borrowings through official 
external assistance channels. 
167 
TABLE 4.2 
ESTIMATION OF POTENTIAL OIL EXPORT AND REVENUE, IRAN, 1980-86 
Actual 
Oil 
Price 
per 
barrel 
US S 
Actual Oil 
exports 
Thousand 
tonnes 
Actual Oil 
revenues 
bn rials & 
in brackets 
in bn US $ 
Potential 
exports 
(Thousand 
tonnes) 
Potential 
oil revenues 
bn rials & 
in brackets 
in bn US $ 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
32 
37 
34 
29 
28 
28 
26 
40,112 
41,079 
81,724 
81,100 
72,600 
72,100 
58,100 
684 (9.7) 
732 (9.3) 
1,508 (18.1) 
1,621 (18.8) 
1,066 (11.8) 
1,157 (12.7) 
873 (11.1) 
53,482 
54,771 
108,963 
124,980 
129,229 
129,229 
138,404 
886 (12.5) 
1,163 (14.8) 
2,270 (27.1) 
2,295 (26.5) 
2,387 (26.5) 
2,387 (26.6) 
2,079 (26.4) 
Total 446,815 7,641 (91.5) 739,058 13,467(160.5) 
Source: Mofid, K., The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War: 
Routledge, London, 1990, Page 125. 
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TABLE 4.3 
GNP AND THE VALUE OF PETROLEUM EXPORTS 
(1975, 1979-87) 
(US $ million) 
Year GNP Value of Petroleum Ratio Percentage 
export 
37.96 
21.15 
13.52 
11 .02 
14.71 
11 .98 
7.27 
7.79 
4.37 
5.64 
1975 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
51,710 
90,682 
98,221 
109,370 
130,722 
160,417 
168.532 
168,203 
164,500 
177,000 
19,634 
19,186 
13,286 
12,053 
19,233 
19,225 
12,255 
13,115 
7,199 
10,000 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin. 1987. 
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The Quantitative Aspects 
Upto now we have discussed the broad aspects of the 
economic philosophy of the Islsunic revolution, the oil policy 
of the new government and the impact of Iraq-1 ran war on the 
oil industry of Iran. We have seen that after revolution 
some very important changes took place in areas of oil policy 
and structure of the industry. This section will deal mainly 
with some of the important quantitative aspects of 
developments in the oil industry of Iran during 1979-1987. 
These quamtitative aspects, though not comprehensive, include 
the efforts of the NIOC to handle the task of exploration and 
drilling in the new areas, trends in oil production, exports 
and revenues. These trends are extremely important in 
studying the overall development of the industry. 
Exploration and Drilling 
Until 1979 the task of exploration and drilling of oi' 
wells was performed by the foreign oil companies. Although 
since the 1973 agreement the government of Iran had a direct 
say in these matters, it was inevitably guided by the foreign 
experts. 
In accordance with the oil policy of the new 
government, however, Iran had to acquire and augment its own 
capabilities m these upstream operation. These efforts 
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became the responsibility of the newly established National 
Iranian Drilling Company (NIDC). 
The following account of exploration and drilling 
activities undertaken by the National Iranian Drilling 
Company (NIDC) is very sketchy because it pertains to the 
formative years and not much details are available. But it 
does given an idea about the direction in which efforts are 
being made to acquire technical capabilities under the new 
oil policy. 
Establishment of a Seunple Research Unit, design and 
manufacture of required spare parts, renovation and 
maintenance of eight drilling rigs are some of the important 
activities performed by NIDC upto 1985. 
In terms of actual drilling operations, it is reported 
that by the end of 1985 the NIDC had performed 100,000 meters 
of drilling, which by the next year reached 400,000 meters. 
During the same period approximately 200 new wells were 
drilled. Some of the wells which becane operative produced 
nearly 50,000 b/d of crude oil, a very marginal but welcome 
addition to the countries oil production. 
The above description may not seem statistically 
significant but it does give an idea about the process of 
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structural changes in the Iranian oil industry that had 
started soon of the revolution. 
Trends in Oil Production 
Although the revolutionary government of Iran as a 
matter of declared policy wanted to curtail crude production, 
the outbreak of war in September 1980 had changed its 
priority. As mentioned earlier, the government of Iran wanted 
to produce more oil during the war in order to meet its 
financial requirements. The purpose of mentioning these 
facts again is to explain that the fall in Iranian Oil 
production during 1979-87 as witnessed in Table 4.4, was not 
actually due to the operation of the governments' oil 
production policy but it was because of the extensive enemy 
efforts to damage oil supply lines of Iraui. Reference to the 
air attacks on oil terminals, pumping stations and crude 
pipelines has already been made earlier. 
In quantitative terms the oil production of Iran 
suddenly dropped from nearly 3.2 million b/d in 1979 to 1.5 
million b/d in just one year reducing Iran's share by more 
than 7 percent in total OPEC production and more than 3.5 per 
cent in the total world production. It was only in 1982 when 
the production picked up again to the level of nearly 2.4 
million b/d and remained almost around that level till the 
172 
TABLE 4.4 
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, WORLD, OPEC AND IRAN (1979-1987) 
('000 b/d) 
Years Total world Total OPEC IR. Iran Iran as Irsm as 
X of X of 
World OPEC 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Source: 
62,800.1 
59,766.7 
56,028.3 
53,738.8 
52,684.8 
53,502.5 
53,291.0 
56,289.6 
55,521.1 
:OPEC. Annual 
30,928.9 
26,879.4 
22,598.6 
18,992.2 
16,992.2 
16,347.2 
15,447.7 
18,333.1 
17,324.8 
Statistical 
3,167.9 
1,467.3 
1,315.9 
2,391.3 
2,441-7 
2,032.4 
2,192.3 
2,037.1 
2,297.6 
Bulletin. 1987. 
5.04 
2.45 
2.34 
4.44 
6.63 
3.79 
4.09 
3.61 
4.13 
10.24 
5.45 
5.82 
12.59 
14.36 
12.43 
14.19 
11.11 
13.26 
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end of the war with minor fluctuations from one year to the 
other. 
Table 4.5 gives the breakup of Iran's Crude production 
by major oil fields. It is important to mention in this 
context that after the revolution the role of Consortium 
which used to operate all the southern oil fields and all 
other foreign oil companies had finished. It was all Iranian 
production since 1979. The operator of all the oil fields of 
the country was NIOC but the share of different areas in 
Crude production obviously remained in same. The offshore 
areas are picking up smd efforts are being made to discover 
new oil fields, but for all commercial 8md strategic purposes 
the southern oil fields will continue to dominate the Iranian 
oil production for a very long time in future. 
Oil Exports 
For reasons already discussed in the context of crude 
production, Iranian crude exports also witnessed a very sharp 
decline during 1979-87. The fall in oil exports was infact 
much sharper than the fall in crude production because the 
domestic requirements were in any case to be met out of the 
country's own production. While production decreased by 53.7 
17. Difference in figures is due to the usual differences in 
source. 
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TABLE 4.5 
IRAN'S P90DUCTI0N OF CSUDE OIL IT MAJOR FIELDS (1)7!-1S88) 
COQO b/d! 
1!T! 1980 t«81 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19!? 1988 
1. Southern Oil Fields 2.994 1,237 1,255 2.437 2.454 2.113 2.285 2.019 2.424 2,44i 
2. Maft-Shir Oil Fields 12 5 
3. Off-Shore Oil Fields 427 234 186 242 255 256 239 157 36 102 
Ooroud. Forouzas !2021 (71! (7) (60! (831 (701 (72! (47! !3! (5B 
Abouzir*. Sorouss* 
Babre^artsart-Noroyz* (34! (10! (0! (0! (0! (01 0 0 0 0 
Saluii-Rostai (158! (1321 (1S4| (160! (172! (168! (144! (81! 9 (22: 
Sim (33! (21! (25! (22! (201 (201 (23! (29! (33! (22 
* Tliere «as no sroductiEa during the «ar. 
Source: Central Bani of the I? of Iran, Econoiic Report and Balance S!!eet. jiffersst issue. 
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per cent in 1980 over the previous year's level, the crude 
exports fell by nearly 67 per cent over that period. San>e as 
in the case of production, oil exports picked up by a little 
less than 1 million b/d since 1982 and remained constant for 
the rest of the period under reference (see Table 4.6). This 
increase in exports by even 1 million b/d was extremely vital 
for Iran in the context of its financial need due to the war. 
This would not have been possible if the Iranian government 
and the oil workers were not so determined to restore the 
exports of oil in the midst of constant air attacks. The 
marginal increase in oil exports during 1986-87 assumed 
greater importamce in view of the fact that the enemy attacks 
on oil export outlets were most intensive during these two 
years. 
Oil Revenues 
The period under reference in this chapter i.e. 1979 to 
1987 was the most volatile period as far as international 
prices of crude oil are concerned. It was in these nine 
years only that the oil prices reached their highest level 
due to the second major price hike during 1979-80. The 
upward trend continued upto January 1981, when oil was sold 
officially around $ 37 per barrel by the OPEC countries. 
Then the gradual fall in oil prices began and it reached its 
lowest somewhere in 1986 with a slight recovery towards 
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TABLE 4.6 
CRUDE OIL EXPORT WORLD, OPEC AND IRAN 
(1979-1987) 
COCO b/d) 
Years 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Source 
Total world 
33,541.2 
29,937.6 
25,780.7 
22,426.2 
21,260.3 
21,453.0 
20,407.7 
22,797.8 
22,364.4 
:OPEC. Annual 
Total OPEC 
26,793.2 
22,843.7 
18,424.0 
14,235.2 
12,485.6 
11.983.0 
10,810.5 
12,779.6 
12,013.4 
Statistical 
IR. Iran Ii 
X 
W( 
2,407.0 
796.7 
714.6 
1,623.2 
1,718.7 
1,521.8 
1,568.3 
1,454.0 
. 1,710.0 
Bulletin. 1987. 
'*an as 
of 
srld 
7.17 
2.66 
2.77 
7.23 
8.08 
7.09 
7.68 
6-37 
7.64 
Iran as 
% of 
OPEC 
8.98 
3.48 
3.87 
11 .40 
13.76 
12.69 
14.50 
11.37 
14.23 
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1987. Table 4.7 gives the movement of the prices of two main 
varieties of Iranian Crude through the years. There are, of 
course, minor variations in prices of different varieties of 
Crude oil depending upon their level of purity but on an 
overall basis, the trend remains what it is in the market. 
This brief note about the oil prices was important 
because the changes in Iran's Oil revenues or the value of 
Petroleum exports (which includes both the crude and oil 
products) can not be clearly understood without a view on the 
oil prices. Afterall the total value of petroleum exports is 
dependent on the volume of exports and the price-movement. 
As evident from Table 4.6, the Iranian export of crude 
oil witnessed a very sharp decline during 1960 and 1981 due 
to the sudden outbreak of war. It then stabilized for the 
remaining seven years under reference. Looking at both the 
variables mentioned above, the sharp decline in oil revenues 
in 1980 and 1981 was mainly due to the fall in production 
although the oil prices during these years were at their 
peak. Since then the recovery and fall in oil revenues 
clearly follow the pattern of production and prices (see 
Table 4.8). 
If one looks at the relative contribution of oil 
revenues in total exports of the country, it would seem 
rather strange at the first sight that the percentage share 
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TABLE 4.7 
POSTED OR TAX REFERENCE OF IRANIAN CRUDE OIL: MAIN VARIETIES 
(1979-1987) 
1979 
Jan.1 
Apr.1 
May,15 
Jun,1 
Jul,1 
Oct,1 
Dec,1 
I.R. Light (34°) I.R. Heavy (31°) 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1985 
1987 
Feb,1 
Apr,1 
Jul,13 
Jan,1 
Nov.1 
Jan,1 
Feb. 5 
Feb.12 
Feb.21 
Jul.1 
Mar-15 
Aug.10 
Jan.1 
Feb.1 
13.45 
16.57 
17.17 
18.47 
22.00 
23 .50 
28 .50 
31.00 
35.37 
37.00 
34.60 
34.20 
33 .20 
32 .20 
30 .20 
31.20 
28 .00 
29.11 
28.05 
13.06 
16.04 
16 .64 
17.74 
19 .90 
22 .77 
27 .77 
30 .27 
34 .37 
36 .00 
33 .40 
32 .30 
31 .30 
30 .30 
28 .30 
29 -30 
26 .90 
27 .10 
27 .55 
27 .35 
Feb-1 17-50 16.89 
Source:OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin. 1987. 
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TABLE 4.8 
IRAN'S OIL REVENUE AND THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
(1979-1987) 
(US $ million) 
Year Value of Value of Value of X of petroleum 
Total Petroleum non-petroleum Export to 
Export Exports Total Export 
19,186 621 96.86 
13,286 820 94.18 
12,053 544 95.68 
19,233 197 98.98 
19,225 153 99.20 
12,255 167 98.65 
13,115 213 98.40 
7,199 900 88.80 
10,515 1,090 90.60 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
19,807 
14,106 
12,597 
19,430 
19,378 
12,422 
13,328 
8,099 
11,605 
Source:OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin. 1987 
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of oil revenues to total exports of the country remained 
almost at the same level as in the pre-war period. This 
apparently anomalous situation was due to the fact that the 
war did not take its toll in oil exports only. The value of 
non-oil exports also went down considerably each year since 
1979 upto 1986 and 1987. One can easily appreciate the 
difference between the level of non-oil exports in 1979 and 
1983 for instzmce. Iran's total value of non-oil exports 
have been very meagre any way but the fall in their value 
during the war years made quite a bit of difference as far as 
their relative importance was concerned. What effect did 
these reductions have on the economy and the war efforts of 
Iran will be discussed later. 
Downstream Oil Operations 
Uptil now the entire focus in this study has been on 
the developments related to what is called the "upstream" 
operations of the Iranian oil industry. That is to say on 
changes and development pertaining to activities concerned 
with the production and export of crude oil. But the oil 
industry in its totality also includes operations beyond the 
production of crude oil and natural gas. The activities down 
the line are termed as "downstream" operations and include a 
host of enterprises such as transportation of oil and oil 
products, refining of oil and such industrial activities 
which use primary hydrocarbon products as the feed stock for 
181 
the p r o d u c t i o n o f a number o f i n t e r m e d i a t e and f i n a l 
products. In other words, they include processing a c t i v i t i e s 
which give "value added" to crude o i l and natural gas. The 
generic term commonly used f o r t h i s k ind of a c t i v i t y i s 
petrochemical. 
I t has been t h e o r e t i c a l l y argued t h a t s t r u c t u r a l 
changes "ups t ream" i n e v i t a b l y lead t o developments 
"downstream" and the two s tages o f o i l i n d u s t r y are 
essent ia l ly in tegrated. 
The h i s t o r y o f c o n c e s s i o n a r y p e r i o d i n West As ia 
coun t r ies , i nc lud ing I r a n , has shown t h a t the major o i l 
companies which operated the industry upstream in d i f f e ren t 
o i l producing countr ies had a completely integrated system 
downstream a lso . But since t h e i r p r imary mot ive was t o 
exp lo i t cheap hydrocarbon resources from the o i l r ich areas 
of western Asia (spec ia l l y the Persian Gulf area), they were 
not in te res ted in developing r e f i n i n g and pet rochemical 
a c t i v i t i e s in the producing s ta tes . For t h e i r own economic 
reasons i t was convenient f o r them t o e s t a b l i s h a l l the 
downstream a c t i v i t i e s nearer the market, tha t i s in the west. 
As the o i l producers of the Persian Gulf area succeeded 
in t h e i r s t rugg le to have g rea te r c o n t r o l over the o i l 
industry upstream, they real ized the necessity of in tegrat ing 
i t downstream as wel l w i t h i n t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s . This 
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process was speeded up during the 1970s when the ownershio 
and administrative control of the industry came in the hancs 
of the producing states. 
The following section will be devoted to an outline 
study of major downstream activities in Iran. Because of sone 
constraints the focus will remain confined only to the 
refining and petrochemical activities. Since downstream 
operations have not been studied in Ch8«)ter III which covers 
the period from T973-1978, the present section will deal with 
the downstream activities in both the pre-revolution and 
1 fi post-revolution periods. 
I n d e v e l o p i n g downstream i n d u s t r i e s I r a n i s i n a 
d i s t i n c t l y advantageous pos i t i on . I t has almost unl imited 
and secure supply of feedstocks which are used i n the 
product ion of a large v a r i e t y o f pe t rochemica l p roduc ts . 
With i t s vast natural gas reserves, apart from associated gas 
and r e f i n e r y b y - p r o d u c t s , I r a n ' s p o s i t i o n i s f a r more 
advantageous than many of i t s neighbours in the Persian Gulf 
region. Secondly, un l ike other countr ies of the region Iran 
has a vast and growing domestic «arket f o r re f ined o i l and 
petro-chemical products. In f a c t , f o r ce r ta in products i t s 
18. Hawdon, David, fed.) The Changing Structure of the Worl^ 
Oi l Industry. Croom Helm, London, 1985, page 8 1 . 
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motivat ion is to provide import s u b s t i t u t i o n r a t h e r than 
exports as f a r as f e r t i l i z e r s are concerned. 
I ran 's huge agr icu l tura l sector provides instant market 
l o c a l l y and w i t h s p e c i a l emphasis accorded by th e new 
government to the a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s the deaand f o r 
f e r t i l i z e r s , pesticides and insect ic ides is l i k e l y to grow at 
a very fas t rate in the fu ture years. In t h i s frzunework we 
shall now survey the posit ion of the two major downstream 
a c t i v i t i e s in I r a n i n some d e t a i l s i . e . r e f i n i n g and 
petrochemical. 
Petroleum Refining 
Iran is not only the oldest producer of Crude oil in 
West Asia, it also has the distinction of having the oldest 
oil refinery in the area. Its Abadan refinery was set up as 
far back as 1912 and at one time it was one of the biggest 
oil refineries of the world. At present Iran has seven 
refineries and another two are under construction. From the 
very beginning Iran has been meeting its domestic 
requirements of oil products indigenously. 
Table 4.5 gives the crude processing capacity of 
different refineries in Iran in different years from 1975-
1987. Total refinery capacity increased from 790 thousand b/d 
in 1975 to 1165 thousand b/d in the next three years but 
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TABLE 4.9 
REFINING CAPACITY IN IRAN BY LOCATION 
Refineries 
Abadan 
Tehran 
Isfeihan 
Tabriz 
Shiraz 
Kermanshah 
Lavan 
Date of 
construction 
1912 
1968 
1976 
1977 
1974 
1935 
1977 
Masj i d-e-Su1ai man 
Total Iran 
Total OPEC 
Iran as X of 
Source: OPEC, 
OPEC 
. Annual 
1975 
535 
200 
-
-
40 
15 
-
-
790 
4,428 
17.9 
Statistical 
1978 
705 
225 
100 
80 
40 
15 
-
-
1,165 
5,225 
22.3 
(' 
1982 
-
220 
240 
80 
40 
-
20 
70 
670 
5,136 
13.0 
Bulletin. 1987. 
000 b/d) 
1987 
-
220 
240 
80 
40 
15 
20 
-
615 
6,628 
9.3 
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a f t e r tha t the war s ta r ted t a k i n g i t s t o l l . The Abadan 
ref inery which alone processed 705 thousand b/d of crude was 
almost completely destroyed i n 1981 and remained out of 
o p e r a t i o n u n t i l 1989 when the f i r s t phase of i t s 
reconstruction was completed. In a l l other o ld re f iner ies the 
C2«>acity remained the same through the period under reference 
except fo r the Isfahan re f inery where even during the war 
work went on and the processing capacity was increased to 240 
thousand b/d, marking an increase of 140 thousand o/d over 
the pre-revolut ion level of 100 thousand b/d in 1978. 
Apar t f rom the c a p a c i t y i n c r e a s e i n t he I s f ahan 
re f i ne r y the greatest achievement o f t he r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
government in the f i e l d of r e f i n i ng was the reconstruct ion of 
the Abadan r e f i n e r y under most d i f f i c u l t anc t r y i n g 
condi t ions. The Abadan re f inery may or may not get sack i t s 
old glory but the very f a c t tha t i t s reconstruct ion >tork was 
undertaken exclusively by the I ran ian workers and experts is 
no mean ach ievement . The o t h e r sma l l r e f i n i n g u n i t s 
renovated and ac t i va ted dur ing the war were a t Lavan and 
Masjid-e-Sulaiman. They together processed some 90 thousand 
b/d of crude in 1982. 
However, while discussing re f i n i ng a c t i v i t i e s of Iran 
af ter 1989 i t ruust be borne in mind that the war damages were 
not conf ined to Abadan r e f i n e r y o n l y . Almost a l l o ther 
re f ine r ies were brought under I raq i a i r ra ids wi th d i f fe ren t 
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intensities at different times. Kermanshah and Masjid-e-
Sulaiman refineries were also extensively deunaged during the 
war but due to the untiring efforts of the workers, they were 
brought back to operation in record time. 
Under the Five Year Plan (1989-93), it is planned to 
increase the refinery capacity of Iran to 1.5 million b/d 
which would include Abadan II phase (250,000 b/d), new Bander 
Abbas refinery (240,000 b/d) and Arak refinery (130,000 
b/d).13 
Petrochemi cals 
Iran was a late starter in establishing petrochemical 
industries while in refining it was the first country in the 
area. It was only in 1961 that the construction of a small 
nitrogenous fertilizer plant was started at Mrvdasht near 
Shiraz. Until then alnost all its requirement of fertilizers 
and other different petrochemical products was imported froo 
outside. Since then, however this important revenue of 
downstream operations was given a very high priority. For a 
country like Iran which had hydrocarbon resources of such 
great magnitude and slightly more comfortable availability of 
capital as compared to other developing countries, it was 
obvious that industrialization based on oil and gas should be 
19. MEES. 6 March, 1989, Page A-2. 
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given a higher priority. As mentioned earlier Iran had a 
ready suid growing domestic market also for these products, a 
situation different than most of its Arab neighbours on the 
other side of the Persian Gulf. To speed up the 
petrochemical industrialization in the country a National 
Petrochemical Company was formed in 1965. Since then Iran 
established a number of important projects. 
The Petrochemical policy of the new Ireuiian government 
after the revolution is very clearly summarized in one of the 
official publications as:*" 
"The petrochemical industry was 
confirmed as a priority sector for two major 
reasons: Firstly because of the necessity to 
reduce dependence on exports of crude oi1 and 
gas as a source of foreign exchange revenue, 
at the same time to help diversify the econowy 
and secondly because of the need for certain 
priority commodities such as fertilizers, and 
plastics and synthetic fibres which replace 
relatively scarce natural materials and are 
facing a very rapid rise of demand within the 
country". 
20. Ministry of Petroleum, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Petroleum Industry in Iran. Tehran, 1987, page 28. 
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The f o l l o w i n g i s a summary v iew of v a r i o u s 
petrochemicals complexes in I ran that existed at the time of 
revolution and the new complexes which were e i ther b u i l t or 
under advanced stage of t h e i r development. I t a lso shows 
pos i t ion regarding the product-wise output of d i f f e r e n t 
21 
complexes in 1990. 
Product Capacity in 1990 
Existing Petrochemical Plants ('000 tons/year) 
Shiraz Petrochemical Complex 
Anmonia *32 
Urea 543 
Nitric Acid 386 
Ammonium Nitrate 254 
Light Sodium Carbonate 60 
Heavy Sodium Carbonate 51 
Sodium Bicarbonate 30 
Sodium Tripolyphosphate 20 
Dieunmonium Phosphate 22 
Hydrochloric Acid 66 
Chlorine 20 
Sodium Hypochlorite 13 
Methanol 84 
Razi Cheaical Conplex 
Ammonia 660 
Urea 720 
Sulphur 675 
Sulphuric Acid 966 
Phosphoric Acid 240 
Monoammonium Phosphate 240 
Oiammonium Phosphate 240 
21. MEES. 28 October, 1991 
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Farabi Petrochemical Complex 
Dioctyle Phthalate 40 
Phthalic Anhydride 5.5 
Kharg Chemical Complex 
Sulphur 216 
Propane 145.71 
Butane 72.12 
Pentane 182.02 
Polika Factory 
PVC Rigid Pipes 6.8 
PVC Fittings 0.2 
PVC Pellets 3.0 
Abadan Petrochemical Complex 
PVC 60 
ODB 10 
Caustic Soda 30 
Pazargad Chemical Complex 
Caustic Soda 5.5 
Hydrochloric Acid 5.9 
Chlorine 4.6 
Iran Carbon Complex 
Carbon Black 20 
New Petrochemical Projects ('000 tons/year) 
Bandar Imam Petrochemical Complex 
(Start upL1990 for LPQ plant and 1993-94 for the Others) 
LPG 1,900 
LD Polyethylene 100 
HD Polyethylene 60 
Polyethylene 50 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber 40 
Caustic Soda 258 
Chlorine 240 
Benzene 351 
PVC/VCM 150 
Mixed Xylenes 144 
Ethylene Dichloride 300 
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Hydrochloric Acid 60 
Arak Petrochemical Complex 
(Start up:1992 for Phase 1) 
HD Polyethylene 60 
LLD Polyethylene 60 
Polypropylene 50 
Acetic Acid 30 
Vinyl Acetate 30 
Polybutadiene 25 
Pyrolysis Gasoline 106 
Butene-1 7 
(Start up:1994 for Phase 2) 
2-Ethyl-Hexanol 45 
Ethylene Glycol 105 
Ethanol Amines 30 
Ethylene Oxide 110 
Khorasan Petrochemical Complex 
(Start up:1994) 
Ammonia 330 
Urea 495 
Chlorinated Solvents 
(Start up: 1994) 
Perchloroethylene 12 
Carbon Tetrachloride 6 
Tabriz Petrochemical Complex 
(Start up: 1994) 
LLDPE/HDPE/Butene-1 100 
Polystyrene 80 
Phenol 30 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber 20 
Styrene Butadiene Latex 15 
Styrene (surplus) 10 
Propylene (surplus) 35 
Acetone 18 
Herbicides 
(Start up:1994) 
Alachlor 0,5 
Butachlor 2.5 
Monochloroacetic Acid 10.5 
Ohloroacetylchloride 1.5 
Diethyl Aniline 2.5 
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Isfahan Aromatics 
(Start up: 1992) 
Benzene 75 
Toluene 20 
Orthoxylene 22 
Paraxylene 4.4 
Diammoniua Phosphate 
(Start up: 1991) 
Diammonium Phosphate 250 
Carbon Black 
(Start up: 1992) 
Carbon (diff. grades) 21 
Helamine Crystals Orimiyeh 
(Start up:1993) 
Melamine Crystals 3 
Ammonium Sulphate 9 
Melamine Crystals - Shiraz 
(Start up: 1994) 
Melamine Crystals 10 
Source: Middle East Economic Survey. 28 October, 1991 
On the basis of above brief description of some 
important downstream activities, one can conclude that Iran 
has a number of very distinct advantages in developing such 
industries which are based on crude oil and natural gas. If 
the current plans to accord a very high priority to 
downstreaun oil ooerations is any indication one can hope that 
in another ten to fifteen years, Iran will acquire a 
prominent place on the world map of refining and 
petrochemical industries. 
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The Iraq-Iran war dealt a very severe blow to the 
efforts already underway in downstream activities in Iran and 
the ambitious plans of the new revolutionary government 
temporarily got a back set but the future definitely holds a 
promise. In any case, now that the entire oil sector is under 
the Iranian control, the downstream sector will have to be 
integrated with upstream oil activities in the country. The 
structural gap deliberately created by the foreign oil 
companies between upstreeun and downstream sectors will have 
to be quickly filled up if the Iranian oil industry has to 
develop in an integrated manner. This hopeful scenario, 
however, should not blur the fact that while Iran has certain 
natural advantages for downstream industrialization, there 
also exist some very serious problems in this regard. 
Downstream operations in their very nature are capi-sal and 
technology intensive activities and Iran has Its own 
limitations in both the requirements beyond a certain limit. 
Apart from developing its own R&D, Iran for a long tine will 
have to seek technological cooperation from other countries 
in order to establish viable projects. In view of financial 
exigencies, the government of Iran has recently decided to 
involve private sector also in both the existing and new 
downstreeim industries.^^ 
22. MEES. 28 October, 1991, pp.D1-D4, 
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Oil, Economy and the Impact of Iraq-Iran War 
Oil is the most important resource of Iran and will 
continue to be so till such time as the economy of Iran is 
diversified to em extent where dependence on the oil sector 
is considerably reduced in self-sustained growth of the 
economy. 
The sudden outbreak of war with Iraq had twin effects 
on the Iranian economy. First, the vital economic 
infrastructure and productive sectors sustained physical 
damage and secondly the country had to find financial 
resources to meet the expenditure of war which was enormous. 
In both of these contexts, the position and role of the oil 
industry was very vital. We have already discussed the 
damages suffered by the oil sector during the war and the 
adverse effects it had on the oil production, exports and 
revenue. In this section it is proposed to study very briefly 
the connection which the oil sector had with the overall 
economy of Iran and what were the dimensions of war 
expenditure they were obviously paid for out of the income 
generated by the oil industry. 
Share in GDP 
Table 4.10 shows that the oil sector which in 1974 
contributed nearly 47.5 per cent to the total QDP of the 
country was relegated to a very low position in the context 
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TABLE 4.10 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF GDP BY MAIN ECONOMIC 
GROUPS AT CURRENT PRICE DURING 1979-1988 
(Percentage) 
Year Agriculture Industry Oil Services Deduction Total 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
11.1 
16.0 
18.6 
18.0 
15.9 
17.0 
19.5 
21.3 
23.3 
20.7 
16.7 
19.1 
18.3 
17.3 
17.8 
17.4 
16.6 
16.1 
14.7 
14.5 
26.2 
14.5 
11.3 
16.7 
13.4 
10.3 
8.8 
3.7 
4.3 
3.6 
49.9 
54.7 
54.7 
50.0 
54.9 
57.0 
56.9 
59.4 
57.8 
61.3 
-3.9 
-4.3 
-2.8 
-2.0 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.8 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: Central Bank of the Islaaic Republic of Iran. 
Economic Report, Balsmce Sheet, Different issue. 
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of i t s share in t o t a l domestic product. A f te r a sharp f a l l 
from 26.2 per cent in 1979 to j us t about 14.5 per cent in 
1980, the share of the o i l sector in GDP went on f a l l i n g and 
by 1988 i t was reduced to an unbelievable f i g u r e of only 3,6 
per cent. For obvious reason, the agr i cu l tu re and indus t r ia l 
sectors also could not pick-up during the war and i t was only 
the services sector which contr ibuted more and more to the 
GDP in r e l a t i v e terms. In absolute te rms , however, the 
cont r ibut ion of the o i l sector remained extremely s ign i f i can t 
because without i t the country would have faced a complete 
economic breakdown, l e t alone meeting the f i nanc ia l burden of 
the War. • 
Share in Government Revenues 
The real s ign i f i cance of the o i l industry in overal l 
economic context of the country during the war i s h ighl ighted 
only when we look at i t s cont r ibut ion to the t o t a l government 
revenues o f d i f f e r e n t years s i nce 1979. A l t hough the 
government of I ran t r i e d i t s best t o e x p l o i t a l l o ther 
sources of generating ex t ra revenues, the share of the o i l 
sector remged between 71.8 per cent in 1979 and 32.0 per cent 
i n 1988 (see Table 4 . 1 1 ) . Of course, i t was a s t o r y of 
constant decline through the years the reasons of which are 
very obvious and have been discussed i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l 
e a r l i e r . What ever these f igures show, a l l the auialysts are 
unanimous in t he i r opinion that i t was only because of the 
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oil revenues and the determined efforts of the governnent to 
keep them up as far as possible that Iran could sustain the 
eight years of costly war without a total collapse of the 
economic system. It is not to suggest that the Iranian 
government was not under economic pressure all these years. 
The fact is that towards the end of 1988 when the war stopped 
Iran was at a very critical economic juncture and it is 
anybody's guess whether in those conditions it could have 
continued the war for another few years. But to emohasise 
the importance of the oil sector, it would not be out of 
place to mention again that if the economy could sustain 
itself for so long it was because of the oil sector and if it 
felt signs of economic distress that was also because of the 
heavy demage to the oil installations and fall in oil prices 
during 1968-88 and a further fall in the share of oil 
revenues to the total budgetary receipts of the country. 
Oil and the Foreign Exchange Earnings 
As far as the requirements of the foreign exchange of 
the country was concerned, we have already discussed earlier 
that the earnings from the non-oil exports had also gone down 
during 1979-87 and it was only the oil income which remained 
the mainstay of foreign exchange earnings of Iran during the 
period under reference. The contributions of oil exports 
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remained as high as nearly 93 per cent of the total Current 
Account receipts of the country. "^  
While discussing the share of oil in the total foreign 
exchange earnings of Iran and its importance for the balance 
of payment of the country during the war years, it is 
important to mention that the role played by some components 
of the Capital Account, specially the contribution of the 
"Returns of Capital and Loans Abroad" was also extremely 
significant during that period. Due to the fall in foreign 
exchange earning capacity of the oil sector of Iran even had 
to go in for short term foreign borrowings, which in normal 
circumstances it would not have liked to avail. 
In the end one can say that inspite of all the damages 
suffered due to the war and the fall in the oil production, 
exports and revenues, the direct linkage of the oil industry 
to the economy of Iran remained extremely strong and 
significant during the period 1979-88, the whole of which was 
covered by the conditions of war. And it was mainly due to 
the oil industry that Iran could preserve its territorial 
integrity in the wake of the eight years war with Iraq. 
23. For details of the balance of payment of Iran, see 
Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic 
Report. Balance Sheet. 1983, 85, 89. 
24. Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
With the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979 
practically everything in Iran underwent a change — the 
society, the polity, the economy. Oil industry was no 
exception. Soon after taking over the reins of power, the new 
government pronounced that the days of the Consortium are 
over. The new oil policy laid emphasis on oil production 
according to the genuine requirements of the economy and self 
determination in all upstream and downstreeun oil operations. 
While this policy brought about a complete structural change 
in the Iranian oil industry it also put to test Iran's 
capability to independently manage its oil affairs. For the 
first time since the discovery of oil the oil industry in 
Iran was completely integrated under the command of the 
national oil company. The Iranian oil industry also becsime 
an independent component of the world oil industry and by 
virtue of being the second largest producer in the OPEC, the 
Iranian oil policy was likely to influence the World oil 
market considerably. 
However, the Iraqi invasion auid the long drawn war did 
not allow the new oil policy to manifest itself completely. 
It did, nevertheless, put the Iranian capabilities to a more 
severe test than one would have expected in the normal 
course, Inspite of repeated attacks of vital oil 
installations and supply lines, Iran could manage to keep the 
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oil flowing. The challenge thrown out by the war, infact, 
provided the government, the NIOC and the workers, an 
opportunity to learn things by doing and in the end Iran's 
native oil talent emerged victorious inspite of its many 
limitations. But the task ahead is also very challenging. 
While there is no doubt that Iran has the basic manpower and 
infrastructure to run its oil industry, in order to meet the 
future requirements of development and integration Iran will 
have to selectively seek foreign collaboration in both the 
upstream and downstream oil operations. In fact this process 
has already begun. 
As regards the quantitative aspects, the war had a very 
negative impact on the oil industry of Iran. During the 
first few years even while the oil prices were at their peak, 
the Iranian oil revenues registered a sharp decline mainly 
due to a drastic fall in oil production. The war also re-
established very strong linkages that the oil industry has 
with the rest of the economy in Iran, Although the share of 
the oil sector in GDP, government revenue and total exports 
showed a decline specially in the later years of the war, it 
was only because of the oil income that Iran could sustain 
the war financially for so msuny years. 
In the end one can conclude that while the oil industry 
will continue to be the leading sector of the Iranian economy 
in the near future, there is an urgent need to diversify the 
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economy so that the country's dependence on the sale of crude 
oil is minimised. In this task the downstreeun activities of 
the oil industry itself offers enormous possibilities. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The f o l l o w i n g paragraphs a r e e s s e n t i a l l y a b r i e f 
restatement of what has been discussed u p t i l l now with a view 
to prepare a summary and highl ight a few broad conclusions 
t h a t emerged out of the s tudy . The main focus w i l l be 
c o n f i n e d t o t h e i m p o r t a n t changes t h a t o c c u r r e d in the 
ownership p a t t e r n and the s t r u c t u r e of the I r a n i a n o i l 
industry a t d i f f e r e n t points of t i m e , the p a t t e r n of o i l 
production and revenues over the years s ince 1973, the 
impact of the recent I r a q - 1 ran war on the o i l industry and 
f i n a l l y the importance of the o i l industry fo r the economy of 
Iran. 
Since I ran has the oldest o i l industry in West Asia, 
the history of i t s struggle against the foreign o i l companies 
is also the longest compared to the o t h e r ne ighbour ing 
countries. The f i r s t phase which lasted upto the signing of 
the 1933 concession agreement was characterised by a complete 
subjugation of Persia V is -a -v is the monopoly of the B r i t i s h 
commercial i n t e r e s t s . The o i l a f f a i r s of P e r s i a were 
conducted on the basis of APOC's commercial imperatives and 
the s t r a t e g i c requirements of the i m p e r i a l government of 
Great B r i t a i n . The helplessness of the Persian government 
became c lear from a decis ion in 1905 when the l o c a l l y 
in f luen t ia l Bakhtiar i t r i b e was given 3 per cent ownership 
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rights in the operating company while the central government 
had to remain contented with a royalty at the rate of 16 
per cent of the net profit of the company. The accounting 
procedure for calculating the net profit was decided by the 
company. In 1928 Reza Khan under great pressure from the 
nationalist forces demanded a revision of the original 
concession but it took him nearly four years to cancel the 
agreement in 1932. He, however, had to be careful not to 
challenge the British might and expressed his willingness to 
grant a fresh concession to the same company on slightly 
better terms. 
The second phase starts with the signing of the 1933 
agreement and extends upto the nationalization of the oil 
industry in 1951. At the time of its conclusion the 1933 
agreement was considered to be an improvement over the 
original concession by the Iranians because under this 
dispensation royalty payments were based on production per 
ton as against the net profit of the company, the area of 
the companies, operation was reduced to one-fifth emd, there 
were some provisions for the training amd employment of the 
Iranina nationals. A careful examination of the 1933 
agreement, however, reveals that even after the revision of 
the old concession the Iranian oil industry remained largely 
isolated from the local economy. In fact its integration 
with the industry and the economy of the West got further 
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strenghtened. Refining a c t i v i t y had begun in I ran providing 
a l i n k between the upstream and downstream operations but 
I ran or the I ran ian people had noth ing t o ga in f o r t h i s 
l o c a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n . There was some development o f 
in f ras t ruc tu re but i t was bas ica l ly of the t yp i ca l co lonia l 
nature. The AIOC retained i t s complete monopolistic hold over 
the I ran ian o i l i n d u s t r y . The system of r o y a l t y payment 
based on production proved as bad for Iran as the one based 
on the net p r o f i t s . Thanks to the " l i m i t a t i o n on dividends" 
p o l i c y o f the B r i t i s h government , payments t o I r a n 
cont inuously decl ined i n p r o p o r t i o n to the l e v e l o f o i l 
product ion and the gains t o the Company and the B r i t i s h 
government . Th i s s i t u a t i o n e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o the 
na t iona l i za t ion of the o i l industry in 1951. 
The dec is ion to n a t i o n a l i z e the o i l i n d u s t r y proved 
ca tas t roph ic f o r I ran except f o r the f a c t i n the 1954 
"Consortium Agreements" the r i g h t of Iran to own the reserves 
o f o i l and the a s s e t s o f t h e i n d u s t r y was n o t i o n a l l y 
recognized and that thereaf te r Iran got the opt ion to receive 
the royal ty payments e i t he r in cash or in the form of crude 
o i l . Otherwise in substance the Consortium agreement was not 
very d i f f e ren t from 50-50 p r o f i t sharing agreements signed 
elsewhere in the area. As f a r as the s t r u c t u r e of the 
industry was concerned the I ranian events between 1951 and 
1954 only helped the process of a horizontal i n tegra t ion of 
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the industry through a system of joint-ownership by a number 
of major oil companies in Iran and practically everywhere 
else in West Asia. In other words the system of monopolies 
in the oil industry was replaced by oligopolies. These 
changes in the industry proved detrimental to the interests 
of the producing states including Iran. In future the 
producing states had to struggle against not just one company 
but a group of them. The broad structure of the Iranian oil 
industry remained the same for a long time after that. The 
only significant change worthmentioning was that under the 
1973 agreement legally the status of the Consortium was 
changed to a service company and the production policy came 
under the perview of the NIOC. A major change that took 
place in the domestic structure of the Iranian oil industry 
during this phase was that on the areas relinquished by the 
Consortium, the NIOC entered into several Joint-Venture and 
Service Contracts with the independent oil companies and the 
terms and conditions of these contracts were far better th«m 
the Consortium agreement. 
It was in the last phase i.e. after 1979 that the most 
radical change took place in the structure of the Iranian oil 
industry. Iran took over the entire ownership of the 
industry both upstream and downstresun and the role of the 
foreign oil companies which had worked as an instrument of 
exploitation for nearly 78 years was con^letely eliminated. 
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For the first time since 1901 the Iranian oil industry got 
truly integrated with the rest of the Iranian economy and 
becsune an independent variable in the world oil market. 
As far as the production of crude oil since 1973 is 
concerned, there was a vast difference in the attitudes of 
the Iranian government under the Shah and the revolutionary 
government that took over in 1979. The Shah, because of his 
keenness to "modernize" the country and the economy as 
quickly as possible, was interested in maximizing the oil 
production. The revolutionary government was, on the other 
hand, more conservationist in its attitude. Thanks to the 
rapid increase in the prices of oil since 1973-74, Iran could 
generate more and more revenues from its oil exports between 
1974-77 without any pressing need to increase the production. 
With minor chemges from one year to the other depending upon 
the market forces Iran's oil production between 1973 and 1978 
remained stable at around 5670 million barrels per day. Most 
of this production (88 per cent) cane from the areas operated 
by the Ckjnsortium. Even without any significant change in oil 
production, the oil revenues of Iran shot up very 
considerably from $ 4.4 bn in 1973 to $ 17.8 bn in 1974 and $ 
21.2 bn in 1977 mainly due to increase in the prices. There 
was a strong correlation between the the oil prices and the 
oil revenues during that period. 
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The curve of I r an ' s o i l production began to s l ide down 
since late 1978 f i r s t due to the o i l worker's s t r i k e and the 
upheaval caused by the revolut ionary change and la te r by the 
I raq- I ran war. The production dropped by nearly 2 m i l l i on 
b/d in the very next year and by another 2 m i l l i o n b/d in the 
coming two years. The revolut ionary government which in i t s 
ea r l y days ca l led f o r a r e s t r a i n i n the o i l p roduc t ion 
suddenly becane in terested in meocimizing the o i l ouput due to 
the war. I t was w i t h g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y t h a t t he o i l 
p r o d u c t i o n cou ld be b rough t up t o 2 m i l l i o n b/d and 
maintained at tha t l e v e l . I t i s i ron ica l tha t even in those 
years when the o i l pr ices were at t h e i r peak (1980-82), the 
I ranian o i l revenues regis tered a general ly downward trend 
due to the loss of product ion. In the la te r years of the war 
the I ran ian o i l i ndus t ry came under double p ressu re , the 
increased attacks on the o i l i n s ta l l a t i ons and the f a l l in 
the world prices of o i l . By 1986 value of I ran ian o i l export 
was reduced to a mere $ 7.2 bn as against $ 21.2 bn in 1977. 
The sudden f a l l i n the I r a n i a n o i l p r o d u c t i o n and 
revenues dur ing 1980-87 was mainly due t o the devas ta t i on 
caused by the I r a q - I r a n war. The o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s and 
supply l i nes were the prime t a r g e t s of t he enemy a t tacks 
which continued throughout and fu r ther i n t e n s i f i e d in the 
l a s t two years. Minor to p a r t i a l damage was caused to 
p rac t i ca l l y each and every o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n and th« Abadan 
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refinery which used to be a pride of Iran was completely 
destroyed. In monetary terms losses of the oil and related 
industries during the war have been unofficially estimated as 
$ 15,000 million. It was only due to an unfailing 
determination of the Iranian government and the oil workers 
that Iram could continue with its oil exports and earn enough 
money to pull on with the war and other requirements of the 
economy. 
When one looks at the overall importance of the oil 
industry for the economy of Iran, the most obvious conclusion 
that emerges is that the oil industry still holds the status 
of the "leading sector" in that country. Apart from being 
the only important source of foreign exchange earnings and 
the government's budgetary revenues, the oil sector has very 
strong forward linkage with other sectors of the economy. It 
provides nearly 90 per cent of the primary energy 
requirements of the country at a very low cost and stimulates 
the establishment and growth of a large number of other 
industries which use oil, gas and their processed derivatives 
as the feedstock. 
Going by the record of this sector since 1973 it is 
found that this sector contributed on an average well over 75 
per cent to the ordinary budget revenues of the government 
between 1973-78. This performemce ceune down considerably 
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after 1979 but that can be considered as a temporary 
phenomenon caused by the war. As a source of export earnings 
also the dominance of the oil sector continued throughout the 
period from 1973-88. Well over 90 per cent of the total 
value of countries' exports came from the sale of crude oil. 
The massive increase of the sectorial growth targets and 
allocations in the revised version of the Fifth Five Year 
Plan (1973-1978) was possible only due to the prospects of 
enhanced oil revenues and in the same way the revolutionary 
government could not have sustained the economy and the 
expenditure of the eight years Iraq-1 ran war if it did not 
have the monetary support coming from the oil revenues. 
In the foreseable future also one can expect that the 
oil industry will continue to be the "leading sector" of Iran 
although the effects should continue to diversify the economy 
in order to reduce the present dependence of the country on 
oil income. Iran has a fairly broad based resource 
endowment. Its agricultural base, other natural resources and 
a sufficiently large population place Iran in a far 
advantageous position than most of its neighbours in the 
Persian Gulf area. A proper and judicious use of oil money 
and the linkages that the oil industry offers can help Iran 
enter into the stage of self-stained growth. 
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